RELIGION AND MENTAL HEALTH

COLLECTED PAPERS

EDITED BY ANTON T. BOISEN - REVISED 1959

C O N T E N T S

MIND AND BODY

Henri Bergson in "L'Energie Spirituelle" pp. 44-63,
7th Edition, Paris, Felix Alcan, 1922

Translated and summarized by A. T. Boisen

An attentive examination of the mental life and of its physiological accompaniment leads me to believe that common sense is right and that there is infinitely more in human consciousness than in the corresponding brain. The brain does not determine thought and by the same token thought is in large part independent of brain.

Real, concrete, living thought is something of which psychologists have hitherto had little to say. What one usually studies under this name is not so much thought as an artificial imitation obtained by piecing together images and ideas. With images and with ideas you will not get thought any more than you will get movement out of positions. It appears when thought, instead of continuing on its way, makes a pause or turns back upon itself.

The brain is the instrument by which consciousness, feeling and thought are directed upon real life and in consequence rendered capable of efficatious action. Let us say, then, that the brain is the organ of attention to life. It is for this reason that a slight modification in the cerebral substance is sufficient to cause an injury to the entire mental life. It is not the spirit itself that is deranged, but rather the instrument for the insertion of mind into matter. When a madman talks his reasoning may be in accordance with the strictest logic. One might say after listening to this or that paranoid that it is by the excess of his logic that he is led astray. His mistake lies not in reasoning badly, but in reasoning away from reality, like a man who dreams.

The only function of thought to which one might assign a place in the brain is memory, particularly the memory of words. Since the time of Broca, a more and more complicated theory of aphasia and of its cerebral accompaniments has been built up. Scientists of unquestioned competence now challenge this theory, but there is one point upon which all agree: maladies in the memory of words are caused by more or less clearly localized lesions in the brain. Let us see what actually takes place in such maladies. In cases where the lesion is grave and the memory of words is profoundly affected, it happens frequently that a strong excitation, an emotion, for example, brings back all at once the memory which had seemed forever lost. Would this be possible if the memory had been deposited in the altered or destroyed matter? What takes place is rather as though the brain served to recall the memory, not to store it.

Notice now what we see in progressive aphasia, that is, in cases in which the forgetting of words keeps getting worse. In general the

words disappear in a definite order, just as if the disease knew grammar. Proper nouns disappear first, then common nouns, then adjectives and lastly verbs. This may at first seem to justify the hypothesis of an accumulation of memories in the brain tissue. Proper nouns, common nouns, adjectives and verbs will constitute so many superimposed strata, as it were, and the disease will attack one of these strata after the other. True, but the disease may originate from the most diverse causes, it may take the most varied forms, it may begin at any point whatsoever of the cerebral area concerned and progress indifferently in any direction; and still the order of disappearance of memories remains the same. Would this be possible if it was the memories themselves that the disease attacked? The explanation must then be sought elsewhere. Here is the very simple explanation which I propose. In the first place, if the proper nouns disappear before the common nouns, the latter before the adjectives and the adjectives before the verbs, it is because it is more difficult to recall a proper noun than a common noun, a common noun than an adjective and an adjective than a verb. The function of recall, in which the brain evidently assists, will then limit itself to tasks that are easier and easier in proportion as the lesion in the brain becomes more aggravated. But whence comes the greater or less difficulty in recall? And why should verbs of all words be those which we have least difficulty in evoking? It is due simply to the fact that verbs express actions and that actions may be mimicked. The verb can be directly represented by gestures, the adjective only thru the mediation of the verb to which it is related, the common noun thru the double intervention of the adjective which expresses one of its attributes and of the verb inplied by the adjective, the proper noun thru the triple intervention of the common noun, of the verb and of the adjective. It follows then that as we go from the verb to the proper noun we go farthur and farthur away from action which is directly capable of expression in gestures and thus of representation by physical acts. Devices more and more complicated become necessary to symbolize in movement the idea expressed by the word we seek. Since it is upon the brain that the task of preparing these movements devolves, and since its functioning is the more impared, reduced, simplified as the region involved is injured, it is by no means surprising that an alteration or destruction of tissues which makes impossible the evocation of proper or of common nouns should leave unimpared the power to recall verbs. Here as elsewhere the facts lead us to see in cerebral activity an acted-out extract of mental activity and not an equivalent of this activity.

I believe that our entire past is present in us subconsciously, -- I mean by that, present in us in such a manner that our consciousness, in order to become aware of it, has no need of going outside of itself or of introducing anything external. In order to perceive distinctly all that it contains, or rather all that it is, it needs only to get rid of an obstacle, to raise a veil. Happy obstacle that! and the veil infinitely precious! It is the brain which renders the service of keeping our attention fixed on life; and life looks forward. It looks back

upon the past only in so far as the past can aid it to clarify and prepare for the future. To live, for the spirit, is essentially to concentrate on the act of accomplishing. It is then inserted into things by means of a mechanism which will extract from consciousness all that is serviceable for action at the risk of obscuring most of the rest. Such is the role of the brain in memory: it is not used to preserve the past but first of all to mask it, then to allow to appear whatever is practically useful. And such also is the role of the brain in the face of mind in general. Disentangling from the mind what is capable of externalization in movement, inserting the mind into the motor frame, it leads it most frequently to limit its vision, but also to render its action efficacious. This means that mind surpasses brain in every respect and that cerebral activity responds only to the lowest part of mental activity.

It follows therefore that the life of the spirit cannot be a mere effect of the life of the body and that everything happens as tho the body were simply used by the spirit. In consequence we have no reason to suppose that body and mind are bound inseparably one to the other.

PSYCHO-PHYSICAL THEORIES

according to McDougall in "Body and Mind"

1. Monistic Theories

1. Epiphenomenalism. This includes the materialistic theories. Representatives: Hobbes with his assertion that sensation is nothing but motion; Cabanis with his dictum that "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile," Huxley, who devised the term "epiphenomenalism" and held that each detail of the stream of consciousness was dependent upon some detail of the brain process. This view is widely held by scientific men today and may be summed up in the following propositions:
a) The universe is composed of matter and energy. Every event is completely determined by antecedent physical processes according to the laws of mechanism. b) What we call "consciousness," "sensation," "imagery," "emotion," "thought," is due merely to certain complex physico-chemical processes within the brain.

According to this view all psychical existence is consciousness only and consciousness is merely the awareness of brain processes. The relationship between consciousness and brain-process is one of dependence without reciprocity of influence.



Fig. I



Fig. 2

Epiphenomeonalism may be illustrated and fixed in the mind by the help of diagram I, or less inadequately but less simply by the aid of diagram 2. In these, as in the following diagrams, physical processes of the brain are indicated by the black discs below; the circles above stand for elements of the stream of consciousness; causal links are indicated by the lines and the time directions by the arrow-heads. The diagram thus indicates the causal network connecting the physical processes of the brain and the causal dependence of each element of consciousness upon some one of the brain processes.

The universe is thus regarded as rolling on thru the ages according to eternally fixed mechanical principles, and as producing now and again one or more of the stellar bodies on which brains happen to be evolved, little specks of consciousness which flash out like sparks of light, flicker for an instant and then disappear; coming and going without affecting in the slightest degree the secular evolution and dissolution of material systems.

2. Psychophysical Parallelism: This term is used in a loose way to include the doctrines which deny psychophysical interaction while at the same time recognizing both psychical and physical processes. These doctrines assume a relationship of concomittance only and deny any causal relation. But within



Fig. 3



Fig. 4

each series the law of causation holds good. This doctrine of parallelism without interaction was suggested by Leibnitz, whose doctrine of pre-established Harmony, served to make it intelligible. It is now commonly held, not as a metaphysical doctrine but as a working hypothesis (c. Wundt, Muensterberg.) Those who are not content with the mere assertion of temporal concommittance are compelled to go further and adopt one of the two forms of identity hypothesis. These, of course, make the claim of metaphysical truth.

a) Phenomenalistic Parallelism (Identity Hypothesis A). Under this head are included the closely associated formulations of Spinoza and of Kant. According to this view the causal series belongs wholly to an unknown series of real processes which appear to us under two aspects, the physical and the psychical. Both series of appearances will seem to be causally linked, just as one shadow may draw another shadow after it. This form of the identity hypothesis implies the metaphysical doctrine known as realistic Monism. It asserts that reality, or real being, of which mind and body are appearances only, is not immediately given to or known by us. This underlying reality may be regarded as an unknown and unknowable X. This was the teaching of Herbert Spencer and of Kant. Spinoza called it God.



Fig. 5

b) Psychical Monism (Identity Hypothesis B). According to this theory consciousness is the only reality and the consciousness of each of us partakes of this real nature; all that man calls matter or the physical world is but the form under which consciousness other than his own is manifest to him. Thus, if I could observe your brain processes while you are thinking, I should be observing the phenominal manifestation of your consciousness. According to this doctrine, then, the causal efficiency is wholly confined to the psychical series; and matter and its processes (all that we call the physical world or Nature) are, as it were, but the shadows thrown by thought. It is thus the converse of Epiphenoemenalism, which regards thought as the shadow thrown by matter. It may be illustrated by the diagram (Fig. 6). This form of the identity-hypothesis implies a metaphysical doctrine which is usually designated idealistic Monism, but is better described as realistic or objective psychical Monism.



Fig. 6

It must not be confused with subjective Idealism or Solipsism; this also is a psychical Monism, for it maintains that my thought or consciousness alone exists. But, while the latter denies the existence of the physical world and of other minds than my own (except as ideas of my own mind) the former maintains the objective existence of the things which appear to me as composing the physical world and of other minds like my own, while holding that they are all of the same nature, namely consciousness. A diagram illustrating Solipsism may help to make clear the difference between these two forms of psychical Monism. It would take the form of Figure 7, tho the links joining the circles would not stand for causal links, since Solipsism denies validity to the principle of causation.



Fig. 7

II. Animistic Theories

I. Animism of the lowest degree as represented by Ostwald, Bechterew, and others regards consciousness as a form of energy which undergoes transformation to other forms of energy and is generated by transformations of other forms of energy.

2. The Transmission Theory, as advocated by William James, Bergson, and others holds that consciousness is a stuff capable of being divided or compounded like putty or any plastic material, its parts enduring or retaining their identity in the various aggregations into which they enter. It is conceived of as existing independently of material organisms either.
a) in disseminated particles, in which case the brain acts as an organ of concentration, or
b) it may exist in vaster unities (Absolute world soul) in which case our brains are organs for separating it into parts and giving them finite form.
In his pluralistic Universe James definitely rejected the soul theory in favor of a hierarchy of consciousnesses such as Fechner had dreamed of, the members of each level being formed by the compounding of streams of consciousness of a lower level.

3. The Soul Theory, as presented by McDougall. The soul is a being which is or which possesses the sum of definite capacities for psycho-physical interaction, of which the most fundamental are:
(a) the capacity for producing, in response to certain stimuli, the whole range of sensation qualities in their whole range of intensities.
(b) the capacity for responding to certain sensation complexes with the production of meanings.
(c) the capacity of responding to these sensations and these meanings with feelings of conation or effort under spur of which further meanings may be brought into consciousness in accordance with the law of reproduction of similars and of reasoning.
(d) the capacity of re-acting upon the brain processes to modify their course in a way we cannot clearly define, but which may be provisionally conceived as a process of guidance by which streams of nervous energy may be concentrated in a way that antagonizes the tendency of all physical energy to dissipation and degradation.

While rejecting the idea that the soul may be compounded of the souls of lesser organisms or of the cells of which the body is made up, McDougall holds that more than one psychic being may well be associated with one bodily organism and that the soul that thinks in each one of us is but the chief of a hierarchy of similar beings. It is reasonable to believe that in respect to the gradually increasing specialization of the physical functions in the brain centers in the human and in the higher animals, organisms recapitulate in their development the history of the race. Each routine function of the body, even in the embryonic condition, may be thus acquired and fixed, like the motor habit of the skeletal system under conscious control or physical guidance. These motor habits never become purely mechanical processes, but always retain something of the character of the psycho-physical processes. The slightest disturbance or obstruction of an habitual movement, causes the process to bring back again into full consciousness, showing thereby that the soul has its hand in the process, ready at any moment to intervene and to make new adjustments. The same thing is true of the old racial habits by which organic life has been regulated, e.g., the respiratory movements. If a serious obstruction occurs, the entire physical activity becomes concentrated upon the effort to maintain and reinforce the process. It is even possible that the phrase "soul of a race" is something more than a metaphor and the wonderful stability in complexity which Weissmann attributes to a hypothetical germ-plasm, is in reality the attribute of an enduring psychic existence of which the lives of individual organisms are but successive manifestations.

BRAIN MECHANISMS AND INTELLIGENCE
K.S. Lashley, 1929

Summary of Findings, pp. 175-76

The influence of the extent of cerebral destruction in the rat was tested for a variety of functions, including retention of maze habits formed before cerebral insult, and learning and retention of several habits after the insult. The results may be summarized as follows:

1. The capacity to form maze habits is reduced by destruction of cerebral tissue.
2. The reduction is roughly proportional to the amount of destruction.
3. The same retardation in learning is produced by equal amounts of destruction in any of the cyto-architectural fields. Hence the capacity to learn the maze is dependent upon the amount of functional cortical tissue and not upon its anatomical specialization.
4. Additional evidence is presented to show that the interruption of association or projection paths produces little disturbance of behavior, so long as cortical areas supplied by them remain in some functional connection with the rest of the nervous system.
5. The more complex the problem to be learned, the greater the retardation produced by any given extent of lesion.
6. The capacity to form simple habits of sensory discrimination is not significantly reduced by cerebral lesions, even when the entire sensory field is destroyed.
7. This immunity is probably due to the relative simplicity of such habits.
8. The capacity to retain is reduced, as is the capacity to learn.
9. The maze habit, formed before cerebral insult, is disturbed by lesions in any part of the cortex. The amount of reduction in efficiency of performance is proportional to extent of injury and independent of locus.
10. Reduction in the ability to learn the maze is accompanied by many other disturbances of behavior, which cannot be stated quantitatively but which give a picture of general inadequacy in adaptive behavior.
11. No difference in behavior in maze situations could be detected after lesions in different cerebral areas, and the retardation in learning is not referable to any sensory defects.
12. A review of the literature on cerebral function in other mammals, including man, indicates that, in spite of the greater specialization of cerebral areas in the higher forms, the problems of cerebral function are not greatly different from those raised by experiments with the rat.

From these facts the following inferences are drawn:

1. The learning process and the retention of habits are not dependent upon any finely localized structural changes within the cerebral cortex. The results are incompatible with theories of learning by changes in synaptic structure, or with any theories which assume that particular neural integrations are dependent upon definite anatomical paths specialized for them. Integration cannot be expressed in terms of connections between specific neurons.
2. The contribution of the different parts of a specialized area or of the whole cortex, in the case of non-localized functions, is qualitatively the same. There is not a summation of diverse functions, but a non-special-

ized dynamic function of the tissue as a whole.

3. Analysis of the maze habit indicates that its formation involves processes which are characteristic of intelligent behavior. Hence the results for the rat are generalized for cerebral function in intelligence. Data on dementia in man are suggestive of conditions similar to those found after cerebral injury in the rat.

4. The mechanisms of integration are to be sought in the dynamic relations among the parts of the nervous system rather than in details of structural differentiation.

VIS MEDICATRIX DEI

by Richard C. Cabot

I went into medicine in the hope of helping people. I found that I could help vastly less than I hoped. I was not wise enough to help as I wanted to. But though I could give a great deal less, there was a great deal more for me to receive. There was more for me to learn and to be inspired by as I watched the behavior of this extraordinary creation that we call the human body. I have been more and more amazed at the intelligence, not of the human brain but of the other organs of the human body.

Dr. Walter B. Cannon's book on The Wisdom of the Body gives the best account known to us of what "nature", or as we believe, God, does to keep the body sound despite the strains which challenge its strength in health as well as in disease. That book is a series of examples of what he calls the "homostatic" power of the body. As a ship rights herself after a squall has heeled her over, so that body rights itself after the minor "squalls", chemical and physical, that strike it daily in health and after the tempests of disease. The body's power to right itself when something tends to upset it is what Dr. Cannon calls "homeostasis" or "standing the same".

In this chapter I shall give first a number of examples of this power and then explain why, though some call it homeostasis, we call it God. The examples which follow are familiar to all educated physicians but are not known to the public so widely as they should be. We divide the examples of "homeostasis" into four groups:

1. Reserve.
2. Balance.
3. Compensation.
4. Defense.

In one sense they are all defenses against attack present or threatened.

1. Reserve. In the chief organs of the human body we recognize an extra supply that can be called upon in need, like the reserve of a bank. When a man suffers from tuberculosis of the lungs, a certain portion of the lung is destroyed, but he has a great deal more lung tissue than he needs. He can call upon his reserve and get along, as the great Dr. Trudeau did at Saranac for nearly forty years of hard work, though he had only a part of one lung still healthy.

Experiments have shown that one can remove more than two-fifths of the human liver and still the remaining three-fifths will carry on the work of the organ, so far as one can see, just as well as before.

When we see a surgeon cut and tie thirty or forty blood vessels in the course of an operation we may wonder what is to become of the blood that should circulate through them. The answer is that we have many more than we need. We can sacrifice a great many and still get on perfectly well with what are left.

Each of us has about twenty-two feet of intestine. By reason of disease a portion of it may have to be removed. One can lose three or four feet and hardly miss it at all.

2. Balance. In the laboratories where physiological and bacteriological work is carried on we use an instrument called a thermostat, that is, an instrument which keeps the temperature stable. In growing bacteria we have to arrange that the temperature around them shall not vary more than a few degrees. If it rises or falls more than that the bacteria that we are trying to study die. A thermostat is a difficult instrument to manage. It seldom works perfectly, and it never works nearly so well as that extraordinary instrument, the human body.

Most of us know that if our temperature is taken with a clinical thermometer it is approximately 98.6 degrees Fahrenheit, varying only a few tenths of a degree during the twenty-four hours. But we do not realize perhaps that when a person goes into a temperature of 40 degrees below zero, or when, as used to be the case with the stokers in steamships, he has to live minutes or hours in temperatures of 130 degrees to 150 Fahrenheit, still his body keeps its temperature the same. A piece of metal and most substances that can become heated or chilled, will respond to the temperature around them. The human body has the extraordinary capacity to keep its balance in terms of heat. Unless that were the case death would occur whenever one went into a cold temperature or into a hot temperature. This balance may be lost under a very hot sun, and then "sun stroke" occurs. The body's temperature runs up to 110 degrees or 115 degrees, which it cannot sustain for many minutes and still live.

By a number of ingenious devices the body ordinarily preserves its temperature at a point between 98 degrees and 99 degrees Fahrenheit. These devices are not familiar to everyone. For instance, if we are cold we often shiver, and we think of shivering, perhaps, as an inevitable misfortune. As a matter of fact, by shivering we keep ourselves warmer than we should be if we did not shiver. Shivering is a muscular action, and the action of any muscle tends to create warmth.

There are many other ways, which we shall not stop to describe, by which our body preserves its own temperature as it must if life is to go on. Our brains do practically nothing about this; it is beyond our conscious powers; it is part of the intelligent action of the body itself.

A second example of this intelligence is the balance of moisture in the body. The human body is about four-fifths water, and it must preserve nearly that proportion of water, or life cannot go on. We are giving out water and taking in water all the time, and yet the body by its own intelligent arrangements preserves almost exactly the same proportion of water in itself at all times.

Most of us, most of the time, preserve the balance of our weight. Some people tend to get too heavy and others to get too thin, but on the whole it is amazing how seldom this happens, in spite of the fact that we are putting bulky substances into our tissues all the time and losing pounds and pounds

of weight in every violent exertion. A football player sometimes loses ten or twelve pounds in one game. Nevertheless we hold our weight, most of us, within a pound or two, year after year.

The most delicate of all these balances is our chemical balance. Most of us have heard of the common chemical terms, acidity and alkalinity. Most substances that enter or leave the body can be classified as either acid or alkaline. When a substance is in chemical balance between the two we call it neutral. The body has to be held very close to this neutral point. If it varies as much as a few parts in a thousand we become unconscious. But every act that we do, every muscular motion, every strong feeling, every deep breath, would change the chemical reaction of the body toward acidity unless the body balanced it by a change in the opposite direction. Every meal that we take pushes the body's reaction toward the alkaline side. And yet, although acid is being taken into the body or made in the body in great quantities, in irregular quantities, and at irregular times from moment to moment, the healthy body still preserves almost unchanged this delicate balance of acid and alkali.

It is hard to bring this miracle vividly before ourselves. Imagine a bank with its receiving and paying tellers; imagine that thousands and thousands of dollars are being poured into that bank in various amounts, large and small, and at various times of the day, without any rule or order. Then at the same time imagine that large amounts or small amounts are being taken out of the bank by depositors. This is what is usually going on in fact. Now imagine what, of course, never happens, that the balance of money in that bank is preserved within a few dollars of the same amount at all times. Imagine that if the balance in the bank varied more than a few dollars the bank would break. Then you have a picture of what is actually going on at the present moment in your body and the bodies of all human beings. It seems too strange to be true, but it is true.

3. Compensation. We all know that if a person is unable to use one arm and as a result uses the other constantly, the arm which is used for two gains something like the strength of two. In the School for Crippled Children at Canton, Massachusetts, I saw a few years ago a little boy who as the result of infantile paralysis had lost altogether the power of his legs. He had been at home without treatment for a long time, and there he had learned to walk on his hands. When he wanted to walk he folded up his useless legs, pushed them out of the way over his head, stood up on his hands and walked on them. He could walk upstairs and downstairs. Of course, his arms were enormously developed. That is "compensatory hypertrophy", or enlargement of the muscles in response to need and use. It is familiar to most of us in muscles. It is not so familiar, perhaps, inside the body.

When heart disease takes the form of valvular inflammation and deforms the valve, the situation is like what would happen if one of the doors of a room were stuck halfway open, so that it would neither open nor close fully. That is what happens to the heart valve when the germ of rheumatism attacks it. The individual could not live if it were not that, as the deformity gradually occurs in the valve, the heart gradually thickens and so strengthens its own muscle. A heart that is ordinarily the size of an individual's fist will become as big as two or three or even four fists, because it must,

In no other way can it push the blood along hard enough to maintain the circulation when the openings into the heart and out of it are narrowed. The circulation must go on about as fast as it normally does. The compensatory growth of the heart muscle makes this possible.

With automobile accidents as common as they are today, there are a great many cases in which children are run over by a wheel in such a way that the kidney is broken or cut. The surgeon, when he operates on such a case, tries to repair the damage and in some cases he can. But in many cases he cannot do so and in order to stop the bleeding he has to remove the kidney altogether. How can he possibly have the temerity to do such a thing as to remove a human kidney? Because experience has shown that as soon as one kidney is removed the other begins to grow, and in a very short time doubles its size so that it is as big as the two were before, and does the work exactly as well.

The work of the kidney seems to us one of the most wonderful things to be found anywhere on earth. In any pair of healthy human kidneys there are many miles of tubes, and within these tubes all sorts of processes are always going on. When the solitary kidney gets twice as big, something very complicated is rebuilt or enlarged. All the details are rebuilt so as to leave the patient in the end not merely somewhere near as good, but exactly as good as he was before. The architecture of a kidney is far more complicated and differentiated than the architecture of any ordinary building. In a house we build a cellar, kitchen, sleeping rooms, attic, closets, and so forth, for different purposes. The kidney has as many different parts. It has its own chemical laboratory in which analytic and synthetic, dissolving and combining processes are done. Some of these chemical processes are new. On occasion they make substances which so far as we know have never been manufactured in that kidney before. They are made in response to a need for an antidote for a special poison.

We said just now that we have more blood vessels, tubes which carry blood, than we need. One of the reasons that we get along so well when a number of vessels are cut or destroyed is that some of those that are left become enlarged. One of the common diseases of the liver is called "cirrhosis" or the "gin-drinker's liver". That means that alcohol or some other substance taken in with the liquor circulates through the liver, hardens it and blocks it so that the blood which should go through it from the intestine cannot pass. Yet people sometimes live with this disease for many years and never find out that they have it, because detours, such as we provide when a street is blocked, are arranged by the wisdom of the body. The blood goes through a new set of blood vessels, partly newly formed and partly old ones enlarged. In this way we sometimes get such perfect compensation for the cirrhosis that the individual feels entirely well for years and finally dies of something else.

When one goes into a high altitude and lives above 5,000 feet, the air which one breathes is rarified so that less oxygen is taken in at each breath. No one would be able to live at this altitude were it not that the red corpuscles, which carry the oxygen from the lungs to all parts of the body, begin to grow in number as soon as the air becomes notably thinned, and soon in-

crease to an extraordinary degree.

In every cubic millimeter of blood (which means a drop about the size of a large pinhead) we have five million of red corpuscles. After a person has spent a few weeks in a high altitude he has six million, and if he goes to a higher altitude he has seven million. I have seen a person who had gone to so high an altitude and lived there so long that he had nine million red corpuscles to a cubic millimeter of blood. This was a compensatory change. He used the diminished supply of oxygen which came into his lungs in that high altitude so effectively and so rapidly that he was perfectly well. When he came down to a low altitude the extra red corpuscles were destroyed and put out of the body and he throve on five million, as he did before.

4. Defense. Rest is defense. If you sprain your wrist it becomes swollen and stiff. Nature says, "You had better rest that wrist." Even before the doctor comes, "nature" splints the wrist by making it so sore that you hesitate to move it, and so stiff that you cannot easily move it. The doctor reinforces nature's splint with an artificial one.

If a patient is strained emotionally or physically beyond a certain point by exertion or terror, nature says, "Take a rest," and he faints. Soreness and stiffness in a wrist, fainting after a hard race or in an accident, seem like something hostile to our welfare, something to be fought against. But the truth is that they are evidence of a power working on our side to do us service.

What we do in the treatment of an injured joint is to imitate nature and to supplement nature. What we do in most branches of medicine is to imitate and supplement nature. We imitate by means of a stomach tube one of the body's natural defenses: vomiting. When poison is swallowed the stomach usually rejects it before the physician with his stomach tube can get there to help in the emptying. The body rejects poisons through several channels; it throws out alcohol through the lungs so that we smell it in the drinker's breath. The body also puts out poisons by the bowels and sometimes by the blood. Nosebleeds in persons with kidney trouble help to get poisons out of the body. Any competent physician knows that when a person with kidney trouble has nosebleed it is one of the best things that can happen. By bleeding him nature is unpoisoning him and lowering his blood pressure at the same time.

The body also defends itself against poisons by neutralizing them. The most familiar example of this is the germ diseases, from which we suffer because bacteria invade our bodies and form poisons or "toxins." These must be neutralized or we die. The body itself forms antitoxins which are specific, unique substances, each different from each and hostile only to the poison of the disease for which it is formed.

Before we had the remedy which we now call "antitoxin" for diphtheria the mortality was about forty per cent, which meant that in about sixty per cent of the cases nature formed enough antitoxin in the child to cure it, but that in forty per cent the body did not make enough antitoxin. To supplement it we make outside the body an artificial "diphtheria antitoxin," imi-

tating nature as nearly as we can. We build up in the blood of another animal, ordinarily a horse, an antitoxin like that which the human body itself builds up against diphtheria, but which it does not always build in sufficient quantity. We put into the veins of a healthy horse a small amount of diphtheria poison. The horse eats a little less hay for a day or two and then he is all right. Then we put in double that dose. Again he may be a little under the weather but in a few days he is all right. So we go on step by step to build up in this animal the neutralizing substance opposite to this particular poison. His blood will not neutralize the toxin of any other disease except diphtheria. The new-formed antitoxin is a specific and unique substance.

Then we draw off from the jugular vein of the horse a certain amount of his blood, not enough seriously to incapacitate him but enough to be of use to many human beings. We drain off the corpuscles, put in a preservative, and the result is a yellow fluid which we call diphtheria antitoxin. That is what we put into the child's body to aid the antitoxin which the body has already made there after the disease began. In this way the mortality of diphtheria has been reduced to six or seven per cent, and with the protective injections which are now being carried out in every intelligent community we are reducing diphtheria to zero. Many of us now alive may see diphtheria wiped out altogether, as small pox is in places intelligent enough to down the antivaccinationists and enforce vaccination laws.

We have described how the body neutralizes poisons of the kind produced in infectious diseases by bacteria. But the body neutralizes poisons in many other ways. A suicidal unfortunate swallows a strong acid. Then the body manufactures enormous quantities of alkali, far more than it was making before for any other purpose, and so neutralizes the poisonous acid. When one recovers from certain kinds of poisoning it is nine-tenths by reason of what the body does by way of neutralization and one-tenth what the doctor does to imitate and to supplement nature.

Consider now another of the body's self-defenses. If you wound your finger with a splinter of wood or with anything else that is apt to be dirty, there often occurs the process that we call <u>festering</u>. What we call "pus" appears around the splinter. We do not stop to think what this means. To me it is one of the most dramatic and one of the most wonderful things that happen in the human body. What is this stuff called "matter" or "pus"? It is the dead bodies of leucocytes, that is, of white corpuscles from the blood, which have come to the spot, have fought upon our side against the bacteria, have died in the fight and have piled up their bodies to make a wall of defense between the attacking bacteria on the one side and the free circulation on the other. If this wall were broken down and the bacteria got into the blood we should have blood poisoning and probably die. Every dirty splinter that we get into our hands might be fatal were it not for the fight put up for us by these little creatures called leucocytes.

The human body is built up of cells, just as houses are built up of bricks. Among these cells most are as fixed as the bricks in a wall, but there is one race of free, lively and intelligent cells, the leucocytes in the blood, which in response to a need for them, travel to any part of the human body

and there fight, destroy many bacteria, and are themselves often killed in the fight. They conquer in the vast majority of cases because they build up the protecting wall just described. Almost every case of appendicitis would be fatal if this wall of leucocytes were not built by "nature" around the diseased appendix. What doctors call "walling off" the disease happens without any surgeon and before the surgeon gets there, in the majority of cases. The bodies of the leucocytes shut in the inflammation until the surgeon gets there to remove it.

In my medical work I have had the chance to examine dead bodies of persons who had died in spite of the best we could do at the Massachusetts General Hospital, where I have worked for nearly forty years. Nothing sounds more sordid and more discouraging than the job of examining dead bodies. There we see the failures of nature's healing, the defeats of the human body in its struggle against disease. Yet the study of these bodies has been one of the most inspiring experiences that has ever come to me. For we see at an autopsy not merely the defeat that has resulted in death, but the whole history of that body's earlier victories written in its tissues. Here we see the battlefields on which the body has conquered disease years ago, without even letting the brain know that the disease was going on.

When we cut into a lung at autopsy we often find evidence of a healed tuberculosis which during his life the person never knew he had. The knife with which we cut may be broken across a stone, a mass of lime deposited there by the blood so as to wall in a group of tubercle bacilli, as in the Middle Ages they sometimes walled in a human being in the wall of a castle and left him to die. So the healing powers of the body, wall in the tubercle bacilli in the lung so that they are harmless. We cut through this stone and sometimes find the tubercle bacilli still alive but harmless because they are shut off from the lung. Till recently the majority of all the bodies which we examined showed some signs of a healed tuberculosis.

Summing up this chapter I will describe one individual whose face comes before me as I write about him. An elderly man, sixty-four years of age, with a ruddy, fresh complexion and white hair, stepped off the corner of a street without looking where he was going, was struck by an automobile and fatally injured. He was brought to the Massachusetts General Hospital and died within an hour. His wife came soon after, and when we asked her about him, she declared that he had never been sick in his life. He was a bartender, a local politician, a most active person both in mind and body. I was present at the autopsy on his body, and this is what we found: (1) Healed tuberculosis of both lungs. (2) Cirrhosis of the liver, with all the blood going around by a new set of roads above and below his liver. (3) Chronic kidney trouble, but with enough reserve kidney tissue to carry on the kidney's function perfectly despite the destruction of a large portion of one and a small portion of the other kidney. (4) Hardening of the arteries and compensatory enlargement of his heart. No doubt he had had high blood pressure for a long time. All this he never knew. In other words here was a perfectly well man with four fatal diseases inside of him, none of which had done him any harm!

When part of a vessel is injured in a storm, they rig up something to take

the place of it. A "jury mast" is rigged up for a broken mast, or a "jury rudder" for a broken rudder. This man's body was full of "jury" arrangements. Four vital organs had these compensatory defenses, but he was a going concern. He could do what he wanted to do and felt no inconvenience, because of the intelligence of the human body exerted in his defense.

The facts are before us. Every doctor knows them. There is nothing new or doubtful about them. The conclusions are for each to draw for himself. The conclusion which I draw is a greater confidence in life. However we may fall short, a gigantic healing power fights on our side. Mathew Arnold defined God as the power not ourselves that makes for righteousness. The thing I am speaking of here is that great power in ourselves that makes for health, and that works day and night, when we are asleep and when we are awake, when we are good and when we are bad. Its beneficence falls like rain upon the just and upon the unjust.

To me that means the goodness of God--vis medicatrix Dei. It means that the powers which carry on the work of our body are not neutral in the battle between us and the enemies of our health. A great healing power fights on our side and wins most of our battles for us. When we look around at "nature" in the mountains, the forests, the plains or the sea, we see no evidence of powers that care about us. Nature seems indifferent to our welfare. But if we look at that portion of nature which concerns us most, our own bodies, we see no indifference, no neutrality, but an extraordinary bias in our favor. On the basis of these healing powers our intelligence and our will get their opportunity.

ORGAN LANGUAGE

From "Psychosomatic Medicine"

By Weiss and English

A method of helping patients to understand their symptoms which we find useful is based upon the symbolism of symptoms. Patients are told that if they cannot find an outlet for tension of emotional origin by word or action, the body will find a means of expressing this tension through a kind of "organ language."

For example, if a patient cannot swallow satisfactorily and no organic cause can be found, it may mean there is something in the life situation of the patient that he "cannot swallow." Nausea, in the absence of organic disease, sometimes means that the patient "cannot stomach" this or that environmental factor. Frequently a feeling of oppression in the chest accompanied by sighing respirations, again in the absence of organic findings, indicates that the patient has a "load on his chest" that he would like to get rid of by talking about his problems. The patient who has lost his appetite and as a consequence has become severely undernourished (so-called "anorexia nervosa," which in its minor manifestations is such a common problem) is very often emotionally starved just as he is physically starved. The common sympton fatigue is very often due to emotional conflict which uses up so much energy that little is left for other purposes. Again emotional tension of unconscious origin frequently expresses itself as muscle tension giving rise to aches and pains and sometimes these are represented by sharp pains such as atypical neuralgia. Thus, we suggest that atypical neuralgia of the arm or face may be due to focal conflict as well as "focal infection." An ache in the arm, instead of representing the response to a focus of infection, may mean that the patient would like to strike someone but is prevented from doing so by the affection or respect that is mingled with his hostility. Itching for which no physical cause is found very often represents dissatisfaction with the environment which the individual takes out upon himself; martyr-like, he scratches himself instead of someone else. "All-gone" feelings in the epigastrium, "shaky legs," and even vertigo are common physical expressions of anxiety, and the anxiety attack, so frequently called a "heart attack", a gall-bladder disturbance, hyperthyroidism, neurocirculatory asthenia, hyperinsulinism, etc., is still far from being understood in general clinical medicine in spite of the fact that Freud described it more than forty years ago.

This whole approach can be summed up in the following fashion: If symptoms exist without a physical basis or, if physical disease fails to explain the symptoms completely, look for their meaning from the standpoint of behavior.

EXISTENCE, IDEAS, AND CONSCIOUSNESS

(John Dewey in Experience and Nature) pp. 298-311

Two quite different affairs are usually designated by the word "consciousness." On the one hand, it is employed to point out certain qualities in their immediate apparency, qualities of things of sentiency, such as are, from the psychological standpoint, usually termed feelings. The sum total of these immediate qualities present as literal ends or closures of natural processes constitute "consciousness" as an anoetic occurrence. This is consciousness wherever meanings do not exist; that is to say, apart from the existence and employment of signs, or independently of communication. On the other hand, consciousness is used to denote meanings actually perceived, awareness of objects: being wide-awake, alert, attentive to the significance of events, present, past, future. Our previous discussion enables us, it will appear, to place the two denotations. The existential starting point is immediate qualities. Even meanings taken not as meanings but as existential are grounded in immediate qualities, in sentiencies or "feelings," of organic activities and receptivities. Meanings do not come into being without language, and language implies two selves involved in a conjoint or shared undertaking. Thus while its direct mechanism is found in the vocalizing and auditory apparatuses, this mechanism is in alliance with general organic behavior. Otherwise it becomes a mechanical routine not differing from the "speech" of parrot or a phonographic record. This alliance supplies language from the immediate qualitative "feel" that marks off signs immediately from one another in existence.

The same considerations define the "subconscious" of human thinking. Apart from language, from imputed and inferred meaning, we continually engage in an immense multitude of immediate organic selections, rejections, welcomings, expulsions, appropriations, withdrawals, shrinkings, expansions, elations and dejections, attacks, wardings off, of the most minute, vibratingly delicate nature. We are not aware of the qualities of many or most of these acts; we do not objectively distinguish and identify them. Yet they exist as feeling qualities, and have an enormous directive effect on our behavior. If for example, certain sensory qualities of which we are not cognitively aware cease to exist, we cannot stand or control our posture and movements. In a thoroughly normal organism, these "feelings" have an efficiency of operation which it is impossible for thought to match. Even our most highly intellectualized operations depend upon them as a "fringe" by which to guide our inferential movements. They give us our sense of rightness and wrongness, of what to select and emphasize and follow up, and what to drop, slur over and ignore, among the multitude of inchoate meanings that are presenting themselves. They give us premonitions of approach to acceptable meanings, and warnings of getting off the track. Formulated discourse is mainly but a selected statement of what we wish to retain among all these incipient starts, followings up and breakings off. Except as a reader, a hearer repeats something of these organic movements, and thus "gets" their qualities, he does not get the sense of what is said; he does not really assent, even though he give cold approbation. These qualities are the stuff of "intuitions" and in actuality the difference between an "intuitive" and an analytic person is at most a matter of degree, of relative emphasis. The "reasoning" person is one who makes his "intuitions" more articulate, more de-

liverable in speech, as explicit sequence of initial premises, jointures and conclusions. In a practical sense, here is the heart of the mind-body problem. Activities which develop, appropriate and enjoy meanings bear the same actualizing relation to psycho-physical affairs that the latter bear to physical characters. They present the consequences of a wider range of interactions, that in which needs, efforts and satisfactions conditioned by association are operative. In this widened and deepened activity, there are both added resources and values, and added liabilities and defaults. The actualization of meanings furnishes psycho-physical qualities with their ulterior significance and worth. But it also confuses and perverts them. The effects of this corruption are themselves embodied through habits in the psycho-physical, forming one-sided degraded and excessive susceptibilities; creating both disassociations and rigid fixations in the sensory register. These habitual effects become in turn spontaneous, natural, "instinctive;" they form the platform of development and apprehension of furthur meanings, affecting every subsequent phase of personal and social life.

While on the psycho-physical level, consciousness denotes the totality of actualized immediate qualitative differences, or "feelings," it denotes, upon the plane of mind, actualized apprehensions of meanings, that is, ideas. There is thus an obvious difference between mind and consciousness; meaning and an idea. Mind denotes the whole system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of organic life; consciousness in a being with language denotes awareness or perception of meanings; it is the perception of actual events, whether past, contemporary or future, in their meanings, the having of actual ideas. The greater part of mind is only implicit in any conscious act or state; the field of mind -- of operative meanings -- is enormously wider than that of consciousness. Mind is contextual and persistent; consciousness is focal and transitive. Mind is, so to speak, structural, substantial; a constant background and foreground; perceptive consciousness is process, a series of heres and nows. Mind is a constant luminosity; consciousness intermittent, a series of flashes of varying intensities. Consciousness is, as it were, the occasional interception of messages continually transmitted, as a mechanical receiving device selects a few of the vibrations with which the air is filled and renders them audible.

The relation between mind and consciousness may be indicated by a familiar happening. When we read a book, we are immediately conscious of meanings

The relation between mind and consciousness may be indicated by a familiar happening. When we read a book, we are immediately conscious of meanings that present themselves, and vanish. These meanings existentially occurring are ideas. But we are capable of getting ideas from what is read because of an organized system of meanings of which we are not at any one time completely aware. Our mathematical or political "mind" is the system of such meanings as possess and determine our particular apprehensions or ideas. There is however, a continuum or spectrum between this containing system and the meanings which, being focal abd urgent are the ideas of the moment. There is a contextual field between the latter and those meanings which determine the habitual direction of our conscious thoughts and supply the organs for their formation. One great mistake in the orthodox psychological tradition is its exclusive preoccupation with sharp focalization to the neglect of the vague shading off from the foci into a field of increasing dimness.

Discrimination in favor of the clearly distinguished has a certain practical justification, for the vague and extensive background is present in every conscious experience and therefore does not define the character of anyone in particular. It represents that which is being used and taken for granted, while the focal phase is that which is imminent and critical. But this fact affords no justification for neglect and denial in theory of the dim and total background consciousness of every distinct thought. If there were a sharp division between the ideas that are focal as we read a certain section of a book and what we have already read, if there were not carried along a sense of the latter, what we now read could not take the form of an idea. Indeed, the use of such words as context and background, fringe, etc., suggests something too external to meet the facts of the case. The larger system of meaning suffuses, interpenetrates, colors what is here and now uppermost; it gives them sense, feeling, as distinct from signification.

Change the illustration from reading a book to seeing and hearing a drama. The emotional as well as intellectual meaning of each presented phase of a play depends upon the operative presence of a continuum of meanings. If we have to remember what has been said and done at any particular point, we are not aware of what is now said and done; while without its suffusive presence in what is now said and done we lack clew to its meaning. Thus the purport of past affairs is present in the momentary cross-sectional idea in a way which is more intimate, direct and pervasive than the way of recall. It is positively and integrally carried in and by the incidents now happening; these incidents are, in the degree of genuine dramatic quality, fulfillment of the meanings constituted by past events; they also give this system of meanings an unexpected turn, and constitute a suspended and still indeterminate meaning, which induces alertness, expectancy. It is this double relationship of continuation, promotion, carrying forward, and of arrest, deviation, need of supplementation, which defines that focalisation of meanings which is consciousness, awareness, perception. Every case of consciousness is dramatic; drama is an enhancement of the conditions of consciousness.

It is impossible to tell what immediate consciousness is -- not because there is some mystery in or behind it, but for the same reason that we cannot tell just what sweet or red immediately is: it is something had, not communicated and known. But words, as means of directing action, may evoke a situation in which the thing in question is had in some particularly illuminating way. It seems to me that anyone who installs himself in the midst of the unfolding of drama has the experience of consciousness in just this sort of way; in a way which enables him to give significance to descriptive and analytic terms otherwise meaningless. There must be a story, some whole, an integrated series of episodes. This connected whole is mind, as it extends beyond a particular process of consciousness and conditions it. There must also be now-occurring events, to which meanings are assigned in terms of a story taking place. Episodes do not mean what they would mean if occurring in some different story. They have to be perceived in terms of the story, as its forwardings and fulfillings. At the same time, until the play or story is ended, meanings given to events are of a sort which constantly evoke a meaning which was not absolutely anticipated or totally predicted: there is expectancy, but also surprise, novelty. As far as complete and assured prediction is possible, interest in the play lags; it ceases to

be an observed drama, it is not subsequently in consciousness.

An oft-told tale repeated without change fails to engage perception; it liberates us for attention to another story where development of meanings is as yet incomplete and indeterminate, possessed of suspense and uncertainty. Thus while perceptions are existentially intermittent and discrete, like a series of signal flashes, or telegraphic clicks, yet they involve a continuum of meaning in process of formation. If we became convinced that a succession of flashes or clicks were not a series of terms with respect to one and the same unfolding meaning, we should not attend to them or be aware of them. If on the other hand, there are no variations to compell suspense, no unforseen movement in a new direction; if there is one unbroken luminosity, or one unbroken monotony of sound, there is no perception, no consciousness.

These considerations enable us to give a formal definition of consciousness in relation to mind or meanings. Consciousness, an idea, is that phase of a system of meanings which at a given time is undergoing re-direction, transitive transformation. The current idealistic conception of consciousness as a power which modifies events, is an inverted statement of this fact. To treat consciousness as a power accomplishing the change, is but another instance of the common philosophic fallacy of converting an eventual function into an intecedent force or cause. Consciousness is the meaning of events in course of remaking; its "cause" is only the fact that this is one of the ways in which nature goes on. In a proximate sense of the causality, namely as place in a series history, its causation is the need and demand for filling out what is indeterminate.

Empirical evidence in support of the proposition that consciousness of meanings denotes redirection of meanings (which are always ultimately meanings of events) is supplied by obvious facts of attention and interest on one side, and the working of established and assured habits on the other. The familiar does not consciously appear, save in an unexpected, novel, situation, where the familiar presents itself in a new light and is therefore not wholly familiar. Our deepest-seated habits are precisely those of which we have least awareness. When they operate in a situation to which they are not accustomed, in an unusual situation, a new adjustment is required. Hence there is shock, and an accompanying perception of dissolving and reforming meaning. Attention is most alert and stretched, when, because of unusual situations, there is great concern about the issue, together with suspense as to what it will be. We are engaged at once in taking in what is happening and looking ahead to what has not yet happened. As far as we can count upon the contemporary conditions and upon their outcome, focalization of meaning is absent. That which is taken to be involved in any event, in any event, in every issue, no matter what, we are not aware of. If we consider the entire field from bright focus through the fore-conscious, the "fringe", to what is dim, sub-conscious "feeling," the focus corresponds to the point of imminent need, of urgency; the "fringe" corresponds to things that just have been reacted to or that will soon require to be looked after, while the remote outlying field corresponds to what does not have to be modified, and which may be dependably counted upon in dealing with imminent need.

THE EGO AND THE ID

by Sigmund Freud

Summary

The Id: That part of the mind which behaves as tho it were unconscious (28). The vast reservoir in which are stored "vestiges of the existences of countless former egos" (52). The experiences of the id are capable of being inherited (52). The id is totally non-moral (79). The id is unable to say what it wants. It has achieved no unity of will. Eros and death struggle within it (87). The id contains the passions. It is under the control of the pleasure principle (30).

The Ego: The ego is that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world acting thru the perceptual system (29). The ego has the task of bringing to bear upon the id and its tendencies the influence of the external world and of substituting the reality principle for the pleasure principle (30). In the ego perception plays the part which in the id devolves upon instinct (30). In relation to the id the ego is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse (30). The ego's position is like that of the constitutional monarch, without whose sanction no law can be passed but who hesitates long before imposing a veto upon any measure put forward by Parliament. All the experiences that originate from without enrich the ego. The id however is another outer world which it strives to bring into subjection to itself (82). The ego is that id which has been especially modified. The experiences of the ego when repeated often enough and with sufficient intensity in the successive individuals of many generations transform themselves into experiences of the id and are then capable of transmission by inheritance (52).



The Super-Ego: The faculties of self-criticism and conscience - mental activities which rank as exceptionally high - are unconscious and unconsciously produce effects of the greatest importance. In a number of neuroses this unconscious sense of guilt plays a decisive part. We are compelled therefore to say that not only what is lowest but also that which is highest in the ego can be unconscious (33). To this may be given the name of "super-ego" or "ego-ideal". Whereas the ego is essentially the representative of the external world, the super-ego stands in contrast to it as a representative of the internal world. Thru the formation of the ego-ideal all traces left behind in the id by biological developments and by vicissitudes gone thru by the human race are taken over by the ego and lived thru again by it in each individual. The ego ideal has many points of contact with the individual's archaic heritage. Thus it is that what belongs to the lowest depths in the minds of each one of us is changed thru the for-

mation of the ideal into what we value as highest in the human soul (48). The ego-ideal answers in every way to what is expected of the higher nature of man. In so far as it is the substitute for the longing for a father, it contains the germ from which all religions have evolved. The power of the parental injunctions remains vested in the ego ideal and continues in the form of conscience to exercise the censorship of morals. The tension between the demands of the conscious and the attainments of the ego is experienced as a sense of guilt (48-9). To the ego living means the same thing as being loved - loved by the super-ego (86).

The origin of the ego-ideal is to be found in the first and most important identification of all, the identification with the father which takes place in the pre-history of every person (39). The ego-ideal is then the heir of the Oedipus complex. By setting up the ego ideal the ego masters its Oedipus complex and at the same time places itself in subjection to the id.

The Sense of Guilt: There are certain people who during analysis react unfavorably to expressions of encouragement or praise. Every partial solution which ought to result in improvement produces in them the exacerbation of their illness. The explanation is to be found in the sense of guilt which is finding atonement in the illness and is refusing to give up the penalty of suffering.

In cases of melancholia the super-ego manifests an extraordinary harshness toward the ego. The destructive component entrenches itself in the super-ego and turns against the ego.

In obsessional neuroses the "object-cathexis" is retained and thru a regression to pre-natal organization the love impulses have transformed themselves into impulses of aggression against the object. But these tendencies are not adopted by the ego. It struggles against them and they remain in the id. The super-ego however, behaves as tho the ego were responsible. Helpless in either direction, the ego defends itself against the instigations of the murderous id and the reproaches of the punishing conscience. The outcome is interminable self-torment. The obsessional neurotic, however, never takes the step of self-destruction.

In the hysterical type the ego defends itself from the painful perceptions which the criticisms of the super-ego threaten to produce in it by an act of repression. It keeps at a distance the material to which the sense of guilt refers.

Behind the ego's dread of the super-ego, its fear of conscience, we may see the fear of castration with which the higher being, which later became the ego-ideal once threatened the ego. It is this dread which persists as the fear of conscience.

PSYCHOANALYSIS OF THE TOTAL PERSONALITY: ALEXANDER

Abstract by A. T. Boisen

An attempt to apply Freud's theory of the ego, particularly that offered in the Ego and the Id, to the individual neuroses and to extend this application to account for isolated clinical facts. The distinctive contribution to which Alexander lays claim is to be found in his ideas of the significance of the neurotic self-punishing mechanisms in the formation of symptoms, ideas which he has derived from Freud's conception of the pleasure principle and of the death instinct.

This unconscious need for punishment presupposes a psychic faculty which sits in judgment upon our thoughts and wishes and condemns them just as tho they were actions. To this faculty Freud has given the name superego. The moral principles of this faculty are identical with the commands and prohibitions which the child inherits from those responsible for his up-bringing. In the child's development those persons who first in his environment oppose the instinctual urges become internalized as conscience and conscious inhibition becomes internalized as unconscious form. This transformation of conscious condemnation into unconscious process is a typical example of the conversion of mobile psychic energy into tonic form and one which in accordance with biological law leads to a corporalization of the psyche. The unconscious, according to Freud, is thus a borderland between body and mind. The superego may then be defined as that part of the conscience which has become unconscious. It is an outpost of conscience confronting the life of instinct. Just as the demands of the child's parents or guides are at first assimilated into the conscious ego thru identification with those persons in order to escape conflict with them, taking the form of conscience, so the conscience itself is shifted to a deeper stratum of the psyche and becomes second nature. Thus it becomes possible for the claims of conscience to act directly upon the life of instinct without involving consciousness and the conscious self is freed from the necessity of internal psychic expenditures. The superego deviates in many ways from the conscious conscience or the "ego-ideal." The latter developes with the individual and its claims change with growth. The superego remains rigid and represents the training to which we are subjected in youth. Not infrequently the superego becomes over-severe and such over-severity is usually accompanied by a corruptibility which permits the gratification of ego-alien tendencies. Such over-severity accompanied by corruptibility is one of the basic psychological factors in the formation of a neurosis. The greater the incongruity between the standpoint of the superego and that of the conscious conscience, the wider the neurotic splitting of the personality. It is however to be noted that the over-severe superego may result not merely when the father has been over-severe. An unduly gentle and indulgent one may predispose an individual to place undue restrictions upon his instinctual urges. If the father is too kind, the hate tendencies arising in the Oedipus complex may occasion an even livelier sense of guilt than if the father's strictness had permitted a rationalization of the hate tendencies. The insufficient severity of the father is thus replaced by the over-severity of the superego.

Conscience is to be viewed as a secondary instinct derived from the original primordial instincts. While its claims originate without in those claims of society which the child has taken to himself thru identification with his

parents, his first guides, and the child thus comes to recognize as his own some of those environmental influences which were originally opposed to his wishes, the power thru which these claims make themselves felt in the psyche originate within in the instinctual reservoir of the psyche, the id. These come from two sources: 1) outwardly directed aggression which checked by resistance in the environment turns inward upon the self and becomes the sadism of the superego; 2) primary masochism of the ego. The basis of the neurotic mechanism is to be found in submitting to suffering in order to satisfy the claims of conscience and finding a substitutive gratification. The superego metes out punishment, inflicts pain, and as a result of this the sins committed in the form of symptoms are expiated. Suffering thus becomes the psychic coin by means of which any offence may be expiated. Once this coin has become legal tender within the depths of the personality the reappearance of the repressed in its original form is assured. The superego meets out punishment instead of prohibiting and the ego suffers instead of renouncing. The equilibrium of the personality is thus shifted in the direction of the id.

The meaning of every neurosis consists in an attempt to cling to an instinctual satisfaction which has been condemned by conscience. This attempt succeeds only when the inhibiting effect of conscience is abolished at the same time. This is accomplished thru suffering or thru the formation of ascetic traits of character. The neurotic illness thus serves two purposes: viz., gratification of forbidden tendencies and the relief of conscience anxiety. The dynamic basis of every neurosis is to be found in the attempt to strike a balance between instinctual gratification and the need for punishment. In the case of sublimation the original impulse undergoes profound modification and becomes attached to impulses which are acceptable to the ego. In the case of the neurotic symptom the original condemned tendency is not altered but only disguised. Along with this disguise goes generally the punitive tendency which enables the patient to get rid of the sense of guilt and thus permit the indulgence of the disapproved tendency. To rid the patient of the sense of guilt is to rid him of the means of gratifying his instinctual craving. We may say that all neurotic symptoms mean the gratification of desires which have been forbidden in childhood.

In this corruptability of the superego the ego itself dreives secondary benefits and it therefore clings to the symptoms. It cannot therefore be exonerated from complicity. Nevertheless in neurotic persons the superego seems to constitute a circumscribed secondary personality within the ego and it is the behavior of this superego which is the distinguishing feature of the different neuroses.

In the case of hysteria the ego is able to maintain its maximum strength. It pushes the sense of guilt down into the physical processes and thus gets rid of it altogether.

In the mechanism of projection (paranoia) the ego yields to the id to a much greater extent and even goes so far as to falsify its perceptions and to reshape reality in harmony with the tendencies of the id. In one sense the paranoid mechanism has the same purpose as the analytic endeavors, to drive

the superego from the field and to bring the ego and the id into direct contact. But in paranoia the ego is at the mercy of the more powerful id. To deprive the ego of its protection and thus deliver it into the hands of the repressed tendencies is often fatal. The ego may yield before the onslaughts of the more powerful id and regress to primitive levels.

In the case of the compulsion neuroses the two antagonistic forces exist side by side. Most commonly the over-moral tendencies come to expression in the form of compulsive acts which represent an exaggeration of the requirements of upbringing, while the aggressive ego-alien urges appear as obsessive thoughts with a content painful or incompatible with the conscious ego, such as murderous ideas, ideas of dirty activities or of incest. In other cases the a-social impulses appear in the form of incomprehensible, pointless symptoms (forced touching of objects or ceremonial acts while walking) and the over-moral ones in the form of excessive scrupulosity and punctiliousness. Frequently the aggressive tendencies come into consciousness scarcely disguised at all. This happens when the over-severe manifestations have succeeded in relieving the sense of guilt and removing the inhibiting effects of conscience. For the most part however in the compulsion neuroses the a-social tendencies manifest themselves in the most harmless forms while the morality is one of technicalities and externalities. The essence of the compulsion neurosis is to be found in the proposition that wish and deed are of equal validity and yet not only is a wish not a deed but it has no existence at all. Hence neurotic doubt. The compulsion neurotic eroticizes his thought processes and thereby serves the id tendencies. Doubt serves to permit such gratification, while the superego, undeceived and resentful of such gratification demands punishment.

In the case phobias the punitive tendencies are not satisfied by means of symptoms punitive in meaning, as in the compulsion neuroses, but are felt by the ego as permanent threats. The ever-present anxiety shows that the demands of conscience remain unsatisfied and no equilibrium is attained. The phobic patient is able to avoid anxiety only by not undertaking the activity which in the compulsion neurotic gives the symbolic satisfaction. The developement of phobias would thus mean that the ego had not yet succeeded in adapting itself to meet the superego's threat of punishment. This explains the fact that phobias are so frequently characteristic of childhood and of the initial stages of a neurosis.

In the case of hypochondria the need for punishment and the severity of the superego appear as a compulsive passion to discover in one's self symptoms of disease. Every reassurance of the baselessness of the fear will in such cases only increase the need for punishment and consequently the fear of the superego.

In the case of the manic depressive insanities of the circular type the claims of conscience and those of instinct are satisfied at different successive periods.

In the internal regime of the neurotic psyche we may recognize the mirrored image of that spirit which gave rise to the primitive form of societal organization, and is exemplified in religious systems and in criminal law.

The structure of the neurosis represents the perpetuation of a primitive level of social organization based upon punishment. Or we may say that man has created society in his own image. We may see in the law of conscience a reflection of the laws of society or we may see the laws of society as reflections of internal psychic relationships. The psyche is forced to recognize the inevitable succession of pleasure and pain not merely thru the struggle with reality for instinct gratification but also thru the biological development of his instinctual life. The rise in instinct tension is due to the fact that the psychic apparatus has not as yet mastered some required new method of instinct gratification. It is thus in a state of continuous stimulation during the period of its tentative efforts at instinct release. The resulting traumatic situation is intensified and prolonged by the tendency of the organism to cling to the old methods of instinctual gratification. The renunciation of these old instinctual demands which the new situation cannot gratify is an indispensable condition of overcoming the traumatic state of tension accompanying the abandonment of a lower stage of organization. It is these instinctual claims no longer capable of being satisfied which constitute the internal danger comparable in its psychological significance to external danger. Repression is a defense mechanism which prevents the infantile urges, out of accord with the demands of society, from gaining access either to the motor apparatus or to consciousness.

The Unconscious - Some Excerps from "Two Essays on Analytical Psychology" by C. G. Jung

1. Purposive Aspects of the Unconscious:

We always find in a patient some conflict, which at a particular point, is connected with the great problems of society; so that when the analysis has arrived at this point the apparently individual conflict is revealed as a universal conflict of the environment and the epoch. Neurosis is thus, strictly speaking, nothing but an individual attempt, however unsuccessful, at a solution of the general problem; it must be so, for a general problem, a "question," is not an end in itself; it only exists in the hearts and heads of individual men and women.

Freud's theory of repression does, indeed, seem to postulate the existence only of people who, being too moral, are continually repressing the immorality of their natural instincts. According to this idea, the immoral man who allows his natural instincts an unbridled existence should be proof against neurosis. But daily experience proves this is obviously not the case; he may be just as neurotic as other men. If we analyse him we find that it is simply his decency that has been repressed.

It should, indeed, never be forgotten--and the Freudian School needs this reminder-- that morality was not brought down upon tables of stone from Sinai and forced upon the people, but that morality is a function of the human soul, which is as old as humanity itself. Morality is not inculcated from without. Man has it primarily within himself--not the law indeed, but the essence of morals.

There is, therefore, probably no other way for the immoral man but to accept the moral corrective of his unconscious, just as he who is moral must come to terms as best he may, with his demons of the nether world.

A person is only half understood when one knows how everything in him came about. Only a dead man can be explained in terms of the past, a living one must be otherwise explained. Life is not made up of yesterdays only, nor is it understood nor explained by reducing today to yesterday. Life has also a tomorrow, and today is only understood if we are able to add the indications of tomorrow to our knowledge of what was yesterday. This holds good for all expressions of psychological life, even for symptoms of disease. Symptoms of neurosis are not merely consequences of causes that once have been, whether they were "infantile sexuality" or "infant instinct for power." They are endeavors toward a new synthesis of life.

I have known more than one person who attributed all his usefulness, and the justification for his existence even, to a neurosis, that hindered all decisive stupidities of his life, compelling him to lead an existence which developed what was valuable in him; material that would have been crushed out had not the neurosis with its iron grip forced the man to keep to the place where he really belonged. There are people the meaning of whose life--whose resl significance--lies in the unconscious; in consciousness lies only all that is vain and delusive. With others the reverse is the case, and for them the neurosis has another significance. An extended reduction

is likely to occur in the one, but not so in the other.

2. The Idea of God:

Men must always have demons and cannot live without gods. No doubt we must make the exception of some peculiarly clever specimens of the homo occidentalis of yesterday and the day before--supermen whose god is dead; wherefore they themselves become gods, that is, rationalistic fake-gods with thick skulls and cold hearts. The concept of god is merely a necessary psychological function of an irrational character which has nothing to do with the question of the existence of god. The human intellect can never answer this question, and still less can it give any proof of god. Furthermore, such proof is altogether superfluous, for the idea of an all-powerful divine being is present everywhere, if not consciously recognized, then unconscoously accepted, because it is an archtype.

The consensus gentium has spoken of gods for aeons of time, and will still be speaking of them aeons hence. No matter how beautiful and perfect man may believe his reason to be, he can always be certain that it is only one of the possible mental functions, and covers only that one aspect of the phenomena of life which corresponds to it. There lies on every hand the irrational, that which does not fit in with reason. And this irrational is equally a psychological function, the collective unconscious in a word; while the function of consciousness is essentially rational.

3. The Structure of the Unconscious:

The unconscious contains, as it were, two layers; first the personal, and secondly the collective. The personal layer does not go further than the earliest memories of infancy; the collective unconscious, on the other hand, all time before the actual dawn of infancy, that is, the residue of the life of the ancestors. While the memory images of the personal unconscious have some detailed form, since they consist of images that have been experiences, such detail is lacking in the memory-traces of the collective unconscious, since they have not been experienced individually. If the regression of the physical energy, retreating before an insurmountable object, goes back even further than the time of early infancy, it reaches the traces or deposits of ancestral life, and mythological images awaken. An inner mental world, whose existence we never before suspected, unfolds and displays contents which are perhaps in sharpest possible contrast to our previous conceptions.

4. Catastrophic Experiences:

A collapse of the conscious attitude is no small matter. It always feels like the end of the world; as though everything had tumbled back into original chaos. There is a sense of being delivered up, disorientated, like a rudderless ship that is abandoned to the moods of the elements. At least this is how it seems. In reality, however, one has fallen back upon the collective unconscious, which now takes over the leadership. Innumerable examples could be given, where at the critical moment a "saving" thought, a vision, an inner voice came with an irresistible power of conviction, and gave a new direction to life. But probably as many instances could be found,

in which the collapse meant a catastrophe that destroyed a life; for in these moments morbid ideas are liable to take firm root, or chosen ideals may be obliterated, which is equally bad. In the first type of case a psychic singularity, or a psychosis develops, and in the latter a condition of disorientation and demoralization. But when the unconscious contents break through into the conscious, filling it with their almost sinister power of conviction, it is very much a question as to how the individual will react. Will he be overpowered by these contents? Or will he simply believe them? (The ideal thing, namely, critical understanding, I am leaving out of account for the moment.) The first type of case means paranoia, or schizophrenia. The second may either become an eccentric with a taste for prophecy, or he may revert to an infantile attitude, but in either case he is cut away from human society and culture. The third case involves the regressive restoration of the persona.

The second possibility of meeting the problem would be by the way of identification with the collective psyche. One would be the lucky possessor of the great truth, that was waiting to be discovered, the conclusive realization which means the "saving of the peoples." This attitude does not necessarily signify megalomania in its most direct form; it corresponds rather to the milder and more familiar form of the prophet, reformer, and martyr. Weak minds run no small risk when exposed to this temptation, since as a rule they have more than their due share of ambition, vanity, and inappropriate naivety. The opening of the doors to the collective psyche means a renewal of life for the individual, whether or no this renewal is felt as pleasant or unpleasant. Everybody desires to sustain this renewal: one man because his life-feeling is intensified, another, because it seems to promise an abundant increase of knowledge, a third, because it offers him a key which can transform his whole life. Everyone, therefore, who does not want to lose the great value that lies buried in the collective psyche, will strive his utmost not to lose the newly won access to the fundamental sources of life. To this end, identification would seem to be the most direct way; since the disintegration of the persona in the collective psyche is almost a direct invitation to espouse these abysmal powers, or like a descent into the abyss, leaving memory behind. This piece of mysticism is innate in all men of the better sort, just as "the longing for the mother," or the backward glance towards the source whence he sprang is born in every man.

As we have already seen, the regressive longing which Freud conceived as "infantile fixation," or as the "incest wish," contains a particular value and necessity. This is beautifully exemplified in the myths by the fact that it is just the best and strongest man of the people, its hero, who follows the regressive longing, and purposely exposes himself to the danger of being swallowed-up by the monster, not once, but many times. It is the conquest of the collective psyche that yields the real value, the capture of the treasure, the invincible weapon, the magic shield, or safeguard, or whatever things the myth deems most desirable. Therefore, whoever identifies himself with the collective psyche, or, in mythical terms, whoever lets himself be swallowed by the monster--hence more or less consumed by it--is certainly near the treasure that is guarded by the dragon, yet he is in the highest degree unfree, and is there to his own great harm.

No one conscious of the absurdity of this identification would have the courage to make a principle of it. But there is danger in the fact that many lack the necessary humour, or lacking it at just this point, are seized by a sort of pathos, a perpetual pregnancy of meanings which hinders any effective self-criticism. I do not mean to deny in general the existence of real prophets, but in the name of caution we must begin by doubting each individual case; since it is a very ticklish matter simply to accept a man without more ado as a genuine prophet. Every real prophet defends himself vigorously against the unconscious expectations which this role always provokes. When therefore a prophet suddenly emerges from obscurity, it is better first to bear the possibility in mind of a loss of psychic balance.

INSTINCT AND CULTURE

Bronislaw Malinowski: Sex and Repression in Savage Society

Let us inquire now what is the biological value of rut for an animal species and what are the consequences for man of its absence. In all animal species mating has to be selective, i.e. there must be opportunities for comparison and for choice with either sex. Both male and female must have a chance to display his or her charms, to exercise attractions, to compete for the chosen one. Colour, voice, physical strength, cunning and agility in combat -- each a symptom of bodily vigour and organic perfection -- determine the choice. Mating by choice, again, is an indispensable counterpart of natural selection, for without some arrangement for selective mating the species would degenerate. This necessity increases as we ascend the scale of organic evolution; in the lowest animals there is not even the need for pairing. It is clear, therefore, that in the highest animal, man, the need for selective mating cannot have disappeared. In fact, the opposite assumption, that it is most stringent, is more likely to be true.

Rut, however, supplies the animal not only with the opportunities for selection. It also definitely circumscribes and delimits sexual interest. Outside the rutting season the sexual interest is in abeyance and the competition and strife as well as the overpowering absorption in sex are eliminated from the ordinary life of an animal species. Considering the great danger from outside enemies and the disruptive forces within, which are associated with courtship, the elimination of the sex interest from normal times and its concentration on a definite short period is of great importance for the survival of animal species.

In the light of all this, what does the absence of rut in man really signify? The sexual impulse is not confined to any season, not conditioned by any bodily process, and as far as mere physiological forces are concerned, it is there to affect at any moment the life of man and woman. It is ready to upset all other interests at all times; left to itself it tends constantly to work upon and loosen all existing bonds. This impulse, absorbing and pervading as it is, would thus interfere with all normal occupations of man, would destroy any budding form of association, would create chaos from within and would invite dangers from without. As we know, this is not a mere phantasy; the sex impulse has been the source of most trouble from Adam and Eve onwards. It is the cause of most tragedies, whether we meet them in present day actualities, in past history, in myth or in literary production. And yet the very fact of conflict shows that there exist some forces which control the sexual impulse; it proves that man does not surrender to his insatiable appetites; that he creates barriers and imposes taboos which become as powerful as the very forces of destiny.

It is important to note that these barriers and mechanisms which regulate sex under culture are different from the animal safeguards in the state of nature. With the animal instinctive endowment and physiological change throw male and female into a situation out of which they have to extricate themselves by the simple play of natural impulses. With man the control comes, as we know, from culture and tradition. In each society we find rules which make it impossible for men and women to yield freely to the

impulse. How these taboos arise, by what forces they work, we shall see presently. For the moment it is enough to realize clearly that a social taboo does not derive its force from instinct, but that instead it always has to work against some innate impulse. In this we see plainly the difference between human endowment and animal instinct. While man is ready to respond sexually at any moment, he also submits to an artificially imposed check upon this response. Again, while there is one natural bodily process which definitely releases active sexual interest between male and female, a number of inducements towards courtship guide and bring out the impulse.

We can now formulate more precisely what we mean by the plasticity of instincts. The modes of behaviour associated with sex interest are determined in man only as regards their ends; man must mate selectively, he cannot mate promiscuously. On the other hand, the release of the impulse, the inducement to courtship, the motives for a definite selection are dictated by cultural arrangements. These arrangements have to follow certain lines parallel to the lines of natural endowment in the animal. There must be an element of selection, there must be safeguards for exclusiveness, above all there must be taboos which prevent sex from constantly interfering in ordinary life.

The plasticity of instincts in man is defined by the absence of physiological changes, of automatic release of a biologically determined cause of courtship. It is associated with the effective determination of sexual behaviour by cultural elements. Man is endowed with sexual tendencies but these have to be moulded in addition by systems of cultural rules which vary from one society to another. We shall be able to see with greater precision in the course of our present inquiry how far these norms can differ from each other and diverge from the fundamental animal pattern.

Let us follow the universal romance of life and look into its next stage. And let us examine the bonds of marriage into which lead the two parallel paths of man and animal, of eolithic cave-dweller and of super-simian ape. Of what does marriage really consist in animals, especially in apes? Mating occurs as the culminating act of courtship and with this the female conceives. With impregnation the rut is over and with its end there ceases the sexual attractiveness of the female to other males. But this is not the case with the male who has won her, whom she has chosen and to whom she has surrendered. It is difficult to affirm from the data at our disposal whether in the state of nature the higher apes still continue to mate sexually after impregnation. The fact, however, that the female ceases to be attractive to other males while her mate remains attached to her constitutes the bond of animal marriage. The specific response of both male and female to the new situation; their mutual attachment; the tendency of the male to remain with his consort, to guard her, to assist her, and to protect and nourish her -- these are the innate elements of which animal marriage is made up. The new phase of life therefore consists of a new type of behaviour; it is dominated by a new link in the chain of instincts. The new link might appropriately be called the matrimonial response in contrast to the sexual impulse. The animal union is based neither upon the uncontrollable passion of rut nor on the sexual jealousy of the male nor on any claims of general appropriation on the part of the male. It is based on a special innate

tendency.

When we pass to human society the nature of matrimonial bonds is found to be entirely different. The act of sexual union, in the first place, does not constitute marriage. A special form of ceremonial sanction is necessary and this type of social act differs from the taboos and inducements of which we spoke in the previous chapter. We have here a special creative act of culture, a sanction or hallmark which establishes a new relation between two individuals. This relationship possesses a force derived not from instincts but from sociological pressure. The new tie is something over and above the biological bond. As long as this creative act has not been performed, as long as marriage has not been concluded in its cultural forms, a man and woman can mate and cohabit as long and as often as they like, and their relation remains something essentially different from a socially sanctioned marriage. Their tie, since there is no innate matrimonial arrangement in man, is not biologically safeguarded. Nor is it, since society has not established it, enforced by cultural sanction. As a matter of fact, in every human society a man and a woman who attempt to behave as if they were married without obtaining the appropriate social sanction are made to suffer more or less severe penalties.

A new force, therefore, a new element, comes into play supplementing the mere instinctive regulation of animals: the actual interference of society. And it need hardly be added that once this sanction has been obtained, once two people have been married, they not only may but must fulfill the numerous obligations, physiological, economic, religious, and domestic which are involved in this human relationship. As we have seen, the conclusion of a human marriage is not the consequence of a mere instinctive drive but of complex cultural inducements. But after matrimony has been sociologically sealed and hall-marked, a number of duties, ties, and reciprocities are imposed, backed up by legal, religious, and moral sanctions. In human societies such a relationship can usually be dissolved and re-entered with another partner but this process is never easy to carry out, and in some cultures the price of divorce makes it almost prohibitive.

Here we see clearly the difference between instinctive regulation on the one hand and cultural determinism on the other. While in animals marriage is induced by selective courtship, concluded by the mere act of impregnation, and maintained by the forces of the innate matrimonial attachment, in man it is induced by cultural elements, concluded by sociological sanction and maintained by the various systems of social pressure. And yet here again it is not difficult to perceive that the cultural apparatus works very much in the same direction as natural instincts and that it attains the same ends though the mechanism entirely differs. In the higher animals marriage is necessary because the longer the pregnancy, the more helpless the pregnant female and the new-born infant and the more necessary it is for them to have the protection of the male. The innately determined bond of matrimonial affection by which the male responds to the pregnancy of his chosen mate fulfills this need of the species, and is, in fact, indispensable for its continuity.

In man this need for an affectionate and interested protector of pregnancy

still remains. That the innate mechanism has disappeared we know from the fact that in most societies on a low as well as on a high level of culture the male refuses to take any responsibility for his offspring unless compelled to do so by society, which enforces the contract of marriage. But each culture develops certain forces and there exist certain arrangements which play the same part as the instinctive drives do in an animal species. The institution of marriage in its fundamental moral, legal and religious aspects must thus be regarded not as the direct outgrowth of the matrimonial tendency in animals but as its cultural substitute. This institution imposes upon man and woman a type of behaviour which corresponds as closely to the needs of the human species as the innate tendencies in animals correspond to theirs .....

.....In no human society, however high or low it might be in culture, is maternity simply a matter of biological endowment or of innate impulses. Cultural influences analogous to those we found determining relations between lovers and imposing obligations between consorts, are at work even in moulding the relation of the mother to the child. From the moment of conception this relation becomes a concern of the community. The mother has to observe taboos, she follows certain customs and submits to ritual proceedings. In higher societies these are largely but not completely replaced by hygienic and moral rules; in lower they belong to the domain of magic and religion. But all such customs and precepts aim at the welfare of the unborn child. For its sake the mother has to undergo ceremonial treatment, suffer privations and discomforts. Thus an obligation is imposed upon the prospective mother in anticipation of her future instinctive response. Her duties run ahead of her feelings, culture dictates and prepares her future attitude.

After birth the scheme of traditional relations is not less powerful and active. Ceremonies of purification, rules which isolate the mother and child from the rest of the community, baptismal rites and rites of the reception of the newborn infant into the tribe, create one and all a special bond between the two. Such customs exist both in patrilineal and matrilineal societies. In these latter there are, as a rule, even more elaborate arrangements and the mother is brought into yet closer contact with the child, not only at the outset but also at a later period.

Thus it can be said without exaggeration that culture in its traditional bidding duplicates the instinctive drive. More precisely it anticipates its rulings. At the same time, all cultural influences simply endorse, amplify, and specialize the natural tendencies, those which bid the mother tenderly to suckle, to protect, and to care for her offspring.....

.....And this brings us to a very interesting point. In all human societies -- however they might differ in the patterns of sexual morality, in the knowledge of embryology, and in their types of courtship -- there is universally found what might be called the rule of legitimacy. By this I mean that in all human societies a girl is bidden to be married before she becomes pregnant. Pregnancy and childbirth on the part of an unmarried young woman are invariably regarded as a disgrace. Such is the case in the very free communities of Melanesia described in this essay. Such is the case in all human societies concerning which we have any information. I

know of no single instance in anthropological literature of a community where illegitimate children, that is children of unmarried girls, would enjoy the same social treatment and have the same social status as legitimate ones.

The universal postulate of legitimacy has a great sociological significance, which is not yet sufficiently acknowledged. It means that in all human societies moral tradition and law decree that the group consisting of a woman and her offspring is not a sociologically complete unit. The ruling of culture runs here again on entirely the same lines as natural endowment; it declares that the human family must consist of the male as well as the female.

SEXUAL ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE SEXUAL IMPULSE

Otto Rank - Modern Education, pp. 40-53

The question, how is sexuality to be discussed and explained, and at the same time its activity restricted, seems to me not yet solved. The treating of masturbation as something harmless and not dangerous, is supposed to have a calming effect and not a threatening one; but I should say there are few parents. even among the pioneers of modern education who would be inclined to draw from this enlightenment the conclusion to let their children masturbate. But when they do not allow it, they place themselves in a new difficulty of having to give a reason for it. The whole movement of sexual enlightenment is doubtless praiseworthy in its tendency to consider sexuality as something harmless and not as something sinful and forbidden, an attitude which can only poison the entire latter life of the individual. But this inoffensiveness tacitly comprises the release of sexual activity, for it cannot be comprehended -- especially by the child -- why one should not do something when it is not "bad." In its extreme consequences, then, sexual education would not result in an education of the sexual impulse (in the sense of training it), but in a release of it, and this would lead us back to the level of the primitives.

Fortunately the child himself vigorously upsets all our psychological calculations by carrying on his sexual activity independently of our attitude towards it. But that means that the child not only gives in to his sexual impulse in spite of our prohibitions, but also that he experiences it as something forbidden, bad, and something to conceal even when we permit and release it. This is the first momentous discovery we have made with our sexual propaganda for children. This experience points to the fact, that it is not the external prohibition or the influence of education that connects sexuality with the idea of sin and guilt, but something inherent in it which is experienced by the individual as dangerous and, perhaps, rightly.

I believe that most of the child's questions concern philosophical and religious problems, that also occupy the minds of adults even today, and are still unsolved and perhaps even are insoluable. I am convinced, however, that particularly the sexual questions of children have this enigmatic background and that we answer these eternal problems of humanity concerning our origin, our future, and the meaning of our whole existence at the time only in the natural scientific terminology of our sexual-biology and materialistic psychology. But this answer does not satisfy the child in the least and if we want to be honest we have to admit also that it does not satisfy ourselves, and it only seems to satisfy because we know we have no other reply. Perhaps this explains why the adult seems to suffer from the sexual problem as much as the child; because the biological solution of the problem of humanity is also ungratifying and inadequate for the adult as for the child. The religious solution was and still is so much the more gratifying because it admits the unknown, indeed, recognizes it as the chief factor instead of pretending an omniscience that we do not possess. Besides, religion is also, more consoling, I should like to say more therapeutic because, with the admission of the unknown and unknowable it also leaves room for all kinds of hope that it still may not be so hopeless as it seems. The feeling of inferiority from which apparently our children now seem to suffer, is certainly increased by the impression they get of the godlike omniscience of their parents and their own ignorance in sexual matters. But the sexual instruc-

tion of children, that is, putting them on an equality with adults in this matter, does not help much if the parents' valuation of the sexual problem excludes their religious belief, or in other words, if the parental knowledge of sexual matters has the appearance of being a knowledge of all the mysteries of life, a knowledge which the child does not and never will possess even as the adults do not possess it. Religion, from the very beginning, here places children and adults on one level in so far as their inability to know ultimate things is concerned.

If we compare the idea of sexual education with the religious education hitherto prevailing, we shall find that in sexual training there is an element of wishful-thinking carried over by the adult into the children ideology. It has indeed thus arisen that the therapeutist has wished that the adult neurotic might have been sufficiently experienced as a child to be able to avoid all later difficulties. It is a primitive wishful-thinking projected back in this form, and in this respect sexual education differs in no way from other ideologies of education that want to spare the child the adult's harmful experiences or at least to give the child a taste of them in the form of education.

I believe that the deepest resistance to sexuality arises from the claim of the species that directly threatens individual integrity. The child, who, as it were, begins at birth to sunder itself from the species and to develop its individuality, feels sexuality first of all to be an inner claim of the species hostile to individuality and hence resists it. This leads as I have already stated elsewhere to an inner strife in the individual against sexuality, a conflict which arises necessarily and independently of external influence. This strife within is carried out by the individual in the same manner as in external strife, namely, by means of the will. For the will represents the individual energetically, it is psychologically synonymous with individual will. Sexuality is a kind of racial will forced upon the individual, the final acceptance of which is made possible through the individual love choice, against which, however, the individual and the individual will are continually striving. In this strife between the individual will and the biologically given community ideology of the species we have before us the prototype of the educational problem with all its conflicts and difficulties.

The idea of sexual education may give the appearance of emancipating the individual and his impulse life from the chains of a religious and conventional morality; whereas its practical application in educational reforms may be in fact not at all radical but conservative because it is not individual but collective. In that sexuality is first consciously and then officially made the subject of education, the idea of sexual enlightenment loses its individual-revolutionary character and necessarily becomes -- like every educational ideology -- a representative of the collective community will. This regular and necessary transformation of an individual's revolutionary ideas into the conservative ideology of the community encounters in the sexual problem quite peculiar difficulties. Not, perhaps, because sexuality is too individual, too personal, to be made into a community ideology, but just the reverse, because in essence sexuality is a collective phenomenon which the individual at all stages of civilization wants to individualize, that is,

control. This explains all sexual conflicts in the individual, from masturbation to the most varied perversions and perversities, above all the keeping secret of everything sexual by individuals as an expression of a personal tendency to individualize as much as possible collective elements in it. On the other hand we see the community at all times and under all circumstances endeavoring to deprive the individual as far as possible through convention, law, and custom, of the arbitrary practice of sexuality. But the community's every step in the direction of making the sexual life collective leads to new attempts at individualization which again bring forth community reactions.

S E X L O V E

W. E. Hocking in "Human Nature and Its Re-making," chapter 42

The sexes are fitted to recognize more and more of the subconscious and growing in one another than can ordinarily be appreciated between membersof the same sex; they are drawn into a protective attitude toward whatever is groping and 'unsaved' in the other self. An extension of 'sympathy," love, appears as a premonition of the power to confer and receive life at a profounder level than that of words and services. Thus the craving of sex on its psychological side might be roughly described as a craving for subconscious respiration.

Between lovers there is a wholly mutual sense of dignity which comes from the awareness of validity; with their other metaphysical knowledge, the lovers know that between them - not in either of them - the tribe is present: the promise and potency of humanity as a self-sustaining stream of conscious life is, if not in their keeping, still within reach of their conjuring. Love finds itself assuming for a brief moment the actual work of a god. It undertakes, while acting as a channel for universal life, to be an original maker of life.

The only being you can love is the being who has an independent object of worship and that holds you out of your self-indulgence to a worship of that same object. The health and meaning of love depend on that common devotion to a common divinity.

All love, according to Plato, as it becomes aware of its meaning, is a demand for immortality thru creation in the medium of beauty. Ignorant love forgets that its horizon is immortality; enlightened love realizes that its meaning is only completely found when personal and family relations are left behind; it is found in that metaphysical element which all love more or less dimly reveals, in the quest and transmission by teaching of the knowledge of what is absolutely real; it is in the giving of second birth, of which the Brahmans taught, rather than in the giving of the first birth that the full satisfaction of love is to be found. Thus sex love, completely understood has no psychological need of physical relationship nor of marriage; and Plato seems to speak in total accord with Christianity.

Thus we confirm the existence of an analogy in the life of religion with the life of sex, which has been much dwelt upon of late as though it were a new discovery. But what it means is a very ancient insight; and that insight is not that religion is nearly identical with sex, but that sex love, as it finds its own meaning, approaches identity with religion. The same is obviously true of patriotism and of every other positive human impulse; but the relationship is particularly direct in the case of sex love.

THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF CONSCIENCE

by Charles H. Cooley
"Human Nature and the Social Order," pp. 382 - 390

Our mature life is not radically distinguished from childhood as regards the working of personal influence upon our moral thought. If there is progress it is in the way of fullness of experience and better organization: the mental life may become richer in those sympathetic or imaginative impulses which we derive from healthy intercourse with the world and without a good store of which our judgments of right must be narrow and distorted; there may at the same time be a completer ordering and discipline of these materials, a greater power to construct the right, the unifying thought, out of diverse elements, a quicker recognition of it when achieved, and a steadier disposition to act upon it. In most cases, perhaps, a person after thirty years of age gains something in the promptness and steadfastness of his moral judgment, and loses something in the imaginative breadth of his premises. But the process remains the same, and our view of right is still a sort of microcosm of our whole character. Whatever characteristic passions we have will in some way be represented in it, and until we stiffen into mental rigidity and decline, it will change more or less with every important change in our social surroundings.

To a very large class of minds, perhaps to the largest class, the notion of right presents itself chiefly as a matter of personal authority. That is, what we feel we ought to do is simply what we imagine our guide or master would do, or would wish us to do. This, for instance, is the idea very largely inculcated and practiced by the Christian church. It is not anything opposed to or different from the right as a mental synthesis, but simply means that admiration, reverence, or some other strong sentiment, gives such overwhelming force to the suggestions of a certain example, that they more or less completely dominate the mind. The authority works through conscience and not outside of it. Moreover, the relation is not so one-sided as it would seem, since our guide is always, in one point of view, the creation of our own imaginations, which are sure to interpret him in a manner congenial to our native tendency.

The immediate power of personal images or influences over our sense of right is probably greater in all of us than we realize. "It is wonderful," says George Eliot in Middlemarch, "how much uglier things will look when we only think we are blamed for them, and, on the other hand, it is astonishing how pleasantly conscience takes our encroachments on those who never complain, or have nobody to complain for them." That is to say, other persons, by awaking social self-feeling in us, give life and power to certain sentiments of approval or disapproval regarding our own actions. The rule, already suggested, that the self of a sensitive person, in the presence of an ascendant personality, tends to become his interpretation of what the other thinks of him, is a prime factor in determining the moral judgments of all of us. Everyone must have felt the moral renewal that comes with the mere presence of one who is vigorously good, whose being enlivens our aspiration and shames our backsliding, who makes us really feel the desirability of the higher life and the baseness and dullness of the lower.

Our higher selves, our distinctly right views and choices, are dependent up-

on imaginative realization of the points of view of other persons. There is, I think, no possibility of being good without living, imaginatively of course, in good company; and those who uphold the moral power of personal example as against that of abstract thought are certainly in the right. A mental crisis, by its difficulty, is likely to call up the thought of some person we have been used to look to as a guide, and the confronting of the two ideas, that of the person and that of the problem, compels us to answer the question, what would he have thought of it? The guide we appeal to may be a person in the room, or a distant friend, or an author whom we have never seen, or an ideal person of religion. The strong, good men we have once imagined live in our mind and fortify there the idea of worthiness. They were free and noble and make us unhappy to be less.

Of course the influence of other persons often goes by contraries. The thought of one who is repugnant to us brings a strong sense of that for which he stands, and our conviction of the hatefulness of any ill trait is much enlivened by intimate contact with one who exhibits it.

The moral potency of confession, and of all sorts of publicity, rests upon the same basis. In opening ourselves to another we are impelled to imagine how our conduct appears to him; we take an outside view of ourselves. It makes a great difference to whom we confess: the higher the character of the person whose mind we imagine, the more enlightening and elevating is the view of ourselves that we get. Even to write our thoughts in a diary, and so to confess, not to a particular person, but to that vague image of an interlocutor that connects itself with all articulate expression, makes things look different.

It is, perhaps, much the same with prayer. To pray, in a higher sense, is to confront our moral perplexities with the highest personal ideal we can form, and so to be unconsciously integrating the two, straightening out the one in accordance with the other. It would seem that social psychology strongly corroborates the idea that prayer is an essential aspect of the higher life; by showing, I mean, that thought, and especially vivid thought, is interlocutory in its very nature, and that aspiration almost necessarily takes, more or less distinctly, the form of intercourse with an ideal being.

Whatever publishes our conduct introduces new and strong factors into conscience; but whether this publicity is wholesome or otherwise depends upon the character of the public; or, more definitely, upon whether the idea of ourselves that we impute to this public is edifying or degrading. In many cases, for instance, it is ruinous to a person's character to be publicly disgraced, because he, or she, presently accepts the degrading self that seems to exist in the minds of others. There are some people to whom we should be ashamed to confess our sins, and others, perhaps, to whom we should not like to own our virtues.

Because of its dependence upon personal suggestion, the right always reflects a social group; there is always a circle of persons, more or less extended, whom we really imagine, and who thus work upon our impulses and our conscience while people outside of this have not a truly personal existence for us. The extent of this circle depends upon many circumstances, as for instance upon

the vigor of our imaginations, and the reach of the means of communication through which personal symbols are impressed upon them.

There are all degrees of vagueness of definition in our personal ideas. They may be no more than scattered imaginings of traits which we have met in experience and felt to be worthy; or they may assume such fullness and cohesion as to be distinct ideal persons. There may even be several personal ideals; one may cherish one ideal of himself and a different one for each of his intimate friends; or his imagination may project several ideals of himself, to correspond to various phases of his development.

It would always be found, I think, that our ideal self is constructed chiefly out of ideas about us attributed to other people. We can hardly get any distinct view of ourselves except in this way, that is by placing ourselves at the standpoint of someone else. The impressions thus gained are worked over and over, like other mental material, and, according to the imaginative vigor of the mind, more or less reorganized, and projected as an ideal.

Once formed and familiarized the ideal self serves, like any ideal only more directly, as an incitement to growth in its direction, and a punishment to retrogression. A man who has become used to imagining himself as noble, beneficent, and respected has a real picture in his mind, a fair product of aspiring thought, a work of art. If his conduct violates this imagination he has a sense of ugliness and shame; there is a rent in the picture, a rude shapeless hole, shattering its beauty, and calling for painful and tedious repairs before it can be even tolerable to look upon. Repentance is the pain of this spectacle; and the clearer and more firmly conceived the ideal, the greater the pain.

The idea, cherished by some, that crime or wrong of any sort is invariably pursued by remorse, arises from the natural but mistaken assumption that all other people have consciences similar to our own. The man of sensitive temperament and refined habit of thought feels that he would suffer remorse if he had done the deed, and supposes that the same must be the case with the perpetrator. On the contrary, it seems likely that only a very small proportion of those whom the higher moral sentiment regards as wrong-doers suffer much from the pricks of conscience. If the general tenor of a man's life is high, and the act is the fearful outcome of a moment of passion, as is often the case with unpremeditated murder, he will suffer, but if his life is all of a piece, he will not. All authorities agree that the mass of criminals, and the same is clearly true of ill-doers within the law, have a habit of mind of which the ill deed is the logical outcome, so that there is nothing sudden or catastrophic about it. Of course, if we apply the word conscience only to the mental synthesis of a mind rich in higher sentiments, then such people have no consciences, but it seems a broader view of the matter to say that they have a conscience, in so far as they have mental unity, but that it reflects the general narrowness and perversion of their lives. In fact, people of this description usually if not always, have standards of their own, some sort of honor among thieves, which they will not transgress, or which, if transgressed, cause remorse. It is impossible that mental organization should not produce a moral synthesis of some sort.

In many cases degenerate conduct is due to the fact that the individual lives in a group having degenerate standards: it does not indicate intrinsic inferiority on his part at all. I mean, for example, that a boy who runs away from school, plunders freight cars, breaks windows, and the like, may do these things merely from suggestion and emulation -- just as other boys under other influences turn their energies into athletics and the actions of Boy Scouts -- without being exceptional in any way unless as to the sort of "bunch" he runs with. And the same may be true of any kind of misconduct. These things exist in groups, and the degenerate individual, so far as he is human, is a socius like the rest of us. The group forms his conscience, and what it countenances or admires will not seem wrong to him, no matter how the rest of society may regard it. If it becomes traditional for the members of a certain college fraternity to drink, gamble, and cheat their way through examinations, the freshman will fall into these practices as a matter of course.

The fact that the judgment of right is likely to present itself to people of emotional temperament as an imagined voice, admonishing them that what they ought to do, is an illustration of that essentially social or interlocutory character of thought, spoken of in an earlier chapter. Our thoughts are always, in some sort, imaginary conversations; and when vividly felt they are likely to become distinctly so. On the other hand, people whose moral life is calm perceive little or no distinction, in this regard, between the conclusions of conscience and other judgments.

MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY by George H. Mead, Chicago, U. of C. Press, 1935

The behavior of all living organisms has a basically social aspect. The fundamental biological or psychological impulses and needs which lie at the basis of all such behavior - especially those connected with nutrition and reproduction - are impulses and needs which, in the broadest sense, are social in character and have social implications. There is no living organism of any kind whose nature and constitution is such that it could exist or maintain itself in complete isolation from all other living organisms. All living organisms are bound up in a general social environment or situation, in a complex of social interrelations and interactions upon which their continued existence depends.

Among these socio-physiological impulses or needs, the one which is most important in the case of human social behavior is the sex, or reproductive impulse. The family is the fundamental unit of reproduction and of maintenance of the species. All such larger units or forms of human social organization as the clan or the state are developments from or extensions of the family. In short, all organized human society - even in the most complex and highly developed forms - is in a sense merely an extension and ramification of those simple and basic socio-physiological relations among its individual members upon which it is founded and from which it originates.

Indeed, any psychological or philosophical treatment of human nature involves the assumption that the human individual belongs to an organized social community, and derives his human nature from his social interactions and relations with that community as a whole and with the other individual members of it.

The principle of organization among ants and bees is that of physiological plasticity, giving rise to an actual development in the physiological process of a different type of form adjusted to certain functions. Thus, the whole process of reproduction is carried out for the entire community by a single queen bee or queen ant, a single form with an enormous development of the reproductive organs with the corresponding degeneration of the reproductive organs in other insects in the community. There is the development of a single group of fighters, a differentiation carried so far that they cannot feed themselves. This process of physiological development that makes the individual an organ in the social whole is quite comparable to the development of different tissues in a physiological organism. In a sense all of the functions which are to be found in a multicallular form may be found in a single well. Unicellular forms may carry out the entire vital process; they move, get rid of their waste products, reproduce. But in a multicellular form there is a differentiation of tissue forming muscle cells for movement, cells which take in oxygen and pass out waste products, cells set aside for the process of reproduction. Thus, there results tissue made up of cells which are differentiated. Likewise there is in a community of ants, or of bees, a physiological differentiation among different forms which is comparable to the differentiation of different cells in the tissue of a multicellular form.

The degree to which insect differentiation can be carried is astonishing. Many of the products of a high social organization are carried on by these communities. They capture other minute forms whose exudations they delight

in, and keep them much as we keep milk cows. They have warrior classes and they seem to carry on raids, and carry off slaves, making later use of them. They can do what the human society cannot do: they can determine the sex of the next generation, pick out and determine who the parent in the next generation will be. We get astonishing developments which parallel our own undertakings that we try to carry out in society, but the manner in which they are carried on is essentially different. It is carried on through physiological differentiation, and we fail to find in the study of these animals any medium of communication like that through which human organization takes place. Although we are still very largely in the dark with reference to this social entity of the beehive or the ant's nest, and although we note an obvious likeness between them and human society, there is an entirely different system of organization in the two cases.

The human group, on the other hand, is dependent upon the development of language for its own distinctive form of organization. The principle is that of communication involving participation in the other. This requires the appearance of the other in the self, the identification of the other with the self, the reaching of self-consciousness through the other. This participation is made possible through the type of communication which the human animal is able to carry out -- a type of communication distinguished from that which takes place among other forms which have not this principle in their societies. I discussed the sentinel, so-called, that may be said to communicate his discovery of the danger to the other members, as the clucking of the hen may be said to communicate to the chick. There are conditions under which the gesture of one form serves to place the other forms in the proper attitude toward external conditions. In one sense we may say the one form communicates with the other, but the difference between that and self-conscious communication is evident. One form does not know that communication is taking place with the other. We get illustrations of that in what we term mob-consciousness, the attitude which an audience will take when under the influence of a great speaker. One is influenced by the attitude of those about him, which are reflected back into the different members of the audience so that they come to respond as a whole. One feels the general attitude of the whole audience. There is then communication in a real sense, that is, one form communicates to the other an attitude which the other assumes toward a certain part of the environment that is of importance to them both. That level of communication is found in forms of society which are of lower type than the social organization of the human group.

In the human group, on the other hand, there is not only this kind of communication but also that in which the person sho uses this gesture and so communicates assumes the attitude of the other individual as well as calling it out in the other. He himself is in the role of the other person whom he is so exciting and influencing. It is through taking this role of the other that he is able to come back on himself and so direct his own process of communication. This taking the role of the other, an expression I have so often used, is not simply of passing importance. It is not something that just happens as an incidental result of the gesture, but it is of importance in the development of co-operative activity. The immediate effect of such role-taking lies in the control which the individual is able to exercise over his own response. The control of the action of the individual in a co-

operative process can take place in the conduct of the individual himself if he can take the role of the other. It is this control of the response of the individual himself through taking the role of the other that leads to the value of this type of communication from the point of view of the organization of the conduct in the group. It carries the process of co-operative activity farther than it can be carried in the herd as such, or in the insect society.

And thus it is that social control, as operating in the terms of self-criticism, exerts itself so intimately and extensively over individual behavior or conduct, serving to integrate the individual and his actions with reference to the organized social process of experience and behavior in which he is implicated. Thus he becomes not only self-conscious but also self-critical; and thus, through self-criticism, social control over individual behavior or conduct operates by virtue of the social origin and basis of such criticism. That is to say, self-criticism is essentially social criticism, and behavior controlled by self-criticism is essentially behavior controlled socially. Hence social control, so far from tending to crush out the human individual or to obliterate his self-conscious individuality, is, on the contrary, actually constitutive of and inextricably associated with that individuality; for the individual is what he is, as a conscious and individual personality, just in so far as he is a member of society, involved in the social process of experience and activity, and thereby socially controlled in his conduct.

The very organization of the self-conscious community is dependent upon individuals taking the attitude of the other individuals. The development of this process, as I have indicated, is dependent upon getting the attitude of the group as district from that of a separate individual -- getting what I have termed a "generalized other". The degree to which the life of the whole community can get into the self-conscious life of the separate individuals varies enormously. History is largely occupied in tracing out the development which could not have been present in the actual experience of the members of the community at the time the historian is writing about. Such an account explains the importance of history. One can look back over that which took place, and bring out changes, forces, and interests which nobody at the time was conscious of. We have to wait for the historian to give the picture because the actual process was one transcended the experience of the separate individuals.

Occasionally a person arises who is able to take in more than others of an act in process, who can put himself into relation with whole groups in the community whose attitudes have not entered into the lives of the others in the community. He becomes a leader. Classes under a feudal order may be so separate from each other that, while they can act in certain traditional circumstances, they cannot understand each other; and then there may arise an individual who is capable of entering into the attitudes of the other members of the group. Figures of that sort become of enormous importance because they make possible communication between groups otherwise completely separated from each other. The sort of capacity we speak of is in politics the attitude of the statesman who is able to enter into the attitudes of the group and to mediate between them by making his own experience universal, so

that others can enter into this form of communication through him.

The getting of this social response into the individual constitutes the process of education which takes over the cultural media of the community in a more or less abstract way. Education is definitely the process of taking over a certain organized set of responses to one's own stimulation; and until one can respond to himself as the community responds to him, he does not genuinely belong to the community. He may belong to a small community, as the small boy belongs to a gang rather than to the city in which he lives. We all belong to small cliques, and we may remain simply inside of them. The "organized other" present in ourselves is then a community of a narrower diameter. We are struggling now to get a certain amount of international mindedness. We are realizing ourselves as members of a large community. The vivid nationalism of the present period should, in the end, call out an international attitude of the larger community. The situation is analogous to that of the boy and the gang; the boy gets a larger self in proportion as he enters into this larger community. In general, the self has answered definitely to that organization of the social response which constitutes the community as such; the degree to which the self is developed depends upon the community, upon the degree to which the individual calls out that institutionalized group of responses in himself. The criminal as such is the individual who lives in a very small group, and then makes depredations upon the larger community of which he is not a member. He is taking the property that belongs to others, but he himself does not belong to the community that recognizes and preserves the rights of property.

What goes to make up the organized self is the organization of the attitudes which are common to the group. A person is a personality because he belongs to a community, because he takes over the institutions of that community into his own conduct. He takes its language as a medium by which he gets his personality, and then through a process of taking the different roles that all the others furnish he comes to get the attitude of the members of the community. Such, in a certain sense, is the structure of a man's personality. There are certain common responses which each individual has toward certain common things, and in so far as those common responses are awakened in the individual when he is affecting other persons he arouses his own self. The structure, then, on which the self is built is this response which is common to all, for one has to be a member of a community to be a self. Such responses are abstract attitudes, but they constitute just what we term a man's character. They give him what we term his principles, the acknowledged attitudes of all members of the community toward what are the values of that community. He is putting himself in the place of the generalized other, which represents the organized responses of all the members of the group. It is that which guides conduct controlled by principles, and a person who has such an organized group of responses is a man whom we say has character, in the moral sense.

I have so far emphasized what I have called the structures upon which the self is constructed, the framework of the self, as it were. Of course we are not only what is common to all: each one of the selves is different from everyone else; but there has to be such a common structure as I have sketched in order that we may be members of a community at all. We cannot be our-

selves unless we are also members in whom there is a community of attitudes which control the attitudes of all. We cannot have rights unless we have common attitudes. That which we have acquired as self-conscious persons makes us such members of society and gives us selves. Selves can only exist in definite relationships to other selves. No hard-and-fast line can be drawn between our own selves and the selves of others, since our own selves exist and enter as such into our experience only in so far as the selves of others exist and enter as such into our experience also. The individual possesses a self only in relation to the selves of the other members of his social group; and the structure of his self expresses or reflects the general behavior pattern of this social group to which he belongs, just as does the structure of the self of every other individual belonging to this social group.

There is one other matter which I wish briefly to refer to now. The only way in which we can react against the disapproval of the entire community is by setting up a higher sort of community which in a certain sense out-votes the one we find. A person may reach a point of going against the whole world about him; he may stand out by himself over against it. But to do that he has to speak with the voice of reason to himself. He has to comprehend the voices of the past and of the future. That is the only way in which the self can get a voice which is more than the voice of the community. As a rule we assume that this general voice of the community is identical with the larger community of the past and the future, we assume that an organized custom represents what we call morality. The things one cannot do are those which everybody would condemn. If we take the attitude of the community over against our own responses, that is a true statement, but we must not forget this other capacity, that of replying to the community and insisting on the gesture of the community changing. We can reform the order of things; we can insist on making the community standards better standards. We are not simply bound by the community. We are engaged in a conversation in which what we say is listened to by the community and its respons is one which is affected by what we have to say. This is especially true in critical situations. A man rises up and defends himself for what he does; he has his "day in court"; he can present his views. He can perhaps change the attitude of the community towards himself. The process of conversation is one in which the individual has not only the right but the duty of talking to the community of which he is a part, and bringing about those changes which take place through the interaction of individuals. That is the way, of course, in which society gets ahead, by just such interactions as those in which some person thinks a thing out. We are continually changing our social system in some respects, and we are able to do that intelligently because we can think.

C O N S C I E N C E

W. E. Hocking in "Human Nature and Its Re-making." pp. 119 - 168

Conscience is the principle inner agency for the re-making of human nature; hence it must stand as a critic over against everything that is to be re-made, and so over against all instincts. It plays the part of censor, for the most part permissive, and hence silent: but it is cognizant of every act of will, and of the total policy of the self. All that belongs to the will, including every form of the will to power, must be bringable under its scrutiny ..... My view is that conscience stands outside the instinctive life of man, not as something separate, but as an awareness of the success or failure of that life in maintaining its status and its growth. It is a safe-guard of the power at any time achieved. It interposes a check when an act is proposed which threatens 'integrity.' What conscience recognizes is that certain behavior increases our hold on reality while certain other behavior diminishes that hold, constitutes what the old Southern Buddhist called as asava, a leak. The remark of conscience is: "That course, or that act, promises to build or threatens to tear down, what you metaphysically are," ..... Conscience is the latest and finest instrument for the self-integration of instinct. It is an instinct characteristically human.

If we are right in thus placing conscience on the growing edge of human nature, we can understand the importance which men have assigned to its working.

There are signs of bewilderment in our current moral judgments regarding sin. We see clearly that there is something disproportionately dark in the thoughts of Augustine and his followers; we do not see clearly what to put in their place. General amnesty is hardly more successful than general condemnation of the race. Let me try to get rid of the idea of guilt, substituting for it the idea of illness or misfortune. Let me take into my employ a man with a 'record,' believing that society is part-responsible for every crime, - I find that I feel far more confidence for the future if my unfortunate brother condemns himself than if he chimes in too heartily with my own point of view. There is a margin of indulgence in the moral book-keeping of society, perhaps also of the universe, and all of us profit by it; yet if any one demands this indulgence as a right he disqualifies himself. If we think we can omit the moral sermon and substitute the hygienic measure or the change of place, we find the rebuke is still implied in the need for these measures. The 'ought' is none the less active for not being verbally invoked. The sense of sin seems to have at least so much pragmatic force,-it does not quite work to omit it, as a prevalent modern attitude tries to do.

Moral mistakes seem to bear a close analogy to the mistakes which are inevitable in acquiring any new art, and may have the same explanation. The beginner at target practice will miss the mark: that is a safe prediction. He is entirely free to hit it: and there is no assignable reason why he must miss it. "Good shooting," said a marksman to me, "is simply a matter of caring enough about each shot." Yet the beginner will miss. As time goes on, he will miss less frequently,--a curve of his progress in learning can be drawn. Some men progress more rapidly than others, and go farther toward a perfect score; but there is a similarity in all curves of learning. Is not sin a missing of the target, and hence a phenomenon of the curve of learning?

For any particular technique at which we try, the curve of learning holds; and so with the virtues, so far as they have a technique. Franklin's scheme of monthly practice was a prudent one. But right is not a matter of matching an objectively definable standard. In all such efforts the full will of the individual is on the side of striking the mark, and the adjustment is defeated by the physical obstacles of imperfect organization and control. In the moral effort there is no difficulty of this sort: the nature of right is to be always within reach, otherwise there is no obligation. The point is that my full will is not on the side of striking that mark. Hence the analogy breaks down; and there is no law of learning for morality. The sinful situation is not a failure to reach what was by some organic law beyond reach; it is a defection from what was within my power. I have, as a fact of history, preferred an easier course.

Sin has commonly referred to individual deeds,--and so we have understood it; but it has also referred to a status. As a status, or condition, it has implied impurity, pollution, liability to banishment, etc., metaphysical outlawry. The word sinner refers to this status rather than to the particular deeds. Regarding it in this way we should have to say that so far from rejecting the notion that there is a sinful status, we should have to affirm one, so far, at least, as psychology can carry us.

My moral status, as a fact of psychology, would be the condition of my preferences -- my character. And my preferences I cannot modify in any so immediate way as I can modify a deed. Suppose that, whether by birth or by acquired habit, I simply do not as a fact prefer righteousness,--at the price of moral effort. I might not call this condition depravity. I should certainly not call it holiness.

Apart from particular deeds of sin, then, our common moral consciousness recognizes something like a sinful status. As for those deeds themselves, it is a matter of daily experience that they bring a new status with them. Debasement is not an act; it is a condition of choice resulting from a series of acts. Each abandonment of the effort for complete interpretation, makes the next abandonment easier; and what conscience is concerned about is not alone the issue of this act but also, and primarily, the psychological status which it creates. But what is the significance of this status, whether original or acquired? Allowing that we are justified in viewing it with regret, if not wholly with indignation, is there any excuse for the terror and guilt of soul, the "anxiety neurosis" of the older theology?

We shall see more clearly if we eliminate the psychological element of blame, and ask again simply for fact. What does this status entail? I do not know. But I am not prepared to say that it entails nothing. If I were told that it entails a form of mortality, I should lend the assertion a respectful hearing. It would seem reasonable to me that a lesser status, in things relating to insight, idea, appreciation, should be a measure of lesser validity in point of reality. If ideas are the most real things in the universe, this would most certainly be the case. If life is to be measured in terms of intercourse with minds with whom I am fit to converse, I can see that this status of inferiority is one that must carry with it a lesser degree of life.

Putting away all emphasis on moral ideals, let me look at things "naturally". It seems in this sense natural to me that men should be sinful. It seems also natural to me that they should be mortal. It is not mortality that looks strange to me; it is immortality. I could not rebel if I were told, without prejudice, that my range of existence would be as the range of my own effective wishes. This, I should say, is obvious justice. Let those who care for immortality take the pains; let the others have their own finite reward. Let each have the degree of life which his own status -- by its natural hold on reality -- commands.

This would leave us all in calm, were this the last word. For who could regard that a "punishment" which is simply failure to attain an end that one does not want? You thunder at me that unless I repent of my sin, I shall perish. I reply, I am content to perish -- indeed, I had never aimed at anything else: I have not insisted on being immortal.

But we are not thus left, by nature, at our natural ease. Having become self-conscious, we have no choice but to see life for the good it is, and to be restless at the thought of exclusion from that good. To lose life, to lose the quality of life, to lose the possibility of responding to what we believe to be the best, and hence the possibility of being with the best, to be unable, as Dostoievski's Father Zossima has it,--to be unable to love, and to know this inability and this loss: this is a torment to man as it is not to the other creatures. If man must recognize in himself a status of natural finitude, we must also ascribe to him, in his original equipment, an impulse which repudiates that status and demands a being at the level of his appreciation. If man is by nature evil, that evil is not all of him: he is also by nature ill-at-ease with his imperfect self, fretted by an ambition to become what he is not, an ambition which makes of his conscience an ally and a tool. This is not something different from the will to power; but it is the deepest expression of that will. It is the will to overcome death.

Religion has had this service to render: it has co-operated with this human unwillingness to accept mortality. It has constantly reminded man how easily he may remain mortal, and how hardly he may earn immortality. It has made him pray with a touch of fear, "Take not thy holy spirit from me." There are those who refer to this state of mind as an 'anxiety neurosis': it may become such. But in substance, it is simply the original man in his whole-ness facing the fact of his natural status. Others have called it the 'divine spark' which somehow disturbs our clod. Names matter little; but the disturbed state is one of increased, not lessened, awareness of truth. The capacity of feeling the natural bent of desire as invested with the omen of finitude is what constitutes man not only a self but a soul. For the soul is the self as aware of, and seeking to control, its metaphysical status. It is original man in his full stature.

SOCIAL ASPECTS OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

by W. A. White

Disease used to be considered, in fact still is, as something that comes from without in some way and attacks the individual and in medieval thought was thought of as a sort of devil that took up its residence within the body. Disease is nothing of the sort. Disease is only a manifestation of that dynamic interplay between organism and environment when, for the time being at least, the balance is on the wrong side of the ledger, when the organism, for some reason, is losing out. It might be defined in the same words which Schiller uses to define evil when he says, "Evil is that which resists the evolution of the world, and fights a losing battle against the tendencies of things. It owes its persistence simply to this, that the end is not yet, that the purpose of the world process is still being achieved, that the discordant elements are still being harmonized, and that hence what is cannot yet realize what ought to be." In other words, it is the process of dedifferentiation on a large scale. It can readily be understood how this is true, say of the changes incident to old age but it is equally true of less obvious situations such as the infections. Infection does not equally afflict everyone, some are relatively immune, others relatively susceptible. There is an underlying orientation of the organism toward the infectious agent, vaguely referred to as constitutional, which but exemplifies the fact that the result is the outcome of the dynamic interplay between organism and environment. Then when the study of pathology is approached it is found that there nothing is new. Disorder is found among the normal physiological processes but nothing new has been added to the situation. The only differences are quantitative, differences of more or less and not of kind. Pathology is only the study of physiology modified by differences of emphasis here and there.

Disease is, therefore, not an extraneous something like a medieval devil, but, a function of the dynamic interplay of organism and environment and the study of disease alone, as disease, can never give a complete account of the reasons for the symptoms. This is more true, in the realm of mind than elsewhere because the environment at this level, the social environment, plays a predominant role.

Therefore the next step brought the period of interpretative psychiatry, the period upon which it is only now just entering. From this point of view the disease, in this case the mental disease, can only be understood when it is appreciated how it has developed as the result of certain stresses applied to a certain personality make-up, and the symptoms then appear as the result of the stress acting upon this make-up, and express in symbolic form the way in which the personality, more particularly at its weak points, has striven to meet the situation. Psychiatry, therefore, must busy itself, not with the study of a longitudinal section of the individual which shows how a given type of personality make-up has reacted to a given type of stress, how it has brought its assets and liabilities to the problem in hand, how it is dealing with that problem, and how finally it solves it.

This is the type of psychology which is so much in evidence now-a-days and has contributed so much to the practical psychiatrist, social worker, and

vocational psychologist. A scientific psychiatry, based upon a genetic psychology, must, however, delve much deeper in its search for explanations. As already indicated the head end is quite as old in historical development as the rest of the organism. The psyche is not something which has been added at a given point in the course of evolution but, in its present form is the elaboration and final expression of the supremacy of the head end. Therefore the history of the psyche is not confined to the life time of the individual but stretches back over the whole period of organic evolution just as does the history of the body. Just as there can be no adequate understanding of the body except there has been traced its development to its present estate along the path of evolution so it is with the mind .

Concerning the Social Aspects of Psychopathology

Just as it has been already indicated that the multicellular organism is not a mere aggregation of cells so society is not a mere aggregation of individuals. Society is made up of the various individuals plus the relations that maintain between them. In other words it is an organism, integrated and structuralized just as are other organisms.
.....From the point of view of society as a higher form of organism certain results flow in explanation of the individual's psychology. Just as the cells are agencies for carrying out the larger plan of the organism as a whole so the individual humans are agencies for carrying out the larger plan of society. What are these larger plans? In general it is perfectly obvious that they must include self-preservation and creative expansion, growth and development. The individual must either fit into or fit out of this general scheme, but how? The answer is found when inquiry is made into the standards he sets himself for conduct. His conduct, when it in any way touches the welfare of the state, is right if it furthers those interests, wrong if it is opposed to them. And the significant fact about this rightness and wrongness of conduct is that it is not merely a matter of the verdict of others but that somehow the actor himself feels his conduct to be right or wrong as the case may be.

This way of looking at society as a higher state of integration than exists in any of its individual components seems to offer the only means of explaining many facts of man's so-called moral nature. Social tradition is passed on from generation to generation just as truly as the more obvious physical characteristics are transmitted through the medium of the germ plasm, and their practical working is as effectively insured by being incorporated as inherent, affective tendencies in the individual. Only in this way can be explained the relatively slight effect which severity of punishment apparently has upon the incidence of anti-social acts. Either individuals have attained such a high point of social integration that the fear of punishment has little or no effect upon their conduct, they will be moral anyway, or they have fallen so far short in their social integration that the fear of punishment cannot have any effect, they are controlled by lower instincts and will be immoral in their conduct anyway. This is especially well illustrated in certain forms of auto-erotic sexual indulgences.

The individual is so oriented towards those acts which, in their general ten-

dency are destructive to the herd that he feels instinctively that they are wrong and if impelled to commit such acts feels, also instinctively, a sense of personal guilt. The individual is truly an agency through which the destinies of the more highly integrated organism, society, works out its expression.

The degree to which the individual is subjected to the needs of the herd is seen in high relief at times of war when he is called upon to die that the State may live. The universality with which this demand is met is the strongest possible proof of this thesis .

Mental disease is disease at the level of integration of the individual and society. It is not a disease of society as such nor yet of man as an individual solely, it is a disease of man as a social animal, it touches him in his social integrations.

Of course this is an attitude quite contrary to that purely materialistic point of view which always seeks back of the symptoms for an explanation, which would explain the paretic psychosis, for example, by syphilis. Syphilis only disintegrates the machinery with which the individual must work out his salvation and brings his difficulties into the foreground. Syphilis may be the prime reason why an individual has a psychosis but the pathology of paresis will never be able to tell why the paretic has the delusion that he is worth untold millions or that he is God Almighty. It has been pretty well shown that the specific character of his delusions only receive their explanation when his personality make-up is known, until the personality material is understood that is involved in the struggle for expression which the syphilis makes so much more difficult.

Attention has already been called to the principle involved. The higher integration can never be explained fully by the lower integrations. Every integration involves at least two factors and the relation between them and in its essence the higher integration is this relation. The properties of water cannot be explained either by a study of oxygen or of hydrogen but only by the relation between them. Schiller discusses this whole question quite fully. He says, among other things: "Naturalism is sooner or later doomed to failure. It leaves out the higher aspects of things and in the end these cannot be omitted. For the objects of the physical sciences forming the lower orders in the hierarchy of existence, though more extensive, are less significant. The atoms of the physicists may indeed be implied in the organization of conscious beings, but in a subordinate capacity: a living organism exhibits actions which cannot be formulated by the laws of physics alone; man is material, but he is also a great deal more, to wit, alive, psychical, and moral. Again, all bodies gravitate, but the activities of living, to say nothing of rational, bodies cannot be explained by the action of gravitation alone. So chemical affinities are presupposed in biological actions, but yet life is something more than and beyond chemical affinity. Thus it is the same inherent law of the method which is displayed, not only the palpable inadequacy of explaining biological facts by chemical or mechanical facts, but also in that of explaining the rational or moral by mere biology.

THE SENSE OF BELONGINGNESS

From "Personality and The Culture Pattern"

By James A. Plant - pp. 95 ff.

It is written that God made a covenant with Abraham in which he stated that every person born a Jew would be an especial treasure in His eyes. This is an interesting agreement because it involved the position of an individual on the basis of who he was rather than on the basis of what he was. The covenant did not stipulate color of hair, stature, strength--or even high IQ! The mere fact of arrival in a certain family settled the matter. Nor did the covenant deal only with those Jews who were then alive. It predicted that those arriving two hundred or two thousand years later would have this place just because of their birth. This interesting situation is being re-enacted in every normal family today.

The child's position in his own family is based very much upon this matter of who he is. His position in society in general, on the other hand, is based upon his various attributes. Thus the school, the social worker, and the judge assay Johnny on the basis of his repeated delinquencies, his mediocre intelligence, his poverty-stricken and dirt-ridden family, and have only dazed resentment for the mother's insistent cry that "He's my Johnny." In a great deal of our whole program of social engineering, we have failed to realize that the essential strength of family life lies in the tying together of its members on the basis of who they are. And this is natural because these family ties are so defiant of rational or reasonable analysis --indeed a large factor in their strength lies precisely in this inability of reasonable considerations to destroy or materially change them.

There comes a time in the usual child's life when he can rather easily transfer this need for a feeling of belongingness to his relationships in his religious life. Here again God is given the role of parent, and again He cares for us because of who we are--and still cares for us regardless of what we are or what we do. Great stress is placed on belongingness in all religious patterns--they give this realization of one's place in the whole scheme of things.

Havelock Ellis long since illuminated this point in his discussion of acquaintanceship and intimacy. (Havelock Ellis, Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Philadelphia, F. A. Davis, 1929. Vol. V, page 12.) In the former we are interested in the traits of persons (what they are or have). Thus a disfiguring characteristic is a deterrent to acquaintanceship. When the stage of intimacy is reached this same characteristic now becomes a cementing factor. "I love John because he is John. The disfiguring characteristic proves that I care for him because of who he is. If our relationship had the slightest tinge of what we have or are, you see I would not care for him." In the same way differences in religion or social background discourage acquaintanceship but are factors of great importance in the strengthening of the intimacy tie.

As far as words allow, we are attempting here to differentiate between the quality of insecurity and the quality of inadequacy (or inferiority which

we use as a synonymous term). This negative approach is here used simply as one of the ways of arriving at a clarification of the difference between security on the one hand and, on the other, adequacy or superiority. The original difference lies in the fact that security comes to the individual because of who he is whereas adequacy is attained through what he is and what he can do. However, as one clinically sees the reactions to insecurity and inadequacy a new set of criteria appear. Insecurity and inadequacy in this light appear to be not a dichotomy but rather as the emphasized ends of a continuous series. It follows that security and adequacy are probably not a dichotomy. Problems of security are met before those of adequacy, and security is the more basic, pervasive, "necessary," of the two. Similarly an individual may be comfortably secure as to his part in the scheme of things though hopelessly inadequate in every standard of attainment which either he or society might erect. The example that comes to mind is the child who is a failure in school because he is intellectually slow and a failure on the street because he is awkward and clumsy but who shows his fundamental feeling that sometime "everything will be all right" because he is unassailably accepted as a necessary and cared-for member of his family group. On the other hand, an individual may have achieved in finance or scholarship the very highest degree of adequacy and yet have his every act and attainment pervaded by a restless ill-at-ease-ness if he does not have security.

THE MYSTICAL AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPT

George A. Coe in the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology
and Scientific Methods - April 1909

Current usage of the term "mysticism" is unprecise and inconsistent except at one point. Speculative or epistemological mysticism is well understood as a theory of immediacy, and specifically such immediacy as causes the finite search to cease because the other is no longer another. Professor Royce has given us a searching analysis of this epistemology, but his plan did not require an investigation of the genesis of the experiences out of which speculative mysticism grows. Professor James names four marks of the mystical state -- ineffability, noetic quality, transiency, and passivity -- but his attention, in turn, was upon the value rather than upon the genesis of the experience, and consequently the marks that he enumerates are borrowed without thorough criticism from the unscientific introspection of the mystic himself. Leuba, Murisier, Delecroix, and others have worked out either special aspects of mysticism or the psychology of a particular group of mystics, and in these studies there are many illuminating glimpses into the broad field of mystics as a whole. Yet I know of no attempt to run a line around this broad field so as to determine its boundaries, nor have we, so to speak, a general physiography of it. The content and value of the mystical experience rather than its form and genesis have been the favorite topics of investigation. As a result, psychologists feel free to use the term mysticism in any sense that suits their incidental purposes, and even careful writers on religion define it with an arbitrariness that practically ignores both psychology and history. No wonder that popular speech plays fast and loose with the term, and that the religious world is in confusion as to the whole notion of religious experience.

How can we hope to make any approach toward precision in the use of this term, or secure a basis for a general evaluation of religious mysticism, unless we first make a good survey of the facts that seem to call for a common name? Such a survey ought to show whether or not any definite psychological fact or notion lies at the basis of the problem, and it will certainly do this if it reveals the genetic relationships of different types of mysticism.

As a rough attempt at such a survey, a tabular "view of the mystical" is herewith submitted. In the main it will explain itself. It takes its start from what is universally recognized as completely mystical, namely, religious ecstacy, together with the theory of it and the practice that seeks to realize it. In the next place, certain less extreme experiences, common to the great mystics on the road toward ecstacy, and to a multitude of those who never reach ecstacy at all, fall into place as mystical in the same sense as ecstacy itself. A convenient name for them is "inspirations." These, in turn, give rise to a belief and a practice. We next notice that experiences of the same psychological type take place outside of what is conventionally called religion. We might, indeed, extend the term inspiration beyond the religious usage. For spiritualism gives us supposed inspiration by a deceased human being, telepathy by a living one, and clairvoyance and premonition by, perhaps, the nature of things. A common term for the phenomena in this field has, however, come into general use, namely, "psychical phenomena." For the practice of non-religious inspirations we have the general term "mediumship." Finally, looking to the historical genesis of these

A SURVEY OF THE MYSTICAL

Experience	Supposed Source	Deliberate Practice
Supreme mystical state: Ecstacy Supposed form: complete absorption or loss of personality Supposed content: either zero or infinity	God - tendency toward pantheistic conception	An attempt to realize God as the All: Yoga Christian "Via Negativa" Christian Science and New Thought Method: narrowing of attention and auto-suggestion
Incomplete mystical states (religious): Inspirations: Experience of seer: sense of guidance or of illumination; witness of the Spirit; sense of presence; anesthetic revelation; cosmic consciousness Form: partial abeyance of self-control in mental functions; occasional loss of muscular control Content: somewhat specific ideas which seem self-evidently true	God or gods generally conceived as transcendent	Attempts to realize God on special occasions or for special ends: Oracles and other methods of penetrating the unknown Some forms of revivalism, Holiness movements and allied practices Divine healing Transsubstantiation Method: surrender or quiescence of will, suggestion (largely social)
Incomplete mystical states other than religious: Psychic phenomena, supposed spirit communication, telepathy, clairvoyance, premonitions, etc.	A spirit, a living man or the nature of things	Attempts to take advantage of supposed occult connections: Mediumship in its various forms
Primitive root of the whole: Automatic experiences interpreted as possession	Spirits	Attempts to control spirits: certain parts of magic Shamanism

practices, we come upon the primitive root of the whole in automatic experiences interpreted as "possession," and cultivated by the "medicine man," the shaman, or the "witch doctor."

Complete enumeration is, of course, not intended, but only suggestions of the whole through typical classes. Nor is the table intended as an exhaustive division into mutually exclusive classes. The table does, however, group together phenomena, beliefs, and practices that are psychologically coherent, and it indicates the true psychical and historical genesis of the more developed practices. The psychical genesis of the whole is the duality, which is yet immediacy, that appears when automatic control occurs. Here is the psychical root of the whole of mysticism.

From Psychology of Religion, p. 270

Wherever mysticism is a systematic practice, the procedure contains certain common elements. The first is the withdrawal of attention from the activities and sense stimuli of the common life. The second is extraordinary concentration of attention upon some particular object. We have already seen how the shaman employs such processes. They reappear, in refined form, in the higher religions. The Buddhist, or Brahmin, or Christian mystic does not necessarily resort to any intoxicating, numbing or fatiguing processes, but he does systematize the fixation of attention technically called 'contemplation.'

MENTAL TRAITS OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS

George A. Coe

(in "The Psychology of Religion," pp. 176-192)

Three broad types of leader are distinguishable, the shaman, the priest, and the prophet, and these three reach the climax of their respective influence in this historical order -- the the climax only, for evolution does not separate things as a staircase separates different levels by a vertical rise. Shamanism persists in all religions, though not in all religious individuals, and seeds and sprouts of late maturing plants can be discerned early in the evolution. Furthur, the terms "shaman," "priest," and "prophet," as here used, should not be taken as full and adequate description; they are merely centers around which to gather bodies of related facts.

1. The shaman. Practically everywhere in early religion we find religious specialists who correspond in important ways to the persons among us who are called "psychics." The shaman is supposed to learn and reveal hidden things, such as the future, or the whereabouts of a lost object, or the doer of a secret act, such as theft, and to influence the mysterious forces, all by processes that we recognize as subjective. A typical shamanistic procedure is the trance. By dancing continued to the point of exhaustion, or by exhausting sweating in a sweat lodge, or by mental numbing brought on by monotonous music, prolonged torture, or the use of narcotic drugs, the shaman gets himself out of his usual grooves, is shorn of his habitual inhibitions, and passes into autohypnosis or trance. This condition involves unresponsiveness to the generality of stimuli, with focalized responsiveness to some particular sort of stimuli. The shaman now acts from suggestions, some of which, based upon tribal traditions and upon previous experience of his own, he took with him into the trance, and others of which are derived from the immediate situation. His response to these suggestions is likely to take the form of visions - he sees the enemy, or the god, or the supposed culprit, or the issue of the impending battle. Sometimes he speaks automatically, that is, the impression of the moment passes directly into involuntary speech. To the beholders, and largely to the shaman himself, all this is the direct expression of mana or of some more definite being, such as a spirit, by which he is"possessed."

According to the tribe's theory, the shaman is a leader because of this super-something that is in him. In reality his leadership is due to at least three factors: First comes the impressiveness of the trance phenomenon itself, and the fact that this individual experiences trance more than his fellows. He is likely to have a special aptitude for trances; that is, to be nervously unstable, a neurotic. Certainly spontaneous trances in someone are the necessary anticedent of the cultivation of trance states. Yet, since most normal individuals can be hypnotized, the automatisms of a given shaman may have been induced entirely by training administered by previous shamans. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that a neurotic tendency, if it is not too extreme, is a help to religious influence at this stage of religious evolution.

A second ground of shamanistic influence is success in doing the thing that the people desire. Undoubtedly shamans - and here we may include the oracles - are sometimes wise. They are wise, not merely because they know how to avoid issues, or surreptitiously to gather information, or to give forth ambiguities that can be interpreted in accordance with the event, but also

because the abstracted mind sometimes gains in truth even from its oversimplification. It seems clear that the reducing of inhibitions, the dropping of things from attention, not seldom makes the really important fact seem important. Successful guesses at character, or solutions of problems, or prediction, doubtless do thus occur now and then, redounding to the glory of the shaman, and overbalancing any number of weaker performances or failures. Again, the encouragement that he brings to the anxious, adding to their actual power as well as comfort, is secure ground for the shaman's influence. The mere prediction of victory in battle might produce the courage to win it.

A third ground of the shaman's influence is wisdom gathered from habitual dealing with public interests. For he acts for the group, and therefore accustomes himself to men, to the graver problems, and to causes and effects (however inadequately he may analyze them). x

These are the foundations of the shaman's power in his group. The cornerstone of the whole is automatisms interpreted as intercourse with the superior powers. The shaman himself shares this basal belief with his group. Nevertheless, because he discovers that matters can sometimes be helped along by mixing certain voluntary performances with the automatic, he becomes a trickster as well as a "psychic." The case is parallel with that of some modern psychics who make a livelihood by fortune-telling or by securing supposed communications from the dead. If we detect such a person committing a fraud, we are likely to suppose that he is consciously fraudulent all the way through, whereas he may still believe that "there's something in it" because of the presence of a genuinely automatic factor to which he knows not how to give any but a spiritistic interpretation. What we call fraud is thus in part his way of helping on what he believes to be genuine intercourse with superior powers.

2. The priest. If the central item in the shaman's function is to lay hold of fresh power by psychical means, the corresponding item in priestly functions consists in conserving by institutional means whatever has been attained. This, too, is leadership, and it has a creative aspect; though it is conservative rather than radical, it is not mere petrifaction. The priest, seeing to it that the ceremonies are duly observed; that sacred places, times, objects, and persons are kept sacred; that the traditions are accurately handed down from generation to generation and ultimately commited to writing, not only repeats the utility acts which the shaman originated, but also makes an immeasurable contribution to the organization of a firm society. Priesthoods train men to the idea of law, even to law that enforces itself by inner rather than outer force, as taboo, divine favor or displeasure and post-mortem rewards and penalties. The priestly regime likewise trains men to act and to feel together. Tribal consciousness and, at its beginnings, national consciousness are inseparable from the circle of ideas and practices over which the priesthood presides. In his own way, then, the priest is a religious leader, and his mental traits deserve attention.

Historically the shaman and the priest shade into each other. Yet the shaman type yields in time to the priestly type. For automatisms are not easily organizable into a permanently controlled system. The tribe must repeat

again and again the acts that secure the help of the superior powers, but fresh intercourse with these powers by the way of "possession" cannot always be guaranteed. Besides, early acts that appear to be useful become hardened into custom, so that the ceremony tends to go on, whatever be the psychical outcome of fresh resort to the unseen beings. The priestly mind, accordingly, is the mind that observes times and seasons, holds to exact forms of approaching the gods, systematizes, creates orthodoxies, and finally sets up mental kingdoms and empires that rival in real power the civil and military authorities. Not self-abandonment to fresh impulse, not intuitive certainties, but the logic of consistency, with an ever-present assumption of the validity of the past - this is priestliness. Hence, among other things, the punctilious writing down of the exact formula for the sacrifice, the effort to preserve the very words of religious founders, the interpretation of national history in terms of religious doctrine - in short, the birth of sacred literatures. Here, of course, is opportunity, much used, for dead formalism, mechanical routine, and lazy revenues (the priest's portion of the sacrifice, etc.), yet all in all the priestly mind has shown upon occasion agression and resistance and organizing ability.

3. The Prophet. The term "prophet" is used in two main senses. On the one hand it is made to cover all of the more directly psychical, as distinguished from priestly and ceremonial, methods of intercourse with the gods. Thus the shamanistic performance of Israel's bands of soothsayers, of Saul when he fell into a trance, of Elisha when he called for music as a means to insight - these on the one hand - and the ethical preaching of Amos and the statesmanship of Isaiah, on the other hand, are all called "prophecy." But at times prophecy means specifically the experience that sets such men as Isaiah and Amos apart from both the priests and the sooth-saying types of so-called "prophets." In this restricted sense the term will be used here. It points to the fact that from time to time, in various religions, leaders have arisen who have gone directly to the sources of religious life, thus setting themselves in contrast with the priests and the priestly system; it points also to a second fact of the first importance, namely, that this going to the sources, though it is continuous with shamanism, nevertheless transcends it, and contrasts with it not less strongly than it contrasts with priestliness.

The most accessible and illuminating instances are the great prophets of Israel. "I hate, I despise your feasts, and I will take no delight in your solemn assemblies," says Amos, speaking in the name of Jahwe. "Yea, though ye offer me your burnt offerings and meal offerings, I will not accept them: neither will I regard the peace offerings of your fat beasts. Take thou away from me the noise of thy songs; for I will not hear the melody of thy viols" (Amos 5:21-23). Here is the prophetic protest against the ceremonial or priestly conception of Jahwe's dealings with Israel, a revulsion from orthodox institutionalism toward the primal sources of religious feeling. But this is less than half the story. The spiritual lineage of Amos goes backward, in important respects, toward shamanism. For he feels himself to be the immediate mouthpiece of Jahwe; he experiences a kind of possession. But the contrast with shamanism is as great as that with priestly institutionalism. It is no return to shamanism that Amos desires. "Let judgment roll down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream" (5:24); "Hear

this, O ye that would swallow up the needy, and cause the poor of the land to fail, saying, When will the new moon be gone, that we may sell corn? And the sabbath, that we may set forth wheat? making the ophah small, and the shekel great, and dealing falsely with balances of deceit; that we may buy the poor for silver, and the needy for a pair of shoes, and sell the refuse of the wheat" (8:4-6). Here at last is religious leadership that, conceiving God predominantly as ethical will, regards ethical conduct as the service of God and the prophet's own ethical fervor as divine inspiration. It is true that the great prophets experienced dreams and visions; it is true that these automatisms were interpreted as divine possession after the manner of shamanism; but the complimentary truth is that a distinction was made between true and false prophets upon the basis of the content of their respective messages. The true prophet must speak ethical truth without compromise. "The prophet is a fool, the man that hath the spirit is made!" Hosea's hearers seem to say, and he retorts, "It is for the multitude of thine iniquity, and because the enmity is great". (Hos. 11:7)

The career and the writings of Paul present an extraordinary instance of the coexistence in one individual of the qualities that underlie all three types of leadership. In the first place, he had a luxuriant experience of the sort of automatisms that might have made him a great leader of the shamanistic type. He had visions, fell into trances, spoke and wrote under conscious inspiration, spoke in "tongues" abundantly (an automatic phenomenon that will be described in the next chapter). But, in the second place, there was much of the priest in him, both by reason of his training as a strict Pharisee and by reason of the natural qualities of his mind. A maker of distinctions, a systematizer, a lover of precedent and of consistency, an organizer, a ruler of his followers - think how all this, added to the whole body of assumptions involved in his training as a Pharisee, fitted him to be the originator of a rigid priesthood. Yet both the shamanistic and the priestly tendencies within him were resisted and transcended, though not at all extirpated, by the influence upon him of the prophetic spirit of Jesus. Paul's immortal ode on love is a direct and specific comparison of the values of the shamanistic and the prophetic principles respectively. He is dealing with the extreme, disorderly automatisms of the circle at Corinth. He expresses a wish that all the Corinthian Christians might speak in tongues (1 Cor. 14:5). He thanks God that he himself speaks in tongues more even than anyone there (14:18). He believes, with shamanism, that this experience is actually a divine taking possession of one's vocal organs, yet, unlike shamanism, he is ready to judge it by its fruits. As far as it leads to disorder, it is to be condemned, and anyhow, he exclaims, "In the church I had rather speak five words with my understanding, that I might instruct others also, than ten thousand words in a tongue" (14:19)! Furthur, he prefers "prophecy," or inspirational speech in the language of the people. He prefers it because it can be understood, and also because it can be controlled by the speaker (14:1-33). Without completely reconciling these various supposed sorts of direct intercourse with God, Paul actually attains the notion of sitting in ethical judgment upon anything that offers itself as a divine message. Process is to be judged by content and tendency. In principle this asserts that true communion with God is had in our ethical impulses, judgments, decisions, and actions. He summarizes his position on another occasion thus: "Quench not the Spirit; despise not prophesyings (the automatic); scrutinize all things;

hold fast that which is good; abstain from every kind of evil" (1 Thess. 5:19-21). This is the setting of his ode on love. He contrasts love with the whole wonder-awakening group of automatisms, and even with knowledge, dear as knowledge is to his extraordinary intellect, and leaves us with this ultimate principle: The supreme and normative experience of God is ethical love. (By ethical love I mean the broader social will - broader, that is, than conjugal fondness, parental regard, or the partiality of a narrow friendship.)

The fundamental trait of our third type of religious leader, then, is a broad and intense sociality that transcends mere institutionalism because it individualizes men as objects of love. The leader is now, in a high ethical sense, the lover, and he is able to lead because he loves, and therein represents God. This is the open secret of Jesus' influence upon men. The records of his life are too meager to enable us to speak in much detail of his mental traits, and the critical questions that will gather around the Gospels involve, to some extent, the interpretation of his mind and of his attitudes. Nevertheless, it can be said with confidence that he represents a reaction against the sacerdotal conception of divine communion, and that, though he appears to have experienced some automatisms that he interpreted as special divine impartations, these were not the staple of his reliance either for himself or for others. That is, of shamanism there are only minor traces even in the records, which are themselves interpretations and not port aits, and sacerdotalism is directly opposed. That he was a wonder-worker, a healer of diseases by what we recognize as suggestion, does not indicate that he occupied the standpoint that I have called shamanism. He healed the people because of his overwhelming sympathy, not as a means of dominating them. How he wrought his cures was obviously insignificant to him, compared with the joyous fact that the people were lifted out of their distresses. He was not a shaman, but a servant of the people.

Even if criticism should prove that he held to an extreme catastrophic view of the coming of the Kingdom; even if we should be obliged to believe that he was ultimately a disillusioned idealist (that is, that he expected to be accepted during his earthly lifetime as the promised Messiah), what has been said still holds true of his mortal traits, and it contains the explanation of his power over men. His simple trust in a Father who understands us and brings good to pass even through seeming ill; his equally simple valuation of human life, as if ungrudging, unsparing helpfulness were the most natural thing in the world; his penetrating conceptions of right and wrong, as if he simply gazed upon the thing he talked about; a certain moral irresistibility because he reduces the problems of conduct to simple issues of ethical love - these are the grounds of his influence. In some important respects his influence resembles that of Lincoln. Jesus had the same homespun feeling for "folks," the same appreciation of friendship, corresponding directness of perception and picturesqueness of speech, quiet courage, a more than full measure of patient endurance, something even of the same humor. This is the sort of leadership that describes itself in the old saying, "We love him because he first loved us."

These examples, though they are drawn from a single stream of religious tradition, are representative of religious leadership as a whole. There are

types of leadership, as there are grades of culture. It is a narrow view that thinks to explain the influence of Paul, of Jesus, of the Buddha, or of Mohammed by saying that each was more or less neurotic, or even epileptic, and that the people took his abnormalities for divine possession. In two of these cases at least the neurotic hypothesis rests on slight ground. That Jesus is said to have had a vision or two, and the Buddha a sudden life-enlightening conversion, by no means proves them neurotic in any useful sense of this term. Such experiences come to minds that function so capably that only under the exigencies of some overworked theory can they be called "abnormal." To characterize as neurotic any mind that experiences a well-marked automatism is to make the term "neurotic" scientifically useless. The ultimate test of mental morbidity, whether of the extreme sorts, called "imbecility" and "insanity," or of the milder sorts, called "neurotic," is one's ability to fulfil one's functions as a member of society. Neurasthania, for example, is to be classed as a mental disorder, not because it involves a mental process that is peculiar to neuresthenics, but because certain processes that are common to all men are here present in so excessive or one-sided a way as obviously to interfere with the carrying on of life's business in co-operation with others. Neither Jesus nor the Buddha was made weak or inefficient by automatisms that he may have experienced; neither trafficked in them after the manner of the shaman; neither relied upon them as the basis of his certainty of the principles that he taught, but each rested the authority of his teachings either upon analysis of life or else upon the practical self-evidence of basal ethical ideals; neither was separated from men by any mental peculiarity, but each was drawn to men and drew men to him by compassionate helpfulness. Finally, though each was a dissenter from the existing social-religious order, each dissented, especially Jesus, in the interest of a wider and deeper sociality. That the shamanistic features added by tradition to the picture of each of these prophets, and the so-to-say "rabbinical" doctrines that offered themselves as the historical story had influence with succeeding generations, is undeniable. Antagonistic elements mix in any evolutionary process. But the specific ground of the personal influence involved, the reason why tradition selected these particular men as first among the sons of men, cannot have been either a shamanistic or a priestly element in the men themselves, but rather the element of ethical prophecy, the fresh resort to new and ethically higher sources of religious experience.

Our study of what makes one a leader brings us, of course, to a consideration of what it is that the people desire, or at least are ready to follow. That grounds of religious leadership evolve, as we have now seen, implies that parallel changes occur in the springs of action in the whole religious body.

It is obvious that religious evolution is a movement in which both the leaders and the led are carried along. The notions, once seriously held, that religion was largely invented and imposed upon the people by priestcraft or statecraft, are, as we now see, so unhistorical as to be preposterous. A leader does not manufacture religion any more th an a gardener makes a rose. In religion as in floriculture there is a fundamental, spontaneous process which is guided more or less toward specific products by individual action.

To be more specific, there are three sorts of thing that religious leaders may do. First, a leader may embody, focalize, and render effective an already germinating standpoint of the people by bringing it to conscious definition. He makes them see what it is that they already want, or he guides them in a particular procedure for obtaining what they want. The revealing of men to themselves is what gives such apparent self-evidence to the greatest prophetic messages, and this is also one ground of the impression that God himself speaks through the prophet. Secondly, a leader may bring victory to one of two or more competing attitudes, policies, or beliefs of society. He may do it by superior definition, argument, and emotional appeal; or by organizing a party; or by presenting some apparently supernatural sanction, whether from tradition and precedent, or from some fresh divine interposition. Thirdly, a leader may be thus not only a lens through which light already shining from some large portion of the population is brought to a focus, but also the one through whom a particular ray enters the social complex. Originality in the full sense of insight that has not before existed in the race is implied, of course, in the general progress of knowledge. Each item of this progress begins with some individual who sees something that his predecessors did not see. Similarly, ethical progress in any direction is initiated by some individual or individuals whose satisfactions and dissatisfactions are different from those of other persons. This is ethical originality, which becomes creativeness whenever it effectively organizes and propagates itself. How far a particular genius focuses existing light and how far he emits an original ray is generally hard to make out, but the fact of such original radiation of light, and the other fact of great differences in the amount and color of light radiated by different individuals must be recognized. The religious genius, like other geniuses, is always in a true sense a product of his time and of his people, though he is more than a mere product thereof. Granted a genuine mental evolution, together with genuine differences between individuals, the way is open for a reasonable recognition of originality in any degree. The degree of it in a particular case has to be determined, as well as may be, by historical study of the entire situation.

EXCERPTS FROM "THE WILL TO BELIEVE"

by William James

Pages 1-25

I have brought with me tonight something like a sermon on justification of faith to read to you,--I mean an essay in justification of faith, a defense of our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced. 'The Will to Believe,' accordingly, is the title of my paper.

I have long defended to my own students the lawfulness of voluntarily adopted faith; but as soon as they have got well imbued with the logical spirit, they have as a rule refused to admit my contention to be lawful philosophically, even though in point of fact they were personally all the time chock-full of some faith or other themselves. I am all the while, however, so profoundly convinced that my own position is correct that your invitation has seemed to me a good occasion to make my statements more clear. Perhaps your minds will be more open than those with which I have hitherto had to deal. I will be as little technical as I can, though I must begin by setting up some technical distinctions that will help us in the end.

Let us give the name of hypothesis to anything that may be proposed to our belief; and just as the electricians speak of live and dead wires, let us speak of any hypothesis as either live or dead. A live hypothesis is one which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed. If I ask you to believe in the Mahdi, the notion makes no electric connection with your nature,---it refuses to scintillate with any credibility at all. As an hypothesis it is completely dead. To an Arab, however (even if he be not one of the Mahdi's followers), the hypothesis is among the mind's possibilities: It is alive. This shows that deadness and liveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic properties, but relations to the individual thinker. They are measured by his willingness to act. The maximum of liveness in an hypothesis means willingness to act irrevocably. Practically, that means belief; but there is some believing tendency wherever there is willingness to act at all.

Next, let us call the decision between two hypotheses an option. Options may be of several kinds. They may be -- 1, living or dead; 2, forced or avoidable; 3, momentous or trivial; and for our purposes we may call an option a genuine option when it is of the forced, living, and momentous kind.

1. A living option is one in which both hypotheses are live ones. If I say to you: "Be a theosophist or be a Mohammedan," it is probably a dead option, because for you neither hypothesis is likely to be alive. But if I say: "Be an agnostic or be a Christian," it is otherwise: trained as you are, each hypothesis makes some appeal, however small, to your belief.

2. Next, if I say to you: "Choose between going out with your umbrella or without it," I do not offer you a genuine option, for it is not forced. You can easily avoid it by not going out at all. Similarly, if I say,

"Either love me or hate me," "Either call my theory true or call it false," your option is avoidable. You may remain indifferent to me, neither loving nor hating, and you may decline to offer any judgment as to my theory. But if I say, "Either accept this truth or go without it," I put on you a forced option, for there is no standing place outside of the alternative. Every dilemma based on a complete logical disjunction, with no possibility of not choosing, is an option of this forced kind.

3. Finally, if I were Dr. Nansen and proposed to you to join my North Pole expedition, your option would be momentous; for this would probably be your only similar opportunity, and your choice now would either exclude you from the North Pole sort of immortality altogether or put at least the chance of it into your hands. He who refuses to embrace a unique opportunity loses the prize as surely as if he tried and failed. Per contra, the option is trivial when the opportunity is not unique, when the stake is insignificant, or when the decision is reversible if it later prove unwise. Such trivial options abound in the scientific life. A chemist finds an hypothesis live enough to spend a year in its verification: he believes in it to that extent. But if his experiments prove inconclusive either way, he is quit for his loss of time, no vital harm being done.

It will facilitate our discussion if we keep all these distinctions well in mind.

The next matter to consider is the actual psychology of human opinion. When we look at certain facts, it seems as if our passional and volitional nature lay at the root of all our convictions. When we look at others, it seems as if they could do nothing when the intellect had once said its say. Let us take the latter facts up first.

Does it not seem preposterous on the very face of it to talk of our opinions being modifiable at will? Can our will either help or hinder our intellect in its perceptions of truth?

The talk of believing by our volition seems, then, from one point of view, simply silly, From another point of view it is worse than silly, it is vile. When one turns to the magnificent edifice of the physical sciences, and sees how it was reared; what thousands of disinterested moral lives of men lie buried in its mere foundations; what patience and postponement, what choking down of preference, what submission to the icy laws of outer fact are wrought into its very stones and mortar; how absolutely impersonal it stands in its vast augustness,-- then how besotted and contemptible seems every little sentimentalist who comes blowing his voluntary smoke-wreaths, and pretending to decide things from out of his private dream! Can we wonder if those bred in the rugged and manly school of science should feel like spewing such subjectivism out of their mouths? The whole system of loyalties which grow up on the schools of science go dead against its toleration; so that it is only natural that those who have caught the scientific fever should pass over to the opposite extreme, and write sometimes as if the incorruptibly truthful intellect ought positively to prefer bitterness and unacceptableness to the heart in its cup.

It fortifies my s oul to know
That, though I perish, Truth is so--

sings Clough, while Huxley exclaims: "My only consolation lies in the reflection that, however bad our posterity may become, so far as they hold by the plain rule of not pretending to believe what they have no reason to believe, because it may be to their advantage so to pretend, they will not have reached the lowest depths of immorality.

As a matter of fact we find ourselves believing, we hardly know how or why. Mr. Balfour gives the name of 'authority' to all those influences, born of the intellectual climate, that makes hypotheses possible or impossible for us, alive or dead. Here in this room, we all of us believe in molecules and the conservation of energy, in democracy and necessary progress, in Protestant Christianity and the duty of fighting for 'the doctrine of the immortal Monroe,' all for no reasons worthy of the name. We see into these matters with no more inner clearness, and probably with much less, than any disbeliever in them might possess. His unconventionality would probably have some grounds to show for its conclusions; but for us, not insight, but the prestige of the opinions, is what makes the spark shoot from them and light up our sleeping magazines of faith. Our reason is quite satisfied, in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases out of every thousand of us, if it can find a few arguments that will do to recite in case our credulity is criticized by some one else. Our faith is faith in some one else's faith, and in the greatest matters this is most the c ase. Our belief in truth itself, for instance, that there is a truth, and that our minds and it are made for each other,--what is it but a passionate affirmation of desire, in which our social system backs us up? We want to have a truth; we want to believe that our experiments and studies and discussions must put us in a continually better and better position towards it; and on this line we agree to fight out our thinking lives. But if a pyrrhonistic sceptic asks us how we know all this, can our logic find a reply? No! certainly it cannot. It is just one volition against another,--we willing to go in for life upon a trust or assumption which he, for his part, does not care to make.

Evidently, then, our non-intellectual nature does influence our convictions. There are passional tendencies and volitions which run before and others which come after belief, and it is only the latter that are too late for the fair; and they are not too late when the previous passional work has been already in their own direction. ..... . The state of things is evidentlyfar from simple; and pure insight and logic, whatever they might do ideally, are not the only things that really do produce our creeds.

Our next duty, having recognized this mixed-up state of affairs, is to ask whether it be simply reprehensible and pathological, or whether, on the contrary, we must treat it as a normal element in making up our minds. The thesis I defend is, briefly stated, this: Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, "Do not decide, but leave the question open," is itself a passional decision,--just like deciding yes or no,--and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.

One more point, small but important, and our preliminaries are done. There are two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion,--ways entirely different, and yet ways about whose difference the theory of knowledge seems hitherto to have shown very little concern. We must know the truth; and we must avoid error,--these are our first and great commandments as would-be knowers; but they are not two ways of stating an identical commandment, they are two separable laws.

Believe truth! Shun error!--these, we see, are two materially different laws; and by choosing between them we may end by coloring differently our whole intellectual life. We may regard the chase for truth as paramount, and the avoidance of error as secondary; or we may, on the other hand, treat the avoidance of error as more imperative, and let truth take its chance. Clifford, in the instructive passage which I have quoted, exhorts us to the latter course. Believe nothing, he tells us, keep your mind in suspense forever, rather than by closing it on insufficient evidence incur the awful risk of believing lies. You, on the other hand, may think that the risk of being in error is a very small matter when compared with the blessings of real knowledge, and be ready to be duped many times in your investigation rather than postpone indefinitely the chance of guessing true. I myself find it impossible to go with Clifford. We must remember that these feelings of our duty about either truth or error are in any case only expressions of our passional life. Biologically considered, our minds are as ready to grind grind out falsehood as veracity, and he says, "Better go without belief forever than believe a lie!" merely shows his own preponderant private horror of becoming a dupe. He may be critical of many of his desires and fears, but this fear he slavishly obeys. He cannot imagine any one questioning its binding force. For my own part, I have also a horror of being duped; but I can believe that worse things than being duped may happen to a man in this world: So Clifford's exhortation has to my ears a thoroughly fantastic sound. It is like a general informing his soldiers that it is better to keep out of battle forever than to risk a single wound. Not so are victories either over enemies or over nature gained. Our errors are surely not such awfully solemn things. In a world where we are so certain to incur them in spite of all our caution, a certain lightness of heart seems healthier than this excessive nervousness on their behalf. At any rate, it seems the fittest thing for the empiricist philosopher.

And now, after all this introduction, let us go straight at our question. I have said, and now repeat it, that not only as a matter of fact do we find our passional nature influencing us in our opinions, but that there are some options between opinions in which this influence must be regarded both as an inevitable and as a lawful determinant of our choice.

Moral questions immediately present themselves as questions whose solution cannot wait for sensible proof. A moral question is a question not of what sensibly exists, but of what is good, or would be good if it did exist. Science can tell us what exists; but to compare the worths, both of what exists and of what does not exist, we must consult not science, but what Pascal calls our heart. Science herself consults her heart when she lays it down that the infinite ascertainment of fact and correction of false belief are the supreme goods for man. Challenge the statement, and science can only

repeat it oracularly, or else prove it by showing that such ascertainment and correction bring man all sorts of other goods which man's heart in turn declares. The question of having moral beliefs at all or not having them is decided by our will. Are our moral preferences true or false, or are they only odd biological phenomena, making things good or bad for us, but in themselves indifferent? How can your pure intellect decide? If your heart does not want a world of moral reality, your head will assuredly never make you believe in one. Mephistophelian scepticism, indeed, will satisfy the head's play-instincts much better than any rigorous idealism can. Some men (even at the student age) are so naturally cool-hearted that the moralistic hypothesis never has for them any pungent life, and in their supercilious presence the hot young moralist always feels strangely ill at ease. The appearance of knowingness is on their side, of naivete' and gullibility on his. Yet, in the inarticulate heart of him, he clings to it that he is not a dupe, and that there is a realm in which (as Emerson says) all their wit and intellectual superiority is no better than the cunning of a fox. Moral scepticism can no more be refuted or proved by logic than intellectual scepticism can. When we stick to it that there is truth (be it of either kind), we do so with our whole nature, and resolve to stand or fall by the results. The sceptic with his whole nature adopts the doubting attitude; but which of us is the wiser, Omniscience only knows.

Turn now from these wide questions of good to a certain class of questions of fact, questions concerning personal relations, states of mind between one man and another. Do you like me or not? -- for example. Whether you do or not depends, in countless instances, on whether I meet you half-way, am willing to assume that you must like me, and show you trust and expectation. The previous faith on my part in your liking's existence is in such cases what makes your liking come. But if I stand aloof, and refuse to budge an inch until I have objective evidence, until you shall have done something apt, (as the absolutists say, ad extorquendum assensum meum,) ten to one your liking never comes. How many women's hearts are vanquished by the mere sanguine insistence of some man that they must love him! he will not consent to the hypothesis that they cannot. The desire for a certain kind of truth here brings about that special truth's existence; and so it is in innumerable cases of other sorts. Who gains promotions, boons, appointments, but the man in whose life they are seen to play the part of live hypotheses, who discounts them, sacrifices other things for their sake before they have come, and takes risks for them in advance? His faith acts on the powers above him as a claim, and creates its own verification.

There are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming. And where faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be an insane logic which should say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the 'lowest kind of immorality' into which a thinking being can fall. Yet such is the logic by which our scientific absolutists pretend to regulate our lives!

THE PHENOMENON OF INSIGHT IN RELATION TO RELIGION

Eliot Dole Hutchinson
PSYCHIATRY, 1944

In five previous articles in PSYCHIATRY, I have set forth some conceptions concerning the nature of insight and the creative process, which may be summarized as follows.

The scientist, the artist, the practical thinker--the profession makes little difference--has before him a problem involving some explicit production or decision in life situations. For months or years, it may be, this problem remains unsolved, this creative intention unfulfilled. Attempts at solution have ended only in bafflement. But suddenly, usually in a moment when the work has been abandoned temporarily, or when the attention is absorbed by irrelevant matters, comes an unpredicted insight into the solution. As if "inspired", "given," ideas arise which constitute a real integration of previously accumulated experience--an answer, a brilliant hypothesis, a useful "hunch," forming, it seems, a short cut to artistic or scientific advance. Exhilaration marks such moments of insight, a glow or elation goes with them, a feeling of adequacy, finality, accomplishment. The content of these insights is either lost at once through inattention, or if caught and held by explicit statement in consciousness, takes full form only in a later period of verification and criticism.

Thus the pattern of insightful thinking, as I have shown adequately in these former discussions, involves a period of preparation, a period of renunciation or recession, a period or moment of insight, and a period of verification, elaboration, or evaluation. The process of creative thinking is the cycle of these stages in multiple and ever-changing emphasis.

One of the clearest applications of these principles of insightful or, as I shall also call it, intuitive thought is to religion.

The Psychology of Religion as a science has always lacked a basis for unity. Each phenomenon of the religious mind--mysticism, prayer, conversion, worship, belief, quietism--has been dealt with as an isolated experience, having principles of explanation peculiar to itself. And yet in many of these phenomena, I think, there is a pattern of thought parallel to, if not identical with, that of normal insight. Look for a moment at the various types of religious experience.

MYSTICISM

On its experiential side mysticism simply extends the intuitive pattern to its highest degree of refinement. Philosophically it proceeds upon assumptions of its own relating to the similarity in original nature between the individual self and the Ultimate, and hence to the possibility of communication and union between the two. It usually makes of the self a derivative of the Divine, and posits the possibility of metaphysical interrelation. But on the psychological side it bears a close resemblance to the spontaneously integrative pattern of thought with which I have been dealing in these articles.

The steps in the "Mystic Way," which constitute its technique of action--Awakening, Self Surrender, Enlightenment and Union--are nothing if not the periods of creative thought, which have been so frequently in scientific and artistic work turned to more lofty and esoteric purposes. The initial efforts to grasp the object of desire, that is, the problem situation, and the difficulties of accomplishing this, leading to trial-and-error activity and random intense effort; the consequent introversion of mind with its brooding and meditation, during which the aims of the spirit are more clearly formulated, albeit they are still baffled--frustration; the resignation and mystic quiet, with its "active stillness" and its art of "listening," that is, the period of renunciation; the passionate desire for completeness by absorption in the Ideal--continuance of motivation; the final contemplation after having given up the quest, with its brief insight, its rapture and its ecstasy--Insight; andwith the greater mystics, the swift objectification of these visions in life--Period of Verification, these are the elements of the creative discipline which I have so often emphasized. Moreover, accidental events, as always in creative life, effect alternations in mental level. In the case of St. Teresa chance occurrences brought home to her a neglected ideal, led her to new resolves, thus lifting her to a new level of executive efficiency. Various chance occurrences brought to Suso the realization of the futility of his habits of excessive asceticism. He threw away his instrument of torture only to find that he passed at once from a long period of depressed absorption in himself to one of buoyant practical activity.

When properly balanced, the mystic discipline yields the same growth of personality, the same spiritual achievement, the same sort of new "knowledge," the same emotional by-products of resolution, discouragement and elation, as the creative discipline. It may entail complete reformation of character through the utilization of latent forms of consciousness which, although sometimes called "ecstasy" or "union" with all their theological implications, are more accurately described as simple insight.

But not only the pattern of experience, the intimate characteristics show up as essentially similar also. William James gives the four chief attributes of the mystical experience as ineffability, noetic quality, transiency and passivity. I would now amend that list to read, strenuous problem-oriented activity, the problem being anything from the desire to find light on some personal decision, to the desire to gain ineffable companionship with God; which desire meets with effectual temporary delay and frustration owing to the difficulty of solution; such effort, owing to its apparent futility, leads to a temporary resignation, or renunciation, of the problem--the "dark night of the soul," to use a mystic phrase, which is so introvertive, passive, and full of psycho-pathological symptoms; then, after a fleeting intimation of its approaching release, comes insight with its apparent revelation of new knowledge--noetic quality, with its emotional delicacy and clarity--ineffability, and its suddenness and brevity--transiency; all such ecstasy and union turns out to be valueless, however, unless put to the test of verification and elaboration in practical life, leading to some definite determination or reformation of character. One gains, thus, I believe, a more psychologically comprehensible picture of the whole process. Like the creative process, mysticism is ideally active, although much of it has turned out to be futile because it has considered the moment of insight or illumin-

ation, rather than verification, as the final goal of its effort. Briefly, there are no more great mystics than there are great creators, and the one is likely to be so similar to the other in mental experience, that they are with difficulty separated.

The objectifying of the mystic vision is of course done in terms of practical living, not in terms of a specific art medium. Suso on his apostolic visits discoursing to multitudes upon the love of God, Catherine of Genoa managing her hospital as a Good Samaritan, St. Teresa engaged in her life work as founder of the reformed monasteries, were objectifying their hard-won visions in terms of action. The exaltation and ecstasy of the moment of insight were turned to ethical significance through self-conscious and determined practical effort at a subsequent stage. But owing to the usual abstractness of aims, pathologies do, as a rule, appear more readily in mysticism than in artistic creation. Still, the vagaries, the loss of contact with reality, the stupid delight in fostering visions for their own sake, the loss of purpose and direction, all of which are the faults of the minor mystics, are the faults also of the minor creative artists and scientists. The mystic's transference of his affections from the self to the ideal has its counterpart in the attachment of the artist's emotion and sentiment onto his work, the ecstasy of the mystic in the intense enthusiasm of the artist for production after the moment of insight. The depth of trance is no measure in either case of the moral perfection or social worth of the idea. Nor does the insight develop according to a graded scheme. With the great mystics the Self as well as the Ideal becomes increasingly real in the experience. It is forever being educed by the alternation between the outer and the inner world. As artists stand in a peculiar relation to the phenomenal world, discovering beauties and meanings which are hidden from other men, the mystic stands in peculiar relation to the transcendental world as he conceives of it. With the artist, insight brings with it the longing for expression, although that can never be complete. So the mystic, having possessed his vision, and having discovered what to him is truth, seeks to objectify his thought in a largely unheeding world. The difficulties are incredibly increased. He has little familiar language with which to communicate his ideas, and has to draw his audience partly into the same state of mind before it can grasp his meaning. Similar the two processes are, the greatest difference appearing in the expressed purpose and object of the experience, not in the psychological method. That is an extension of the fundamental intuitive pattern, although it may relive the experience with a new emphasis upon ultimates.

PRAYER

Similarly prayer displays intuitive or insightful elements in its pattern of experience. The problems set by the devotee for himself are usually ones which he cannot solve readily through direct action and rational effort. Petitionary prayer especially entertains the problem of receiving what the person conceives to be outside aid and direction in making choices which are baffling, or meeting situations which seem insurmountable. It is obviously more earnest where the desires of the person are thwarted and his purposes correspondingly uncertain.

The rules of its practice are most effective where their application follows the pattern of creative thought. And this aside from any theological or metaphysical doctrine which the individual suppliant may entertain. "Faith", in religious terms, becomes the maintenance of goal orientation, the "answer" to prayer becomes insight, the realization of that answer becomes verification and elaboration of the insight in practical living. The revelations and answers--and in the intuitive sense there certainly are "answers" which are as much integrations of past experience as all illumination is--will all be in terms of the world picture, the cosmic concepts, held by the devotee. He may be the veriest fundamentalist supplicating a carpenter God who breaks through his provisions to pamper a special petitioner. He may, like many a sectarian, believe in direct guidance by an unseen but benevolent Hand. He maybe far out on the borders of humanism where the gods have vanished and the self is substituted. Or he may be simply a humble seeker after unity in his life purposes using methods which involve no mystery and entail no theology. It makes little difference in what terms the object of reference is carried so long as it constitutes a focal point for the absorption of, and a center of interest for, the self. Whatever his religious designation, he will find that his answers to prayer, like every insight, come sometimes with faint and fleeting intimation of their passing existence, sometimes with full appreciation of their illuminative power.

It may be well to trace in greater detail the steps in the process which are so rarely explicit to the experiencing person. First there is the need, setting the problem situation, and with it longing, desire, demand for aid. A tenacious purpose to wring answer and blessing at the cost of effort develops around this absorbing center. The orientation toward the problem, supported, it may be, with continued appeals for help, sensitizes the suppliant toward any intimation of answer. Come intervals of rest, alternation of interest, waiting and discouragement--at times the surrender of self-will in the face of apparent defeat. Then suddenly the "answer," in the form of a plan of action, decision, or consoling thought, breaks in upon a mind engaged with incidental tasks often wholly irrelevant to the sentiments engendered in the hour of supplication. The flood of thought at the moment of illumination brings with it sudden renewal of energy, unification of purpose, and conviction of certainty, to say nothing of a sense of objectivity of value. The inevitable revision of too sanguine hopes indicates the sheer self-indulgence of it all unless this answer is carried out to effective action. All these parallels, and more, should be etched into the interpretation of prayer by some practitioner who can affirm with a conviction born of success the value of so universal an experience. It certainly involves a technique; there are adepts and failures, genius and tyro, saint and novice.

CONVERSION

The principles of intuitive thinking apply nowhere with more success than to a study of religious conversion. The personality of the convert is split between the desire for the "higher", to which it is predisposed by early training or urgent exhortation, and the "lower," to which it has been drawn by personal inclination or long habit; or, in terms of intellectual conversion, the mind is divided between one set of beliefs to which it is attracted by choice or compulsion, and another to which it is addicted by training. At any rate,

the gap between what is and what ought to be is emphasized; and the more it is stressed, the less likely is the person to be helped by purely rational means. Reason is effective only where action is under voluntary control. There is, of course, a sound element of rationality in all permanent change of character, but the problem of bringing about unity in the desires of the personality, as can be seen in psychoanalysis as well as in conversion, is in one phase an ultra-rational one, requiring the release of inhibition and an extensive emotional reorientation. Even a St. Augustine, with all his splendid equipment of mind, could not voluntarily help himself out of the mire of doubt. The biographies of St. Paul, St. Francis, Wesley, Whitefield, Edwards, Moody, and a host of lesser men who have found a successful resolution of their inner conflict, sketch the details of the process. The initial voluntary efforts at resolution of the problem of decision, the bitter struggle with the divided self, producing despondency, inferiority and despair; the patterning of change after the newly glimpsed ideal, with reversion to similar earlier ideals in the moment of insight; the intimations that change is on its way; the effective resignation of self-will in the face of complete helplessness--these elements indicate the similarity between the preparatory periods in conversion and those of the more general creative process. And moreover, the sudden release, unburdening, and virtual salvation--no matter in what theological or metaphysical terms carried, which is seen in illumination most brilliantly after long periods of doubt; the attendant ecstasy and peace, characterized by the usual amnesia for the events of the period; the renewal of activities bearing momentous import upon subsequent living, and usually involving a radical readjustment to moral or intellectual responsibility; spiritual growth in character through the experience--these phases are also clear. The positive and dated character of the insight, the appearance of it in moments of interest in secondary concerns; its hallucinatory components and vividness, depending upon the fullness of the emotional transformation; the engendered goal-consciousness, or in theological terms, God-consciousness, and the lapses from it which too often follow; the too frequent crystallization of thought at the level of insight with little evidence of subsequent growth--these continue the analogy. A thousand details call for extended comparison with the fundamental experience which underlies all such alteration of spiritual and psychic life.

BELIEF

To carry analysis further, one may quite properly say that the formation of religious belief employs the principles of intuitive thinking to a degree. The objects of reference of such belief are always beyond proof in the sense of exact demonstration. Belief to religion is what hypothesis is to science, the tool by which further truth is unearthed.

Because such belief is founded upon a creative process of thought, its formation will take on definite characteristics. Its first task will be that of gathering background, historical perspective, contemporary data, established evaluations--sifted and related to every aspect of the field of interest. But for all its conscious effort it will not be able at once to make out of that background a satisfying world view. The interpretation of experience as seen profoundly is too baffling. Come, therefore, periods of doubt, hesitation, uncertainty, when life looks meaningless, barren, and the temptation is to give up, regress, become cynical; one must sail it blind in a fog of

doubt. The possibility of conviction will appear as the prevarication of careless men who do not test the principles of their living. And then suddenly, in some moment when the larger view seems unattainable and when certainty is looked upon as the possession of purely logical thinkers, comes a new insight into the nature of experience, a new advance in personal conviction, an enheartening view of new reaches of meaning. And that insight may reshape intellectual life, and add stature to one already growing. At any rate, the task of testing the insight is entered upon with enthusiasm, and through it new levels of thought become the background for further progress. The process will yield nothing that is absolutely final, but an ever growing substructure of material which approaches validity. It gathers no moss, although it may for the time being stand firm.

PSYCHOANALYTIC COMMENTS ON AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL ACCOUNT OF A CASE OF PARANOIA

By Sigmund Freud

Translated and Abstracted by A. T. Boisen

Case History

Dr. Schreber tells us, "I have had two attacks of mental illness, both as a result of mental strain - the first induced by a Reichstag candidacy - the second, by the burden of work incidental to my new task as President of the Senate in Dresden."

The first attack occurred in the autumn of 1884 and was completely cured by the end of 1885. According to Dr. Flechsig, the head of the institute in which Schreber spent six months, it was a severe atteck of hypochondria. What his age was at this time we are not told. We do know that he had been for some time married and that he had attained distinction in the legal profession.

Of his condition in the interim period, Dr. Schreber tells us: "After my recovery I spent eight happy years, blessed with many honors but disappointed in the hope of children."

In June 1893 he was appointed as President of the Senate and entered upon his office October 1. The second disturbance began toward the end of October, with a distressing sleeplessness which led him to visit Flechsig's clinic once again. His condition however became rapidly worse. Of its development his physician reported: "At first he gave utterance to more hypochondriacal ideas. He complained of brain weakness and thought he was going to die. The ideas of persecution intruded themselves and that on a hallucinatory basis. Later visual and auditory hallucinations took complete control of his feeling and thinking. He thought himself dead - defiled, imagined that all sorts of horrible manipulations were performed upon his body - all for the sake of some holy purpose. These pathological impressions took such complete possession that for hours at a time he would sit rigid - motionless. They tortured him so that he wished for death and made repeated attempts to drown himself in the bathtub. Gradually the delusions took a mystical religious character. He was in communication with God. Demons played pranks upon him. He saw miraculous apparitions; he heard holy music. In short he was in another world.

We may note that he cursed different persons by whom he thought himself persecuted, above all his former physician Flechsig. He called him "soul murderer" and repeatedly called him "little Flechsig."

In the course of the next year, the picture changed. It may be described in the words of the director of the institute. "Without going into detail, we may say that the original acute psychosis, with its predominant hallucinatory character, took on more and more the paranoid form." In other words he had developed a delusional system which challenges our attention.

Of the year 1899, Dr. Weber says: "The Senate President Dr. Schreber appears at the present time neither disturbed nor mentally impaired. He is considerate - his memory remarkable - he has command of an immense amount of knowledge, not only in the field of law, but in other fields as well; and can discourse intelligently upon politics, science and art. At the same time this patient is possessed by pathologically conditioned ideas which have been crystalized into a complete system."

The patient however regarded himself as competent and took legal measures to gain his freedom. Throughout, however, he made no secret of his delusions or of his intention to publish his memoirs. On the contrary he emphasized the value of his beliefs for the religious life and their harmony with the findings of modern science. His quick wit and logical acumen won the day and in July 1902 he was released. In the following year he published his memoirs.

In the verdict which gave Dr. Schreber his freedom the content of his delusional system is given as follows: "He holds himself called to save the world and to restore it to its former happiness. This can he do however only when he has been changed from a man into a woman."

His physian Dr. Weber gives the following account of his delusional system for the year 1899.

"The delusional system of this patient centers in the belief that he is called to save the world and that this task has been laid upon him through immediate divine revelations - just as in the case of the prophets. Excited nerves - such as his had been for a long time - had the property of appealing to God. However the subject matter of these revelations can be expressed only with great difficulty in human language - for the reason that it is outside of human experience and clear only to him. The essential feature of his mission is that he must be transformed into a woman. This is not because he wants to be a woman. It is rather a pre-ordained "must," which he simply cannot escape, even though he prefers to remain in his honorable estate of manhood. Only so can his mission be accomplished, He is, it seems, the object of divine wonder - the most remarkable man who has ever lived on earth. For years he has felt that at any hour, at any minute, this transformation is likely to take place.

In the early years of his disturbance, he had suffered disorders in the various organs of his body. He had lived without stomach, without kidneys, almost without lungs, without bladder - but divine miracles had repeatedly restored the missing parts. He was thus not martal. He had the feeling that already feminine nerves had entered his body., from which through direct fertilization from God, men of a new type would issue. Only then could he die a natural death. At times not only the sun but also trees and birds spoke to him in human language and everywhere wonderful things went on . around him.

Remarks by Freud

a) - As the two foci, the psychiatrist will at once single out the savior

role and the transformation into a woman. The former is a most familiar delusion. It constitutes so often the nucleus of religious paranoia. The fact that this salvation was to come about through the transformation of a man into a woman is unusual and in itself surprising in that it is at variance with the historic myth which the patient's phantasy tends to reproduce. We are prompted to agree with Dr. Weber that the ambition to play the savior is the motive power behind this idea, and the loss of manhood is to be regarded merely as a means to this end. A study of the memoirs leads however to a different conclusion. We learn that the transformation into a woman was the primary delusion, that it was then regarded as an act of persecution and only appeared incidently in connection with the Savior role.

(Here follow excerpts from Schreber's memoirs and comments by Freud.)

b) - The relation of the patient to God is so strange and so filled with contradiction, that it is hard to find any method in the madness. This requires a careful study of the memoirs.

According to Schreber the human soul is contained in the nerves of the body. Some of these nerves are adapted only to sense perceptions, others have to do with the psychic. It seems furthermore that each separate psychic nerve represents the total personality of the human being.

While human beings consist of bodies and nerves, God is only nerves. The divine nerves are however not, as in human beings, present in limited numbers. They are unending or eternal. They have all the properties of human nerves but in enormously exaggerated form. In their creative capacity they are called "rays." Between God and the starry heavens or the sun there is an inner relationship.

After the work of creation God withdrew into an immense distance and left the world to its laws. He limited himself to busying himself with the spirits of the dead. Only exceptionally would he establish relationship with some gifted human being.

God himself is no simple being. Schreber recognized the outer courts of heaven and the hinder courts. Corresponding to each is an Overgod and an Undergod - the latter having to do with people of the brown races. These two divine beings conducted themselves very differently toward the unfortunate Schreber during his acute illness.

The world order has a defect - in consequence of which the existence of God himself is endangered. Because of a certain relationship which is not clarified, the nerves of living men, especially in the state of high excitation, exert such an influence upon the nerves of God, that God cannot free himself from them and is therefore threatened in his own existence. This extraordinarily exceptional case occurred in the case of Schreber, and resulted in serious consequences for him. Throughout the entire book, Schreber complains bitterly that God - accustomed only to intercourse with the dead - does not understand the living human being.

In consequence of God's misunderstanding of living men it came to pass that

God himself was the instigator of the persecution of Schreber - that God regarded him as an imbecile and laid upon him the severest trials.

Especially violent is his reaction to God's behavior in the matter of the evacuation processes (here a lengthy quotation).

None the less Schreber continues to look upon God as supreme and himself as God's son, whose mission it is to save the world. We see thus in his attitude God a mixture of respect and rebellion.

c) - (Salvation). Salvation is for Schreber a matter of the future life, to which man is raised through the purification of suffering and death. He describes it as a condition of uninterrupted enjoyment and contemplation of God. That is by no means original. What surprises us is the distinction which Schreber makes between masculine and feminine salvation. Masculine well-being stood higher than feminine. The latter seems to have consisted in a continual sensual pleasure.

Schreber's hope of final reconciliation with God and cessation of suffering seems to rest upon the idea that the rays of God lose their hostile tone as soon as they are assured of being able to pass pleasurably into his body. God himself thus demands that he be able to find satisfaction in him and threatens to withdraw his rays if he neglects the requirements of sensual pleasure.

Before his illness the senatorial Schreber had been a strictly moral man. There are fewmen, he says, who have been reared in such stern moral principles, especially in matters of sex. After his disturbance he came to the conclusion that the cultivation of sensuality was for him a duty, whose fulfilment could alone end his inner conflict.

Freud concludes that the two foci of Schreber's delusions - the transformation into a woman and the privileged relationship with God - are in his system identified with the feminine attitude toward God. It becomes for us an unavoidable task to show the relationship between these two foci.

II. Attempt at Interpretation

Because of the resistance to the publication of these memoirs, a considerable portion of the material - and that precisely the most significant - has been eliminated. I must therefore be content, Freud says, if I succeed with any certainty in tracing even the kernel of this delusional system back to its origin in recognizable human motives. For this purpose I would call attention to a portion of the case history which in the diagnostic impression has received insufficient attention, but which the patient himself has done everything possible to emphasize. I refer to the relationship with his first physician, Prof. Dr. Flechsig of Leipzig.

We know that the case of Schreber from the first has borne the mark of a persecution complex, which was only eradicated after the crisis of the illness. The persecution then became constantly more bearable and the cosmic significance of the loss of manhood overcame its shamefulness. The origin-

ator of all the persecution however was Flechsig, and throughout the entire course of the illness he remains the instigator.

Now the study of a series of cases of persecutory delusion has shown me, and others also, that the relation of the patient to his persecutor may be expressed in a single formula. The person to whom the delusion ascribes such great power and influence - in whose hands all threads of the plot are held is, whenever that person is specifically named, one who before the illness had a similarly important significance in the emotional life of the patient, or else an easily recognized substitute for such a person. The emotional significance is projected as external power and the feeling tone transfered into its opposite. The one who is now hated and feared because of the persecution is one who was formerly loved and honored. The delusional persecution serves above all to justify the transformation which has taken place in the patient's feelings.

From this standpoint we notice that in 1884-85 Schreber passed through a severe mental illness and that Flechsig was his physician. The recovered patient held his physician at that time in high esteem. He expresses himself in the memoirs most warmly regarding his indebtedness to Flechsig.

It is furthusmore to be noted that in the interim period after his first recovery and the commitment of 1893, he had a number of dreams, of hypnogogic ideas to the effect that it would be delightful to be a woman, submitting to intercourse. Bringing this into conjunction with his interest in Flechsig, it becomes clear that the feminine coloring of the phantasy has reference to Flechsig. And the dream that that the illness had returned signifies, "I wish I might see Flechsig once more." We may therefore assume that an attack of homosexual desire was the occasion of this disturbance. The object from the beginning was undoubtedly the physician Flechsig, and his struggle against these unacceptable desires gave rise to the conflict out of which the pathological manifestations sprang. The pathological delusion of being transformed into a woman would then be his justification for the acceptable feelings.

Why this outbreak of homosexuality at just this time, it is not possible to determine in this case. In general a man sways back and forth throughout his entire life between homosexual and heterosexual feelings, and denial or disillusionment on one side drives him over to the other. How it was with Schreber we do not know, further than this: at the time of the onset he was fifty years of age, and subject to the sexual regression characteristic of the climacteric in both men and women.

One of the changes which we see in this case is the displacement of Flechsig by the higher person of God. This is due to the heightening of the conflicts, an increase in the unbearable persecution. It prepares the way for the solution of the conflict. If it is impossible for him to accustom himself to the role of the feminine prostitute, so comes the necessity of ascribing sex desire to God. Transformation into a woman is no longer a disgrace because it is cosmically ordained. Thus the conflict is ended - the solution is shoved from the present far into the future.

In psychiatric textbooks, one frequently reads of a development of ideas of grandeur out of ideas of persecution. The patient who believes himself persecuted explains this persecution on the basis that he must be a very important person to deserve such persecution. The explanation of ideas of grandeur becomes thus a matter of "rationalization." This is an entirely unjustifiable assumption, which is not to be confused with this explanation.

It is important to recognize that Flechsig and God represent the role of the father. And we note that Schreber's father was no unimportant person. He was a distinguished physician whose labors in behalf of young people are still remembered in Saxony. Such a father was most likely to awaken tender memories in his son - especially since he was taken from him by death while the son was still young. Nothing is more natural than that his memory should be associated with the idea of God.

For our sensibilities today, it is difficult to associate the personality of God with that of any man - even the most distinguished. We must not forget however that among the ancients God was much closer to men.

The infantile attitude of the boy to his father is well known to us. It contains the exact combination of respectful subjection and rebellious hostility which we have found in Schreber's attitude toward his God. That Schreber's father was a physician and a highly honored one may explain the most striking characteristics with which he invests God. Can there be a greater expression of contempt for such a physician than to assert that he has no understanding of living men and is only able to associate with corpses? So also the reproach that God learns nothing from experience may be regarded as an infantile retort to a father's reproof.

In this connection we may think of Schreber's ideas regarding the sun, whose rays play such a part in his concept of God. To the sun Schreber has a very peculiar relationship. It speaks to him in human language. According to the medical record he berates it with threatening and abusive words and commands it to kneel before him. He tells us himself that the sun grew pale before him. That the sun has some share in his fate is clear from the fact that important changes take place in its appearance just as soon as there are changes in his situation. Schreber himself tells us that the sun is God. He identifies it both with the lower god and the upper god. "On the following day," we read, "I saw the upper god (Ormuzd) - not this time with my spiritual eye, but with my bodily eye. It was the sun, but not the sun in its usual appearance so familiar to men."

I am not responsible for the uniformity of psychoanalytic interpretation if I call attention to the fact that the sun is for him merely a sublimated symbol of his father. Thus in Schreber's case also we find ourselves upon the familiar ground of the father complex. If for the patient the battle with Flechsig appears as a battle with God, we may then translate it into the terms of an infantile conflict with the beloved father. We have abundant evidence that in the experience of the child the father commonly appears as the disturber of his auto-erotic satisfaction. In Schreber's delusional system the infantile sex-strivings win a great victory. Sexual pleasure-taking becomes godly and god himself does not cease to demand it of

of the patient. The most fearful threat of the father - that of castration - has been accepted and becomes the wish for transformation into a woman. The fact that God thinks of him as an idiot and threatens to banish him may be explained by the common warning that masturbation may result in loss of reason.

A basis for his desire to be changed into a woman may be found in the fact that his otherwise happy marriage had been childless. Since his father and brother both were dead, the family was about to die out. He may then very well have built the phantasy that if he were a woman the matter of children would be better taken care of.

III. Concerning the Paranoid Mechanism

We have now explained the case of Schreber in terms of a controlling father complex and of the centrality of wishful thinking in the illness. In this there is nothing distinctive of paranoia - nothing which we could not find and have found in many other cases of neurosis. The distinguishing characteristic of paranoia is to be found rather in the special manifestation of the symptoms or the type of symptom-building. We might say that the paranoid character is to be found in the warding off of a homosexual wish phantasy through ideas of persecution of a given type.

It is the more significant if we are reminded by experience that homosexual wish phantasies have a deep-seated and perhaps a constant relationship to the type of illness. Distrusting my own observations, I have recently examined from this standpoint a number of paranoid cases from the clinics of my friends C. G. Jung and S. Ferenczi. These were both men and women of various races, occupations and social rank. We saw with surprise how clearly in all these cases protection against homosexual desires could be recognized as central in the mental conflict. They had all been broken by the struggle with strong unconscious homosexuality. This was not what we had expected. It is precisely in paranoia that sexual etiology is least evident, and social and vocational frustrations are most prominent.

It will, I trust, be in order if I attempt to show that the processes of the mind as revealed by psychoanalysis can offer us an explanation of the role of homosexual wishes in paranoid disorders.

Researchers of recent years have called our attention to a stage in the development of the libido which must be passed through in the development from autoerotism to normal heterosexuality. It consists in this - that an individual in the rpocess of development likes himself, that is, his own body, as love object before he is able to pass over to the love of another person. It seems that many persons remain an abnormally long time in this stage of development and that from this circumstance there may be important consequences for later development. In the self thus chosen for love object the genitals may be the most important thing. The furthur course leads to the choice of an object with similar genitals - hence homosexuality must be surmounted before heterosexuality is achieved. We assume that frank homosexuals have never been freed from the attraction to genitalia similar to their own.

In my "Three Contributions to Sexual Theory," I have expressed the view that each stage of psychosexual development brings with it the possiblity of a "fixation," and therewith a predisposition. Persons who have not been freed from the narcissistic stage have thus a fixation at that stage which may operate as a predisposition to illness. They are thus subject to the danger that a flood of libido which finds no other outlet, may subordinate their social drive to the sexual and thus render them regressive in the matter of their hard-won socialization. To such a result anything may contribute which calls forth a regressive flow of the libido, whether it be a collateral exacerbation through disillusionment with some woman, a direct blow in the shape of misfortune in the social relationships with a man - in both cases frustration - also a generalized increase of libido to the part where it becomes too strong to find release through the usual channel and thus breaks the structure of the dam. Since in our analytical work we find that paranoics are seeking to protect themselves against such sexualization of their social drives, we are forced to the conclusion that the weak spot in their development is to be found in the stage between auto-erotism, or narcissism, and homosexuality. A similar predisposition must be ascribed to Dementia Praecox or Schizophrenia. I hope to show that the difference in form and outcome of the two disorders may be explained by differences corresponding to the predisposing fixations.

If we assume the homosexual wish phantasy of loving a man to be the seat of the paranoid conflict, it must not be forgotten that the establishment of such an important assumption will require the examination of many types of paranoid formation. We must even be prepared to limit our theory to a single type. Nonetheless it is noteworthy that all the principal recognized forms of paranoia can be regarded as defence against the proposition, "I (a man) love him (a man)."

The opposite of the proposition "I love him (the man)" is the persecutory delusion, in which the patient says "I do not love him - I hate him." This contradiction, which in the unconscious could not be otherwise, cannot in this form enter into consciousness. The mechanism of symptom-building in paranoia requires that inner perception or feeling must be replaced by external perception. Then the proposition "I hate him" is projected in the form, "He hates (persecutes) me, which justifies me in hating him." The unconscious drive thus appears in consciousness as persecution by way of an outer perception, "I do not indeed love him. In fact I hate him because he persecutes me." Observation leaves no doubt that the persecutor is actually none other than the once beloved.

> (There follows a consideration of the formulae for erotomania, for alcoholic jealousy - for jealousy on the part of women - all of which he explains in terms of homosexuality. He then goes on:)

One might believe that a sentence with three words permitted only three forms of cantradiction. The jealousy mania represents the subject, the persecution mania the verb and the erotomania the object. There is however still a fourth type of contradiction, viz., the denial of the entire proposition: "I have no love for anybody." This proposition is equivalent to saying "I love only myself." This contradiction is the basis of the grandi-

ose type of paranoia, which we interpret as a sexual over-valuation of the self.

It is not without significance for other bits of paranoia lore that an element of grandiosity may be discovered in most other forms of paranoid misinterpretation. We have thus the right to assume that grandiose paranoia is altogether infantile.

It is now in order to examine the mechanism of repression. We have no right to assume that it is identical with that of symptom building. Such an identity is by no means probable. We will however investigate before jumping to conclusions.

In the symptom-building of paranoia the most striking feature is what is known as"projection." An inner perception is suppressed and in its place the content, after suffering a considerable distortion, comes into consciousness as something outwardly perceived. This distortion in persecutory mania involves a transformation of feeling. What from within would be perceived as love is perceived from without as hate. One might be tempted to regard this remarkable process as the most important in paranoia and absolutely pathognomonic for it. We note however that 1) projection does not play the same role in all forms of paranoia and 2) it appears not only in paranoia but also under many other conditions. In fact it is a regular factor in normal attitudes toward the external world. The study of the projection mechanism we shall however defer, in order to examine the mechanism of repression.

In psychoanalysis we have generally traced pathological phenomena to the processes of repression. A closer consideration of what we call "repression" indicates that the process consists of three readily distinguished phases:

1. The first phase is that of fixation, the precursor and condition of every "repression." The fact of fixation can be attributed to the fact that a drive does not succeed in making the normal development, and as a result of this blocking remains in an infantile stage. The libidinous stream pertaining to it then behaves toward the later psychic structure as something belonging to the unconscious, something repressed. We have said that the precondition of mental illness is to be found in such fixation of the libido. We may add that in it also we may find the determining factors for the outcome of the third phase of repression.

2. The second phase of repression is the particular repression which we have been considering: the ordinary type. It proceeds from the more highly developed ego consciousness, and can be described as a suppression. It is a more or less active process, while that of fixation is an essentially passive lag.

3. The third and for pathological phenomena the most important phase is the failure of repression - the break-through, the return of the repressed. This break-through is determined by the location of the fixation, and it consists in a regression of the libido to this place.

the manifold characteristics of fixation we have already mentioned. They are as numerous as the steps in the development of the libido. We must be prepared for similar multiplicity in the mechanism of repression. We may therefore limit ourselves to the question as to how this case of Schreber's can help us in the understanding of paranoia.

At the climax of his illness, under the influence of visions, some of them horrible and others magnificent, Schreber developed the conviction that a world catastrophe was impending. Voices said to him that the work of 14,000 years was undone - that the earth was destined to exist for only 212 years. In the last period of his stay in Flechsig's institution, even that time had already run out. He himself was the last remaining real human being. Concerning the cause of this catastrophe he had a number of ideas. He thought at times of an ice age following the withdrawal of the sun; at times, of destruction through earthquake in which he as seer held the powers of creator. At times he was responsible in that through his magic powers he spread destruction among men and disrupted the foundations of religious faith. He could not doubt that during his illness the world had gone to pieces and what he saw before him was something different.

Such a world catastrophe during the stormy phases of paranoia is not infrequent in many other case histories. On the basis of our concept of libido-attachment it is possible for us to offer an explanation - especially in the light of his estimate of others as fugitive men. The patient has withdrawn his libido from the persons around him and from the external world in general. The end of the world is the projection of his inner catastrophe. His subjective world has gone to pieces since he has withdrawn his love from it.

After the curse with which Faust cuts himself loose from the world, the chorus of spirits sings:

"Woe! woe!
With a mighty blow
Thou hast destroyed
The beautiful world.
In ruin 'tis hurled
A titan has shattered it!

"Mightiest
Of all earth's sons
Build it again
More splendid.
In thine own bosom build it anew."

And the paranoic does rebuild it - not indeed more splendid, but at least enough to permit him to live in it. He rebuilds it through the work of his own phantasy. What we take for pathological symptoms, is really the attempt at cure. This succeeds to some extent, but never completely. A thoroughgoing inner change has taken place in that world, but he has re-established relationship with the persons and things of the world, often a very intensive one, even though it may be hostile where before it was expectantly tender. We may therefore say that the repression process consists in a separa-

tion of the libido from formerly beloved persons and things. All this takes place silently. We get lettle inkling of it, and are compelled to draw conclusions on the basis of the consequences. What makes itself startlingly noticeable is the attempt at cure. This takes place in paranoia by means of projection. It was not correct to say that the suppressed feelings were projected without - we see rather that the inwardly destroyed returns from without.

From this new insight there come a series of questions:

1. In the first place we must recognize that detachment of the libido is not confined to paranoia and that it does not always have disastrous consequences. In normal mental life (and not only at time of bereavement) we see it take place without illness. Detachment of the libido in and of itself cannot thus be regarded as the cause of paranoia. The distinctive feature is however not difficult to discover. In paranoia we have clinical evidence that the detached libido is used in a special way. We are reminded that most cases of paranoia show a bit of grandiosity, and that grandiosity in and of itself can constitute paranoia. From this we may conclude that the free floating libido, in the case of paranoia, becomes attached to the ego. This means that the narcissistic stage in the development of the libido is once more reached in which the ego becomes the sole sexual object. We therefore conclude that the paranoics show fixation in the narcissistic stage and that a recession from subliminated homosexuality to the narcissistic stage of development is characteristic of the paranoid type of regression.

4. Because of the close relationship of paranoia to Dementia Praecox it is not possible to evade the question of how such a conception of the former will affect our interpretation of the latter. That in Dementia Praecox the type of withdrawal of the libido from the outer world is especially clear, has been set forth in penetrating fashion by Abraham. It is to be found in repression through the detachment of the libido. The phase of stormy hallucinations we regard as a battle between the repression and an attempt at cure which seeks to bring the libido back to its object.x This attempt at cure does not however as in paranoia make use of projection but rather of the hallucinatory mechanism. This is one of the great differences between Dementia Praecox and Paranoia. The outcome of Dementia Praecox brings a second distinction. It is in general less favorable than in paranoia. Victory goes, not as in the case of paranoia to the reconstruction, but to the repression. The regression goes not just to the narcissism which expresses itself in delusions of grandeur but to a complete abandonment of interest in the outer world and returns to infantile autoerotism. The predisposing fixation must therefore lie further back than that of paranoia. It is to be found in the beginning of development. It is improbable that the homosexual impulses which we so often and perhaps always find in paranoia play much of a part in the etiology of Dementia Praecox.

TREATMENT OF PARANOIA AND PARANOID STATES - Adolph Meyer, M.D.
(from Modern Treatment of Nerv. and Men. Disorders)

Every hospital for the mentally sick harbors a certain number of patients whose general behavior and mental activity appear in this manner to be perfectly undisturbed and normal, but betraying a peculiar side-tracking of their attitude to the world along certain specific lines of delusions. They appear "perfectly well except on certain topics." One patient confides to the visitor that she is perfectly well but kept in the institution by a conspiracy of people who do not want her to divulge her information obtained by mysterious revelations or visions. Or another claims she is detained for purposes of coercion, e.g., that the physicians try to force information from her which may be of service to them. Or a venerable old sea-captain assures the visitor that his coming to the hospital was a necessary part of the plans of the Almighty, that he is one of God's prophets, that his inner knowledge makes him superior to the scoffers who call him crazy, that he has foretold most of the important events of the last few decades and is still foretelling them. A hard-working German woman, good-natured and a splendid helper, complains occasionally of hearing defamatory remarks from a set of people who have persecuted her for years and in many ways, on account of her "noble origin." A German governess comes to the institution unable to hold her position owing to suspicions, and more and more convinced that she is the humble instrument of a great reformation, a tool of the moral cleansing. Or a childless Russian woman is being tortured every night in her sleep by operations removing children from her body; her husband cooperates with the physicians, who get her children for experimentation. After a time this patient passed into a period of megalomania; she became the daughter of the Queen of Russia, and later Queen herself, held at the hospital unjustly; yet she does excellent work in the sewing room. Another patient, alcoholic, has an elaborate system of delusions of jealousy and of being poisoned with doctored milk, and from time to time has a violent outburst of anger, and complains of slanderous hallucinations of hearing. Another patient with a hemiplegia and hemiopsia on the left side for a number of years appeared perfectly reasonable but urged discharge because the attendants destroy his inside; they make him a crooked invalid; they trouble him by passing electricity through his bedstead at night. All this is stated in a semi-jocose vein. The patient has a history of slowly developing general paralysis with focal symptoms of the right hemisphere, but with remarkable preservation of memory, and merely this paranoid attitude as a residual of several episodes of expansiveness, which he has learned to minimize and to laugh at. Death occurred in the twelfth year of the disease, and the autopsy revealed the focal devastation process of general paralysis, especially in the right hemisphere. Or we find a patient with a slightly depressed and uncertain attitude but a consistent delusional view of everything; that there are debts throughout the world; that everybody is ruined through the evil one and everything is systematically changed, etc. All this is spoken and argued in a perfectly plausible and reasonable way, and referred to the effects of her own bad management and wicked conduct. It is utterly impossible to shake the conviction of the patient. Or a somewhat senile individual gives a consistent account of being deprived of all her property by the machinations of her son-in-law. At the same time there appear episodes of suspicion and unrest at night, but in the main no gap of memory and none of the usual evidences of senile dementia. Or a woman with recurrent attacks lingers in each convalescence with clearly delusional relations to the President of the Uni-

ted States and an attitude of paranoid exaltation.

It is natural that in the interpretation of cases of this kind the desire for a clean-cut issue has lead to the emphasis of the delusion formation as the supposed background of the whole mental affection. It is, however, to say the least fairly possible that we deal only with an end-product, a kind of adjustment on the surface.

The physician will want to go beneath the surface. In keeping with his training, he is naturally apt to look for the so-called "lesion," or at least for a definite somatic or functional disorder, and he assumes that the intellectual picture of the world tends to adjust itself to the abnormal foundations and gets distorted according to the case and the situation. Unfortunately the "lesions" and the somatic disorders back of the delusion-formation remain usually quite hypothetical, and therefore not helpful; as a rule a mere intellectual comfort. We are, however, safe in saying that the whole development of delusions and systematization of experience in keeping with the delusions is the inevitable result of the effort of the person to balance the intellect in harmony with a new or abnormal situation; and beside the prominent nations which create the more or less typical surface pictures mentioned above, there are in evidence fundamental tendencies in these persons to twist a wide range of experiences in keeping with a temporary or lasting bias or reactive tendency, which really should be the chief focus of psychopathological inquiry.

The very fact that the judgment is warped only along specific lines and relatively so clear and acute along most other lines might tempt one to stamp the cases as peculiar personalities rather than as sick persons in the ordinary sense of the word. Experience shows, moreover, that anyone who can hold a delusional attitude, in the face of good reasoning capacity apart from the warped topic, is apt to present a very fundamental and lasting deviation from the normal, a condition not likely to be overcome and more apt to extend under the effect of friction with the corrective agencies of the normal world. Transitory hobbies and notions and dominant preoccupations will occur in many persons; but false convictions which so affect the attitude of the person as to be held in the face even of the fate of having to besegrated in an institution for life certainly represent a clearly momentous pathological transformation of the personality, the fulfillment of a fate of peculiar make-up by itself or with the help of special influences or situations.

Freud's Views--The first systematic attempt at causal interpretation in this direction was made by Freud in 1896 in an analysis of a case of chronic hallucinatory paranoia, which deserves repeated perusal. I know of few instances showing as clearly how a perfectly lucid presentation can remain ignored and only partly grasped until the mode of thinking has become more common property and a habitual expression. Most of the writers up to that time and since were satisfied to consider in a descriptive analytic fashion whether the disturbance was primarily intellectual or emotional, and whether it was a disorder of the intellect or some specially dominant effects such as mistrust (Sandberg) and suspicion that might form the key to a simple and unitary explanation of the developments. Inasmuch as these investigations did

not make clear the origin of the distrust and suspicion and why it should work so disastrously in these special cases, the discussions remain more or less academic.

My own first formulation of the paranoid type of constitution is that it is continually ready to see a (biased) meaning in things, that it is suspicious, and at the same time implies a growing inclination to isolation. These persons are continually concerned with what other people may think. They further attribute intentions to different actions of others, more and more without judgment or attempts at verification of their suspicions.

According to my later formulation, the paranoid developments go with formally correct conduct and grasp, but inability to adapt the personal trend of thought and elaboration and attitude to the facts. We thus see the following grades of developments:

(a) Feeling of uneasiness, tendency to brooding, rumination and sensitiveness, with inability to correct the notions and to make concessions--paranoic constitution and paranoic moods.

(b) Appearance of dominant notions, suspicions or ill-balanced aims.

(c) False interpretations with self-reference and a tendency to systematization, without or with

(d) Retrospective or hallucinatory falsifications, etc.

(e) Megalomanic developments or deterioration or intercurrent acute episodes.

(f) At any period antisocial and dangerous reactions may result from the lack of adaptability and excessive assertion of the side-tracked personality. Paranoic and paranoid developments occur whenever assertion of the personality on logical grounds and reasoning occurs on false or morbid premises with inadequate realization of need of correction. There is a wide range of such possibilities as shown in the "incidental" or symptomatic paranoid episodes, and the paranoid character of "recovery without insight;" and even the full-fledged paranoic states are in a way symptomatic of definite types of maladjustments.

The study of this class of cases led me to look for disturbance of the balance of instincts of which we know that they are the forces irresistibly at work until some form of gratification or adjustment is attained. Certain definite difficulties and conflicts in the satisfaction of instincts would then lead to exaggeration of suspicions, of fears, and to other possible responses to interference with gratification such as definite delusional substitutions for the gratification. On this point, Freud has given us a valuable concept in the term "wish-fulfillment," which to a very large extent characterizes delusional solutions of existing difficulties as a harbor into which the sore mentality of the patient can retreat. The analysis of 1896 and the more recent one of Dr. Schreber's autobiography give us a series of concepts equally suggestive and helpful.

It is natural that the conception which sees in paranoic developments a morbid and delusive attempt at finding a balance would also entail certain therapeutic inferences, part of which are simply commonsense adaptations of this conviction. They urge that the patient should be put into as neutral an environment as possible and protected against irritation and should be fur-

nished adequate occupation to absorb his energies and utilize them to the point of satisfaction, where satisfaction can be obtained.

The first task is to determine from reliable informants and from a study of the patient the extent of what is delusional and what is real and the direction and strength of the manifest motive-forces vitiating the patient's attitude and mental reactions; the plausibility or wildness of the notions which can give us an estimate of the patient's level of resources and tendencies and critical acumen, and of the extent of undermining that has taken place and of the material that might be available for reconstruction or to maintain an equilibrium of safety toward others; the existence of fundamental disturbances such as a depressive or manic tendency, alcoholic or other toxic affection, general paralysis or senility or special constitutional make-up and the existence or absence of remediable exciting factors in the outward situation of the patient which would throw light on our estimation of the depth and intrinsic nature of the disorder; the extent to which hallucinations and autochthonous ideas play a part which would mark the amount and kind of dissociation of the personality; the extent to which ideas of self-reference and morbid misinterpretations and a mood of morbid expectancy prevails, which would form a standard of the acuteness of the disturbance.

We must be ready to accept the existence of any combination of facts presenting themselves and any type of development that may suggest itself, rather than merely one or two or a few set notions or types. We must realize that a paranoic reaction may occur as a harmless simple episode under sufficient provocation, or symptomatically on the ground of visceral disease or malaise, or of some toxic or other cerebral or mental disorder, or it may be a more autonomous paranoic development. However this be, the final estimate should be made after a careful weighing of the factors at work rather than a mere snapshot or stereotyped identification with a standard type, and set inferences from the traditional assumptions concerning incurability, etc.

For this purpose it may be possible to obtain an autobiography, supplemented by trustworthy control accounts of healthy and well-informed persons.

The main thing is, however, a clear and frank unloading on the part of the patient and equally frank acceptance of the patient's point of view by the physicians. And here the first rule is the ability to accept the statements in an attitude in which neither the patient nor the physician need at any time be forced to recognize deception. I am as capable of listening calmly and politely to an account of a system of delusions as I am able to inquire into the religious and philosophical views of an oriental, and do not see why it should not be possible to do the two things with equal fairness and equal suspense of criticism and argument, and to arrive at a working agreement without any need of deception or sheer "humoring". It is possible that such an attitude becomes natural to one who looks upon any set of views as a more or less legitimate outcome of human mentation under certain conditions, and who sees the chief task in finding the conditions which led to such views.

For the working agreement it is always possible to find some really plain issues on which the patient is as anxious to get relief if not clearness as

the physician is anxious to give help. There are always some real nuisances to be eliminated, such as the troublesome nagging of anxious friends, or the upbraidings of an ill-advised wife or husband, or some personal difficulties like headaches and constipation, due to an obvious lack of hygiene. It is possible to start from such complaints in making the plans for the most advantageous daily regime within the possibility of controllable execution, at the same time giving opportunities to penetrate the latent strata. Every patient has definite conflicts and the physician's duty is to see through them and to enter into them without taking any such part as would compromise good sense and consistency of action, and also without neglecting opportunities to go into all those details which might ultimately help in the undermining of the morbid assurance.

This is the point on which the tyro is apt to lose out from the outset. Only infinite patience and a great familiarity with the sensitiveness of the patient and the liability to shrink into the shell of the morbid attitude will prevent excessive precipitation and inevitable failure. Most physicians will offend the patient before they can help, and even before they come to the point at which they are willing and ready to disagree on certain matters.

SCHIZOPHRENIA: ITS CONSERVATIVE AND MALIGNANT FEATURES

A Preliminary Communication

By HARRY STACK SULLIVAN, M. D.

Schizophrenia as a clinical entity continues to occupy an uncertain position. In particular, the matter of prognosis swings between the two poles of an absolute pessimism shown by some followers of Kraepelin, and a rather humble optimism reflected in several schools of research. The general tendency of the former is to divert from the so-called "praecox" group such cases as recover. For this purpose such conceptions as the benign stupor of Hoch, and non-praecox catatonia, among ethers, have been added to our clinical labels. The paper of Drs. Strecker and Willey presented last year to the American Psychiatric Association is an illustration of these tendencies. The following is an attempt to show in concise form a little of the promising side of the matter.

Research workers in this field have the concrete problems of science before them; they must collate and classify their data, seeking always the fundamentum divisionis. That success is at the end of a long path is indubitable; the length of the path has certainly been demonstrated in the past 40 years. Striking, peculiarly in retrospect, is the frequency with which the workers have passed early from the science to the philosophy of schizophrenia. The attractiveness of philosophy in this most difficult of all the fields of human endeavor arises from much the same things that have evolved in rational psychology as distinguished from empirical psychology. Rational or metaphysical psychology consists in the interpretations of mental facts and phenomena in terms of meaning, purpose, and value. Empirical or scientific psychology, on the other hand, is occupied solely with the discovery of causal relations. The field of study being mind, any major tendency of scientific thought to pass over to philosophy must reside in the nature of mind itself. What seems to be the principal feature of mind which stimulates this generally unwitting transition? Now that the enthusiasm for quasi-scientific obscurantism is failing with the collapse of materialism in the joint fields of physics and biology, it seems reasonably safe to express as an answer to the question, the obvious fact of teleology as a characteristic of things mental. As McDougall has put it, "Purposive activity is the most fundamental category of psychology." The element of purpose, which biologists are beginning to invoke in the explanation of vital facts, expends the abstraction principle of science, and enters into the realm of means and ends, of meanings and purpose. In attaching the problem of understanding and treatment of schizophrenia, the element of motivation seems logically fundamental to all others. As Dr. W. A. White has said, "We must understand what the patient is trying to do."

Schizophrenia, in the light of clinical observations, is not to be regarded as a primary disease such as that which one may visualize when mentioning dementia praecox. There is no profit from pondering on an organic substratus which cannot now, or in the next many years, be demonstrated in the patient who comes for treatment. The important conclusion reached in the investigations from which this paper proceeds, designates schizophrenia as a

series of major mental events always attended by material changes in personality, but in itself implying nothing of deterioration or dementia. The disorder is one in which the total experience of the individual is reorganized; there is a great eruption of primitive functions -- of thinking in complex-images, to use Levy-Bruhl's excellent expression; and there is an at least temporarily profound alteration of the egoistic structures, the sentiment of self-regard. It is a disorder which is determined by the previous experience of the individual.

It is not the outbreak of schizophrenic content and behavior which bears upon the individual prognosis: it is the dynamics of the several regressions which seems to be of final importance in determining recovery, chronicity, or a dementing course. The emphasis here is put upon the fact that schizophrenia has to be recognized as a mental process, regardless of anything other than the individual's behavior and thinking during the disorder. When this is done, and study is made of the actual content and of the details of behavior, the phenomena of value in determining unfavorable factors can be collected and classified.

Schizophrenia as a disorder of mind shows as disordered behavior and thinking. The tentative conclusions from our work are that the primary disorder in this illness is one of mental structure. The mental structure is disassociated in such fashion that the disintegrated portions regress in function to earlier levels of mental ontology, without parallelism in individual depth of regression. This disparity of depths seems the essence of that which is schizophrenia, as distinguished from other mental disorders. Judging from our clinical material and from the splendid monograph of Dr. Alfred Storch, the depths of regression in this disorder greatly exceed that in other forms of mental upset; this, too, may be found to be an essential feature.

The conservative features of schizophrenic dissociation have not been emphasized. It is but natural that a condition assumed to be uniformly destructive should be looked upon as completely malignant. Yet clinical experience points definitely to the contrary. In the past seven years, there have been seen and studied a group of brief schizophrenic illnesses which recovered with definite favorable change of personality. The majority of these had been diagnosed by staff conferences of various hospitals, as dementia praecox. In a large number there had been markedly psychopathic traits in the childhood of the patient. Ungovernable temper, tantrums, destructiveness, malicious behavior, emotional instabilities of high degree, excessive sensitiveness, extreme self-consciousness, and severe neuroses, are among the defective reaction-types pictured in the histories. The postpsychotic personality in these cases showed the disappearance or mitigation of defect, a greater adaptability or a greater self-satisfaction such that the stress incident to ordinary life was much nearer the usual. An improvement from seclusive, self-contained, or pent-up attitude with lack of the ability to use available outlets for the expression of distressing content, to one in which the patient was relatively open and able frankly to discuss some of his life problems, was generally observed. Even in the group who came out of their psychosis with a decidedly paranoid adjustment to reality, there had been a change from an obviously ineffectual adaptation to one in which the social contacts of the individual caused him much less profound discom-

fort; emotional introversion and brooding gave way to the less individually destructive projection of discomfort and hate. None of these cases is an instance of emotional or intellectual deterioration such that the personality was reduced below the average of those similarly situated in the social fabric. That each represented a loss of some "superior traits" may be true, but the psychosis was none the less conservative, for it made subsequent social life possible and thereby preserved an individual who had not been equal to the demands of the social integration. Relapse into psychosis has been observed in a group, some of whom had undoubtedly improved in social adaptability as a result of the initial disorder. The subsequent psychosis has not always proven to be more severe than the former. In one case, in particular, the subsequent mental disorder was peculiarly mild, and the conservative features of the process so clear cut that it will be reported in detail elsewhere. In this connection, it must be obvious to anyone, that the social milieu to which the patient has to return, has a great deal to do with his future. If the conservative reorganization of complexes and sentiments which appears to underly a goodly share of the early schizophrenic phanomenology, leads the patient to the foreconscious belief that he can circumvent or rise above environmental handicaps, and this belief is the presenting feature of a comprehensive mental integration, his recovery proceeds. If no such reconstruction is accomplished the patient does not recover. If such a reintegration is made solely on the basis of the particularly favorable institutional environment, with repression of hopeless features of the social situation awaiting him outside; a recovery of a tenuous and unstable kind may be accomplished: the prospect being for prompt relapse. Relapse, which would appear to be more ominous than the first psychosis, if only because of increased discouragement, is not invariably so: in a very few cases, it has seemed as if the patient went into the second illness with fewer problems than into the first, and showed profiting by the former experience -- a prompter and more comprehensive recovery. The degree of "insight" which the patient brings from his psychosis is quite generally accepted as having an an important relation to the stability of recovery. Insight, however, is never perfect, and there are a large proportion of recovered or arrested schizophrenics who have achieved a reasonably unified personality, fairly adapted to the social integration, without any ability for the conscious formulation and expression which we generally seek as evidence of insight.

Wherein the factors of good are contained in the frequently destructive process, has been the principal subject of study. From the start, evidence has been abundant to the effect that, while most schizophrenic dissociations are initially persecutory in coloring, and in many cases explanatory grandiose notions make their appearance, it is only the individual who develops somewhat logical beliefs in persecution, with or without grandiose notions, that comes under the unfavorable rubrics of the paranoid group. Of this section the paraphrenic of Kraepelin is typical, The point here is that illogical or bizarre persecutory beliefs show in subsequent developments not as an adjustment to reality, but as events of psychical reorganization as transient as the notions themselves. The beliefs which are rather consistent, logically, once a small group of false premises have been accepted, are to be viewed as unsuccessful outcome of the psychosis, and are an unfavorable omen.

Again from the outset of the study, before the content and behavior of such

cases had received much attention, it appeared that the case showing silliness as the prevailing affect, and with this much manneristic activity, did not progress but deteriorated. Acting upon the theory of Kempf, that the Hebephrenic was to be regarded as one in whom interests were prevailingly anal, fecal, urinal and sodomistic, and the cravings "would rather remain infantile than strive for the responsibilities of maturity," an attempt was made to determine which of a group of patients diagnosed as hebephrenic dementia praecox fitted this description. It became evident that there was in fact at least two types of content in the general clinical group of hebephrenics. There was one (which is accepted as hebephrenic) in which fecal, anal, and urinary interests dominate the personality. In these, the mannerisms were of great interest. So far, it has seemed that the hostile egoistic desires stirred in opposition to the perverse infantile cravings were the motivation of the mannerisms. This is a tentative conclusion. The appearance of a mannerism, as well as the time of its repetition, the exaggeration of its manifestations and the available content before its appearance and subsequent to an occasional disappearance, has led to the rather startling surmise that the mannerism is a regression to almost purely physiological existence of a mental content, the distinguishing nature of which was its conflict with the perverse adaptation. As such the hebephrenic mannerism may be a bridge from conversion phenomena to tics on the one hand and to epileptiform seizures, on the other. Further development of this subject will be undertaken in a study of epileptic phenomena. The point here is that the group of individuals who lose egoistic strivings and develop mannerisms; this situation being concomitant with frank excretory interests, is of very poor prognosis. Silliness is not a criterion, probably being the affect of perverse infantile behavior in contempt of external disapproval.

The other class of patient found in the clinical group of hebephrenics was made up of diverse "deteriorating" schizophrenics in which conflict with the anti-social desires and with the content antagonistic to more adult egoistic satisfaction, had not disappeared. As such, the prognostic criteria seemed more favorable. Attempts at treatment led to the conclusion that the deterioration features were due to splitting of the sentiment of self-regard in somewhat the fashion seen in multiple personality; so that in these schizophrenics there are a variety of partial goals of the mental life, instead of an integrated ego dominating or striving to dominate the innate and derivative tendencies. It is in this group that many of the "paranoid praecox" cases come to rest, for a time, on their course into dementia.

Finally, there were the group where therapeutic endeavor was consistently encouraging. The rough clinical lable of this group is, of course, catatonic dementia praecox. (Passim, almost all initial schizophrenic psychoses should be considered of this category.) The individual whose struggles in personality reorganization takes this form is primarily distinguishable as one in whom there is neither recourse to comprehensive projection of his problems upon his colleagues, nor such a form of multiple splitting of the ego as that mentioned above in discussing the second hebephrenic group. Also, in contradiction to the pure hebephrenic, his psychosis does not represent a satisfactory adjustment with loss of egoistic strivings and perverse (antibiological) pleasure taking. Because his problems are not solved in these socially destructive fashions, the severe conflict remains unabated and the

purely schizophrenic dissociation becomes greater in the catatonic than elsewhere. The regressive processes go deeper in the mental structures; and the functions appearing in content and behavior become lower and lower in the scale of psychologic ontogenesis. Thus it is here that we see that really marvelous demonstration (by regression) of the intra-uterine mind -- the prenatal a ttitude, sometimes with makeshift uterine environment (tightly enwrapping blanket, darkness, wetness, etc.). Here we see the unmistakable evidence of prenatal experience. The certain experimental proof of ontogenic psychology is provided by the startlingly prompt recovery to accessibility and subsequent health which has been observed, occasionally, to follow upon a fortunately well timed interpretation of the behavior.

To conclude this preliminary and necessarily fragmentary presentation, the conservative aspect of catatonic states in particular, and of early schizophrenia in general, are to be identified as attempts by regression to genetically older thought processes, to infantile or even prenatal mental functions, successfully to reintegrate masses of life experience which has failed of structuralization into a functional unity; and finally lead by that very lack of structuralization to multiple dissociations in the field of relationship of the individual not only to external reality, including the social milieu, but to his personal reality.

Just as the primitive thinking in more normal sleep solves many a problem, and, in the remembered dream, brings up for assistance many an unsolved problem with which we now feel able to deal; so do these primitive processes in schizophrenia, so far as they can be comprehended by another mind (and turned to some purpose in reorganizing experience which had not been integrated) offer a field for direct therapeutic activity and a promise which removes this disorder from the category of unmitigated evil.

While it is not intended that this paper shall relate directly to the therapy of schizophrenia, it being the desire merely to insure a measure of new interest, so that these patients will cease to be regarded by so many as a priori inexplicable and hopeless, a word may be said of clinical applications of the theory. Far more than any single action of the physician, it is his general attitude towards the patient that determines his value. Primitive sympathy phenomena, such as, in fact, underly the psychoanalytic "transference machanism," are of prime importance in relieving the introversion of mental life of the patient, to such effect that his experiences can be brought more and more into objective relations, with increasing adaptation of his personality to reality, and increment in the biological utilization of the hormic energy. The schizophrenic appreciates all too definitely the attitude of the physician regarding the life situation presented by the patient.

THE "TRANSFERENCE"

From Sigmund Freud's "Autobiographical Study"

Even before I went to Paris, Breuer had told me about a case of hysteria which, between 1880 and 1882, he had treated in a peculiar manner which had allowed him to penetrate deeply into the causation and significance of hysterical symptoms. This was a time, therefore, when Janet's works still belonged to the future. He repeatedly read me pieces of the case history, and I had an impression that it accomplished more towards an understanding of neuroses than any previous observation.

When I was back in Vienna I turned once more to Breuer's observation and made him tell me more about it. The patient had been a young girl of unusual education and gifts, who had fallen ill while she was nursing her father, of whom she was devotedly fond. When Breuer took over her case it presented a variegated picture of paralyses and contractures, inhibitions and states of mental confusion. A chance observation showed her physician that she could be relieved of these clouded states of consciousness if she was induced to express in words the affective phantasy by which she was at the moment dominated. From this discovery, Breuer arrived at a new method of treatment. He put her into deep hypnosis and made her tell him each time what it was that was oppressing her mind. After the attacks of depressive confusion had been overcome in this way, he employed the same procedure for removing her inhibitions and physical disorders. In her waking state the girl could no more describe than other patients how her symptoms had arisen, and she could discover no link between them and any experiences of her life. In hypnosis she immediately revealed the missing connection. It turned out that all of her symptoms went back to moving events which she had experienced while nursing her father; that is to say, her symptoms had a meaning and were residues or reminiscences of those emotional situations. It turned out in most instances that there had been some thought or impulse which she had had to suppress while she was by her father's sick-bed, and that, in place of it, as a substitute for it, the symptom had afterwards appeared. But as a rule the symptom was not the precipitate of a single such "traumatic" scene, but the result of a summation of a number of similar situations. When the patient recalled a situation of this kind in a hallucinatory way under hypnosis and carried through to its conclusion, with a free expression of emotion, the mental act which she had originally suppressed, the symptom was wiped away and did not return. By this procedure Breuer succeeded, after long and painful efforts, in relieving his patient of all her symptoms.

The patient had recovered and had remained well and, in fact, had become capable of doing serious work. But over the final stage of this hypnotic treatment there rested a veil of obscurity, which Breuer never raised for me; and I could not understand why he had so long kept secret what seemed to me an invaluable discovery instead of making science the richer for it.

I could not understand why this was until I came to interpret the case correctly and to reconstruct, from some remarks which he had made, the conclusion of his treatment of it. After the work of catharsis had seemed to be completed, the girl had suddenly developed a condition of "transference love"; he had not connected this with her illness, and had therefore retired in dismay. It was obviously painful to him to be reminded of this apparent <u>contretemps</u>.

The question presented itself, whether it was possible to generalize from what he had found in a single case. The state of things which he had discovered seemed to me to be of so fundamental a nature that I could not believe it could fail to be present in any case of hysteria if it had been proved to occur in a single one. But the question could only be decided by experience. I therefore began to repeat Breuer's investigations with my own patients and eventually, especially after my visit to Bernheim in 1889 had taught me the limitations of hypnotic suggestion, I worked at nothing else. After observing for several years that his findings were invariably confirmed in every case of hysteria that was accessible to such treatment, and after having accumulated a considerable amount of material in the shape of observations analogous to his, I proposed to him that we should issue a joint publication.

The theory put forth in our "Studies in Hysteria" was unpretentious and hardly went beyond the direct description of the observations. It did not seek to establish the nature of hysteria but merely to throw light upon the origin of its symptoms. Thus it laid stress upon the significance of the life of the emotions and upon the importance of distinguishing between mental acts which are unconscious and those which are conscious (or rather capable of being conscious); it introduced a dynamic factor, by supposing that a symptom arises through the damming-up of an affect, and an economic factor, by regarding that same symptom as the product or equivalent of a quantity of energy which would otherwise have been employed in some other way. (This latter process was described as conversion). Breuer spoke of our method as cathartic; its therapeutic aim was explained as being to provide that the accumulated affect used for maintaining the symptom, which had got onto the wrong lines and had, as it were, become stuck there, should be directed onto the normal path along which it could obtain discharge (or abreaction). The practical results of the cathartic procedure were excellent. Its defects, which became evident later, were those of all forms of hypnotic treatment.

As a result of taking up the study of nervous disorders in general, I altered the technique of catharsis. I abandoned hypnosis and sought to replace it by some other method, because I was anxious not to be restricted to treating hysteriform conditions. Increasing experience had also given rise to two grave doubts in my mind as to the use of hypnosis even as a means to catharsis. The first was that even the most brilliant results were liable to be suddenly wiped away if my personal relation with the patient became disturbed. It was true that they became re-established if a reconciliation could be effected; but such an occurrence showed that the personal emotional relation between doctor and patient was after all stronger than the whole cathartic process, and it was precisely that factor which escaped every effort at control. And one day I had an experience which showed me in the crudest light what I had long suspected. One of my most acquiescent patients, with whom hypnosis had enabled me to bring about the most marvellous results, and whom I was engaged in relieving of her suffering by tracing back her attacks of pain to their origins, as she woke up on one occasion, threw her arms around my neck. The unexpected entrance of a servant relieved us from a painful situation , but from that time onwards there was a tacit understanding between us that hypnotic treatment should be discontinued. I was modest enough not to attribute the event to my own irresistible personal attraction, and I felt

that I had now grasped the nature of the element of mystery that was at work behind hypnosis. In order to exclude it, or at all events to isolate it, it was necessary to abandon hypnosis.

(Thus developed the doctrine of "transference" which he explains as follows:)

In every analytic treatment, there arises, without the physician's agency, an intense emotional relationship between the patient and the analyst which is not to be accounted for by the actual situation. It can be of a positive or a negative character, and can vary between the extremes of a passionate, completely sensual love and the unbridled expression of an embittered defiance and hatred. This transference--to give it its shortened name--soon replaces, in the patient's mind, the desire to be cured, and, so long as it is affectionate and moderate becomes the agent of the physician's influence and neither more nor less than the main-spring of the joint work of analysis. Later on, when it has become passionate or has been converted into hostility, it becomes the principal tool of resistance. It may then happen that it will paralyze the patient's powers of associating and endanger the success of the treatment. Yet it would be senseless to try to evade it; for an analysis without transference is an impossibility. It must not be supposed, that the transference is created by analysis and does not occur apart from it. The transference is merely uncovered and isolated by analysis. It is a universal phenomenon of the human mind, it decides the success of all medical influence and, in fact, dominates the whole of each person's relations to his human environment.

PSYCHOTHERAPY

Being the substance of a paper on psychotherapy presented before the Massachusetts Medical Society on June 10, 1925

By C. Macfie Campbell, M. D.

In the following remarks I shall confine myself to what I consider to be the general principles of Psychotherapy, which are of very great importance to the general practitioner and to specialists in all branches of medicine. I am afraid the following presentation will appear too simple; my only excuse for such a presentation is that it seems to me to be a true one.

A patient goes to a member of the medical profession to be treated for certain symptoms. The member of the medical profession, after examination and diagnosis, outlines treatment directed towards the symptoms - regime, diet, drugs, appliances, operation, occupation, travel, exposure to sunlight or other forms of light, or to rays of other origin. The patient utilizes the advice given by a member of the medical profession, but if correct it would have been efficacious if discovered in a textbook or extracted from a diagnostic machine or handed in an envelope by the secretary of a medical group or corporation.

The above description does not do justice to the real situation in the consulting room. It deals with it as if a patient, or a disease process inhabiting a patient, were confronted with an impersonal medical machine. The real situation is a man or a woman in trouble appealing for help to a man or woman who has had a special training to equip him for being of use in such situations. The real situation, therefore, is the sick man Brown face to face with Smith the physician--or, to obviate any misleading references, let us call the physician McConnachie. In so far as the benefit done to Brown in relieving him of his symptoms comes from McConnachie <u>listening to</u> and <u>talking to</u> Brown, we are dealing with Psychotherapy.

I am afraid this appears a very ordinary kind of therapy in comparison with such distinguished competitors as opotherapy, heliotherapy, pharmacotherapy and the technical methods of the surgical specialties. The procedure seems rather commonplace, it looks like the mere application of common sense. The only excuse for it is that it may work wonders. The fact that it is so ordinary is, of course, disappointing to the physician accustomed to dealing with therapies which have a much more technical appearance, and which can be formulated in much more precise terms. The modern physician, having lost sight of the patient, and obsessed with the idea of disease processes, expects to find in his armory a suitable weapon of precision to deal efficiently with each disease process. He would like to have a special drug or serum or operative procedure to meet exactly the disease process upon which his attention becomes focused. In the past he has found many of these forms of therapy extremely efficient. When he finds himself face to face with nervous disorders, to understand which requires a complete readjustment of his point of view and the abondonment of the narrow laboratory nosological attitude, he is somewhat at a loss. He naturally refers to his armory for the suitable weapon to deal with these baffling symptoms. He has tried pharmacotherapy and opotherapy and surgical therapy and finds that they seem to be of singularly little value for these nervous troubles. He hears Psy-

chotherapy well spoken of and thinks that he will try this new variety of therapy. He intends to try it in exactly the same way as he has tried pharmacotherapy and surgical therapy, that is, as a more or less impersonal technique which he takes hold of and utilizes in order to deal with some morbid process.

He does not realize that the psychotherapeutic technique carried out by a physician, who is thinking merely in terms of impersonal disease precesses, is a very different thing from Psychotherapy carried out by a physician sensitive to the complexities of human nature and profoundly convinced of the fact that many human ailments are merely the disguised expression of the difficulty which people have in dealing with vital issues in life.

The Psychotherapeutic treatment of Brown by McConnachie consists in McConnachie listening and talking to Brown. Is there any special technique in regard to this type of therapy? So long as McConnachie is intelligent and listens long enough to the information which Brown can put before him, and so long as he is able to talk to Brown in a useful and constructive way, details of procedure or technique are of vanishing importance. They are, to a large extent, questions of taste and tradition and authority. One physician may wish to employ the dramatic technique of the hypnotic procedure in order that he may listen to Brown and talk to Brown. Brown may be docile and have no special objections to this little drama, in fact the mild mystery associated with it may somewhat exalt McConnachie in his eyes. Primitive man has always been very sensitive to the magical forces associated with the medicine-man, and the reactions of primitive man still continue beneath the more highly evolved functions of civilized man. It is not surprising, therefore, to find similar manifestations elicited as easily in Boston as in Central Africa or the wilds of Brazil. Even when Brown is not specially influenced by these primitive mechanisms, he may have other reasons for accepting the hypnotic suggestion. It is less embarassing to tell some things with head averted or with eyes closed; it is gratifying to have at the same time the possibility of unburdening and the official fiction that we, ourselves, are not really conscious of the facts we are disclosing. So in diplomacy it is sometimes useful to communicate some information but at the same time make a dementi officiel. This is in accord with diplomatic tradition and the diplomatist retains his self-respect. So it is the tradition of the hypnotic technique and the patient maintains his self-respect.

That this is the actual situation as it appears to the patient in some cases is shown by the statement of a patient of Kretschmer; very sensitive, deeply distressed over the problems of the sexual life, she prayed to God that He would let her be hypnotized in order that she might tell the physician what, under ordinary conditions, she could not bring over her lips.

A patient who wishes the physician to know certain facts may not have the courage to tell him directly and may hand in a written confession. Occasionally patients ask a nurse or other intermediary to tell the physician. they are afraid to lose the respect of the physician, something which already means a good deal to them. Ordinary social habits furthur tend to make Brown accept the little hypnotic drama if McConnachie seems anxious to play the game; one dislikes to be disobliging to one who is respected or ad-

mired or loved. A soldier who had been talking freely in the so-called hypnotic condition to his military medical officer admitted to another neurologist that during the whole interview he had been quite well aware of what was going on. When this fact was disclosed to the military medical officer he soon gave up the dramatic setting and continued equally efficiently his treatment of his patients, while he listened to them and talked to them face to face while they were wide awake and in no mysterious condition.

An orthodox follower of Freud may prefer to sit behind his patient, who lies stretched out on a couch and with closed eyes talks to the physician about whatever happens to come into his or her mind; there too, the patient has the opportunity to talk with averted face, and it may be more pleasant for the physician not to have the patient scrutinizing his face for an hour continuously. This setting too may give both to the patient and to the physician a diluted magical feeling which heightens the prestige of the physician.

The essential fact about the situation is that Brown, whether in the hypnotic or psychoanalytic setting or sitting with eyes wide open on any convenient chair, is talking seriously and earnestly about vital issues to McConnachie, who is equally seated on some indifferent article of furniture, but who is profoundly convinced of the important role played in many ailments by the complications of human nature and the difficulties of adjustment to a modern cultural environment.

The general practitioner, hearing that the hypnotic and psychoanalytic technique are more or less irrelevant, may feel considerably elated in view of the fact that Psychotherapy merely consists in McConnachie listening to and talking to Brown; for him it may seem very simple. He must realize, however, that this situation of Brown and McConnachie together is an extraordinarily complex one, and that the issue of the psychotherapeutic relationship is going to depend upon the personality of McConnachie and upon the personality of Brown and upon the life issues in which Brown finds himself involved.

Brown may be an ignorant artisan or he may ne an erudite scholar. He may be very receptive of suggestions made or he may be very tenacious of his own views and prejudices. He may be dominated by the appetites or he may be keenly responsive to the finer issues of life. He may be egotistic or he may feel a definite personal responsibility for playing his role in relation to a cultural environment, towards the maintenance of whose standards each one of us must do his bit.

Brown may have an absolutely different scheme of values in life from McConnachie, in regard to set standards of personal behavior, in regard to his relationship to members of his family and to the community in general; he may have a different attitude towards religion, towards sex standards, towards social and legal restrictions.

McConnachie, too, is a real man - no medical machine. He has the likes and dislikes, the prejudices, convictions, enthusiasma that go with human nature. He may be radical or conservative, heterodox or orthodox, matter-of-fact or imaginative, rigid and unbending or willing to listen to compromise. He may have strict standards as to sex relations or he may be extremely tolerant.

With regard to religion and the spiritual values of life, he may treat them with kindly indifference or may consider them as the factors which give life its savor.

Brown may partly owe his nervousness to resentment at an over-dominant father, and if, in McConnachie, he meets again the same paternal or magisterial attitude he may be quite unable to accept the help which McConnachie offers. On the other hand, if he has been unduly dependent upon an over-solicitous parent he may become much attached to McConnachie, who likes to play the authority and who does not see that he is fostering an attitude in Brown which it should be his first duty to check.

Some furthur remarks may be made with regard to the actual procedure involved in the psychotherapeutic treatment of Brown by McConnachie. McConnachie has to listen to Brown's story, he may even ask for furthur details than Brown spontaneously brings up. The story is apt to become long, it involves all sorts of detailed incidents in the past, it draws in the personalities of the family circle, it wanders into an account of a complicated inner life of strivings, regrets and phantasies; frequently isolated and apparently irrelevant recollections or associations thrust themselves into the narrative, coming from some mysterious source. The one very important point of the technique is to let Brown tell his story his own way, spontaneously, fully, with irrelevant interjections, with sudden changes of direction, with hesitations and corrections. The spontaneous account of the problem and of the past life and the inner experiences is an essential part of the psychotherapeutic procedure.

McConnachie does not merely register this account in a mechanical way, but is thinking about what it all means. He notices what is spontaneously brought up, his attention is caught by a sudden check in the narrative with an abrupt change of direction, by a slight hesitation, a stammer, a flush, an uneasy change of position, casual movements on the part of Brown, attention to the neatness of his attire. All these data are problems in dynamic psychology and McConnachie is interested and curious.

An hour has passed and the whole situation is still very obscure, even two hours may have passed and the time of McConnachie is not unlimited, unless this is his first and only patient. What is he to do? If he is going to help Brown to straighten out the issues of his life and help him to get an equilibrium which will make neurotic symptoms superfluous, he has got to understand the whole story, all the forces at work, all the difficulties in the situation, all the undigested residuals of past experiences. One interview evidently does not suffice. It may be only after a long series of interviews that the situation becomes clearer, the tangle unraveled and the tension relieved.

Psychotherapy takes time, it takes a lot of time. One frequently hears a busy internist remark that he tried Psychotherapy in a case but got no results. One sometimes wonders how much time he spent in listening to the patient.

It would be a great gain if one could treat patients in groups. In one case

a group of ward patients made an appeal for such assistance to the physician. In so far as the physician is giving information, correcting false impressions, stimulating hope and courage, formulating a point of view, he may treat certain types of patients in groups, the individual patient extracting from the talk, as from the sermon of the preacher, that message which is specially required by him. The great gain to the patient, however, comes not from what the physician says to the patient but from what the patient says to the physician, and it is obvious that for a frank, unembarrassed review the patient must be alone with the physician.

Psychotherapy takes time, and it takes much time in some cases, but it is important to realize that if McConnachie be deeply interested in these issues, if he have a wide experience, if Brown have confidence in him, the time may be very considerably curtailed and a frank and open atmosphere established with great rapidity. It would be unfortunate if Psychotherapy were to be looked upon as invariably and inevitably involving an enormous amount of time, and were only to be available for those able to pay proportionately for this time.

To return to the concrete situation of Brown and McConnachie devoting themselves in a series of interviews to the problems of the former, it may seem that an undue amount of time is allowed to the analysis or diagnosis of Brown's problems. It may seem unreasonable to allow Brown to get to talking, interview after interview, about his feelings, his memories, his dreams, his inhibitions, his primitive cravings. Brown himself may ask McConnachie "when is the treatment going to begin?" The treatment has already begun when Brown, under the influence of McConnachie, begins to pour out his story. As a matter of fact he may, from the very first, experience a sense of great relief; he may, in the course of the second or third interview, tell of a certain improvement in his condition, of fears molified, of work accomplished, of sleep attained or other progress made, perhaps even to his own surprise for he was still waiting for treatment to begin. The treatment has begun as soon as Brown has taken the first step in exposing his personal difficulties. This active step taken by Brown is a mental exercise of the greatest importance, the continuation of which is going to contribute, in large part, to the re-establishment of his equilibrium.

If Brown has begun his share in the treatment with the first step of the examination, McConnachie likewise has taken part in it. Brown has been able to make the effort to talk because he has found McConnachie willing to make the effort to listen, and the atmosphere of McConnachie's consulting room, the personal influence which he exerts upon Brown, make it possible for him to carry out the necessary review of his problems, the ressurrection of past experiences, the frank facing of difficulties hitherto evaded. In taking seriously Brown's problems and enabling Brown to scrutinize and discuss his troubles in an atmosphere which is not complicated by the ethical and social values of the drawing room and the market place, McConnachie offers to Brown a therapeutic condition as essential for his recovery as fresh air and sunlight for the recovery of the tubercular.

McConnachie does not remain altogether passive in the situation; he encourages Brown to go forward when Brown hesitates and obviously evades a painful

issue; he puts at the disposal of Brown biological information, in the light of which some of Brown's memories lose a great deal of their disturbing force; he encourages, explains and illustrates. Brown hesitates to talk so much of himself; will it not make him introspective? McConnachie explains that introspection may be used for an unwise or a wise purpose. It is unwise to be continually taking a watch or an automobile to pieces just because one is preoccupied with its machinery and has no wider interests. It may be very wise to take an automobile to pieces if some difficulty should have developed, and if the individual wish to be sure that he use the machine to the best purpose and that he be not left stranded in the middle of important undertakings. In over-hauling the automobile one has to go below what is shining and elegant to the driving forces, the examination of which may be distasteful and cover the hands with grease. When the job is done one does not leave the crude machinery exposed, one can still maintain enough pleasure in the beautiful and in what is socially fitting to cover up the inner works and restore the machine to its normal elegance.

So, in over-hauling the psychological machinery one may have to dive below to deal with crude forces, contact with which is somewhat distasteful to us, but having done what is necessary to adjust the machinery one shows a reasonable compliance with the demands of convention. If one wish to have a healthy house it is well to realize frankly that such things as plumbing and a cellar may occasionally require attention. Or McConnachie may vary the simile and remind Brown that we do not treat dirty linen by locking it in a dark cupboard but by putting it out in the sunshine. It is true that we do not bleach our linen on the front lawn; the consultation room may represent the back yard. He may remind Brown that Pompeii owes its preservation largely to the fact that it has been lying covered up for hundreds of years and that now exposed to the weather it will require to be carefully preserved. So with the early experiences and attitudes and emotional values of childhood, so long as they are absolutely covered up by formulae of thought and modes of behavior inculcated by conventional education, they may persist indefinitely, liable to give rise to symptoms above the surface which perplex the individual. Once brought into the light of free discussion and honest information, the angular memory fragments of painful experiences begin to weather and blend with the landscape.

The success of Psychotherapy will depend upon many factors, the discussion of which would take us very far afield. It depends upon the personality of Brown, it depends upon the type and the duration of the disorder which handicaps Brown, it depends upon the life situation before which he finds himself, it depends upon what sort of fellow McConnachie is.

One practical point may be referred to. McConnachie may feel uncertain as to how much of the handicap of Brown is due to some physical disorder and may wish the opinion of an internist or surgical specialist with regard to this point. The specialist thus appealed to is more likely than not to have little interest in the psychotherapeutic situation, although he may be polite enough to cover up his real attitude towards it. He may not explicitly say that the condition of the tonsils and of a molar tooth with a slight hyperacidity and some visceroptosis and mild flat foot are probably the explanation of all Brown's difficulty, but that impression may radiate out

from him and be eagerly welcomed by that craven part of Brown, which still would like to evade the main issues of life and which has not fully taken its stand on the side of complete honesty. It is difficult to carry on Psychotherapy while at the same time the patient is under the influence of another physician, whose special interest leads to emphasis on all deviations from the normal in the simple bodily functions. The situation may be dealt with in various ways. It is wise to let one's colleague know exactly what the situation is so that the latter will not unwittingly influence the patient in an undesirable direction. Sometimes it is better to put off Psychotherapy until after the simpler functions have the necessary attention. The main thing is to be aware of this complication and to deal with it in a common sense and tactful way.

In regard to the psychoanalytic mode of procedure and body of doctrines many questions at once arise. A detailed presentation of these doctrines and a critical estimation of them would be quite beyond the scope of this paper. What is more it would do much to obscure the main point of the paper, which is that McConnachie can be of very great use to Brown, even although, with regard to the complicated and sometimes obscure doctrines of the various psychoanalytic schools, he may feel somewhat ill-informed. Should he read a presentation of any of these special doctrines I should advise him always to keep clearly in mind that the somewhat formal and abstract formulations which he is reading are abstracted from a concrete situation, and to retranslate the abstract formulae into the concrete terms of the individual psychoanalyst, listening, encouraging, explaining, interpreting to the patient before him.

To repeat what has already been said several times in this paper, the essence of Psychotherapy, no matter what the special procedure may be, is that Brown, an individual in trouble, is getting an honest chance to bring up important problems of his life before McConnachie the physician, who is willing to listen to him, and that McConnachie is honestly endeavoring to pool his special knowledge with Brown's lay experience to see whether poor Brown can, by means of his help, make a better job of his life and get along without his previous evasive reactions, whether the latter consist of physical symptoms, special fears, domestic friction, economic inefficiency or social eccentricities.

COUNSELING & PSYCHOTHERAPY
CARL R. ROGERS
Pp. 133-165, Summarized

Response to Feeling versus Response to Content. Probably the most difficult skill to acquire in counseling is the art of being alert to and responding to the feeling which is being expressed, rather than giving sole attention to the intellectual content.

When the counselor responds on an intellectual basis to the ideas which the client expresses, he diverts expression into intellectual channels of his own choosing, he blocks the expression of emotionalized attitudes, and he tends wastefully to define and solve the problems in his own terms, which are often not the true terms for the client. On the other hand, when the counselor continually keeps himself alert not only to the content which is being stated, but to the feelings which are being expressed, and responds primarily in terms of the latter element, it gives the client the satisfaction of feeling deeply understood, it enables him to express further feeling, and it leads most efficiently and most directly to the emotional roots of his adjustment problem.

It is generally not too difficult for the counselor to recognize and help to bring to conscious expression hostile attitudes which are directed toward others--toward employers, parents, and teacher, or toward rivals and enemies. When the negative attitudes being expressed are directed toward the client himself, or toward the counselor, then too often we find ourselves springing to the defense of the client out of our sympathy for him, or rising to our own defense as counselors. It should be recognized that in these areas, also, the counselor is most effective when he aids in bringing the feeling consciously into the picture without taking sides. Here it is especially important that he should recognize his function as that of a mirror which shows the client his real self and enables him, aided by this new perception, to reorganize himself.

It need not disturb the counselor that feelings which are expressed may be in direct contradiction to one another. Often it is these contradictory feelings that constitute the most significant ambivalences which are serving as sources of conflict. Thus, a student talks in the bitterest of terms in regard to his father. He dislikes his father. He has always been ashamed of his father. It was his father's unreasonably harsh and contemptuous criticisms which were responsible for the attitudes of inadequacy which have crippled his life. Yet after several interviews of this type, he slowly recognizes that he admired his father's scientific interests, admired his father's disregard for convention, looked up to his father for his independence of the maternal control which the boy was experiencing. These attitudes are contradictory, but not in the sense that one is true and one false. They are both true feelings, the hostile attitude conscious, the attitude of admiration never before having been recognized openly by the student. As they are both brought openly into the counseling situation, the client is able to reach a much more realistic emotional evaluation of his relationship to his father, and finds himself free of conflicts which previously he has been unable to understand.

In responding to these feelings of warmth and affection on the part of the client, the important element is that the counselor should leave the client free to alter this feeling without any sense of guilt. Essentially the counselor's attitude must be, "You feel very warmly toward me now, but the time may come when you also will feel resentful, and the time will certainly come when you no longer will feel the need of this relationship." While it is probably infrequent that this interpretation would be fully given, this is the attitude which should lie behind whatever response the counselor makes.

The Recognition of Unexpressed Feeling. The point of view has been stressed that the counselor must be alert indeed to be responsive to the client's feeling. It should also be emphasized that only those feelings should be verbally recognized which have been expressed. Often the client has attitudes which are implied in what he says, or which the counselor through shrewd observation judges him to have. Recognition of such attitudes which have not yet appeared in the client's conversation may, if the attitudes are not too deeply repressed, hasten the progress of therapy. If, however, they are repressed attitudes, their recognition by the counselor may seem to be very much of a threat to the client, may create resentment and resistance and in some instances may break off the counseling contacts. Two instances of this type of handling, one constructive and one harmful, will make the discussion more concrete.

Reassurance--Does It Reassure? In various expositions of the principles of psychotherapy, much is made of the need of reassuring the client in order to keep his anxiety from getting out of bounds. A comment on this point may be in order. If the counselor has been successful in "staying with" the client's feelings, recognizing and clarifying those which have been expressed but avoiding the error of bringing to light those attitudes which the client is not yet ready to reveal, it is unlikely that verbal reassurance is needed or will be helpful. There is one underlying form of reassurance which the client is receiving at all times as he tells of his socially unacceptable impulses and attitudes. This is the reassurance which comes from finding his most "shocking" revelations accepted without shock by the counselor.

It should be pointed out that, in any case, the only type of reassurance which has any promise of being helpful is that which relieves the client's feeling of peculiarity or isolation. To know that he is not the only one who has suffered with such problems, nor the only one who has been torn by strongly conflicting desires, may lighten a sense of guilt or make the individual less anxious.

On the other hand, cheery reassurance that the client's problems are not serious, or that he is much more normal than he feels, or that the solution to his problems is easy, has a thoroughly bad effect on therapy. It denies the client's own feelings and makes it well-nigh impossible for him to bring his anxieties and conflict and sense of guilt fully into the conversation when he has been assured that they should not exist. No amount of assurance will eliminate the fact that they do exist.

"Persons or Science? A Philosophical Question," American Psychologist, 10:267-278, 1955.

"I launch myself into the therapeutic relationship having a hypothesis, or a faith, that my liking, my confidence, and my understanding of the other person's inner world, will lead to a significant process of becoming. I enter the relationship not as a scientist, not as a physician who can accurately diagnose and cure, but as a person, entering into a personal relationship. Insofar as I see him only as an object, the client will tend to become only an object.

I risk myself, because if, as the relationship deepens, what develops is a failure, a regression, a repudiation of me and the relationship by the client, then I sense that I will lose myself, or a part of myself. At times this riak is very real, and is very keenly experienced.

I let myself go into the immediacy of the relationship where it is my total organism which takes over and is sensitive to the relationship, not simply my consciousness. I am not consciously responding in a planful or analytic way, but simply in an unreflective way to the other individual, my reaction being based (but not consciously) on my total organismic sensitivity to this other person. I live the relationship on this basis."

THE THEORY OF SELF-CONSISTENCY IN PERSONNEL PROBLEMS

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We conceive of the mind or personality as an organization of ideas which are felt to be consistent with one another. Behavior expresses the effort to maintain the integrity and unity of the organization. The point is that all of an individual's ideas are organized into a single system, whose preservation is essential. In order to be immediately assimilated, the idea formed as the result of a new experience must be felt to be consistent with the ideas already present in the system. On the other hand, ideas whose inconsistency is recognized as the personality developes must be expelled from the system. There is thus a constant assimilation of new ideas and expulsion of old ideas throughout life.

The nucleus of the system, around which the rest of the system revolves, is the individual's idea or conception of himself. Any idea entering the system which is inconsistant with the individual's conception of himself cannot be assimilated but instead gives rise to an inconsistency which must be removed as promptly as possible.

By way of illustration, let us consider the interpretation of why a person feels insulted or has his feelings hurt. An insult is a valuation of the individual by others which does not agree with his valuation of himself. Such a contradictory valuation cannot be assimilated; and, when thrust into a person's experience, evokes an impulse of rejection.

The conflict provoked by the inconsistency may lead to several different kinds of behavior. One method of handling the problem is to strike back and try to inflict an equal injury upon the person responsible for the insult. It seems to be necessary that the injury given shall be equal to the injury received if the conflict is to be dissolved completely. Ancient codes of justice emphasize this equality -- an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. Vigorous rejection and retaliation is especially apparent in children because of their inability to unify on any other basis. The inconsistency may also be removed by an apology, again provided that the apology be interpreted as equal to the insult.

Still another method is to reinterpret the disturbing incident in such a manner that it can be assimilated. For example, a child was deeply wounded when he failed to be invited to a schoolmate's birthday party. The incident was painful because the values implied were inconsistent with his conception of himself. When he discovered that the party was a small one, however, and that several of his close friends were among the uninvited, he was able to reinterpret the situation in such a way that the threat to his values disappeared.

Finally, it is sometimes necessary to alter the opinion one holds of oneself. This is difficult, for the individual's conception of himself is the central axiom of his whole life theory. Nevertheless, a gradual change in the concept of self is imperative to normal development and happiness.

This compulsion to unify and harmonize the system of ideas by which we live provides the basis for the dynamic aspect of the theory. It is only when a person is unable to rid himself of inconsistencies that psychological problems arise. The function of the psychologist is confined to diagnosis and

demonstration. Once the subject, himself, is made to feel the inconsistency in his scheme of life, he can be depended upon to make the problem his own. He is obliged to endeavor to alter the system in the direction of greater consistency. In constructing his personal theory of life, in other words, the individual follows the same method precisely as the scientist in constructing and perfecting his theory of the world. Yet in both cases, despite the need for adaptation to new situations, the resistance to disturbance of the existing organization is readily observable.

As we have already pointed out, the various so-called emotional states cannot be treated independently, but must be regarded as different aspects of a single motive, the striving for unity. For example, love is the emotion subjectively experienced in reference to a person or object already assimilated and serving as a strong support to the idea of self. Grief is experienced when the personality must be reorganized due to the loss of one of its supports. Hatred and rage are impulses of rejection and destruction felt towards unassimilable objects. The emotion of horror appears when a situation arises suddenly which we are not prepared to assimilate, such as the sight of a ghastly accident.

Experiences which increase the sense of psychological unity and strength give rise to the emotion of joy and feelings of pleasure. Occasionally a person's own behavior may violate his conception of himself, producing feelings of remorse and guilt. In that case, the insult to himself as it were, may be eliminated either by reinterpretation or by seeking punishment sufficient to equalize the insult. Fear is felt when no adequate solution of a problem can be found; it is due to dynamic disorganization.

From our standpoint, emotion is a cancept which is necessary only when the problem of behavior is stated in terms of the apparent world. The resemblance to the concept of forces in classical physics, and to the concept of spirits or devils in primitive theories of the world, has been noted previously. A psychological theory which conceives of motivation as a phenomenon of organization has no need for the concept of emotion.

Thinking likewise has the aim of unifying the organization of ideas. Logic and emotion, therefore, are not in conflict, but work toward the same end. If most of our thinking appears to have the purpose of merely rationalizing our behavior to make it seem consistent, of defending conclusions already reached, or justifying positions already taken, this is, indeed, what would be expected under the circumstances. Once a person is able to envision the relationships of his problem, however, to appreciate the wisdom of sacrificing the ideas which interfere with unified action, he devotes himself to the task of reconstruction with an eagerness and sincerity which often is truly amazing. And why not, indeed, when his own efficiency and happiness are at stake?

Of special importance from the standpoint of education is the phenomenon of resistance. When one idea has been accepted, it opposes the acceptance of other ideas which are not consistent with it. The problem of resistance has received scant attention in educational psychology, which conceives of learning as a process of habit formation through exercise. Psychiatry, on the other hand, though it recognizes resistance, regards it as a device to protect the neurosis, and treats it as a phenomenon of abnormal psychology. Yet the obvious fact that new ideas must be harmonized with the old necess-

arily involves resistance to conceptions whose assimilation would be difficult. Hence resistance must be accepted as a normal and necessary aspect of learning. Indeed, a unified organization could not be maintained without it. Early impressions are important, not only in themselves, but because they set the conditions for rejection of other values, whatever their nature, which would tend to precipitate a conflict.

Since the experience of everyone is more or less haphazard, however, there are always present in the system a certain number of ideas accepted on insufficient evidence. These ideas, whose retention depends entirely upon the success with which they can be rationalized and made to seem consistent, give rise to resistances which are likely to be detrimental to the individual in the long run.

The clinical technique which follows from the theoretical conception of the problem must therefore aim to bring about in the subject a re-examination of these ideas which block his development. Academic difficulties and social maladjustments are both conceived of as due to resistances arising from the subject's idea of himself. Obviously, the method must rely upon inducing the subject to observe the system of contradictions in which he has become involved.

Let us take the case of an intelligent student who is deficient, let us say, in spelling. In almost every instance poor spellers have been tutored and practiced in spelling over long periods without improvement. For some reason such a student has a special handicap in learning how to spell, though not in learning the other subjects which are usually considered more difficult. This deficiency is not due to a lack of ability, but rather to an active resistance which prevents him from learning how to spell in spite of the extra instruction. The resistance arises from the fact that at some time in the past the suggestion that he is a poor speller was accepted and incorporated into his definition of himself, and is now an integral part of his total personality. His difficulty is thus explained as a special instance of the general principle that a person can only be true to himself. If he defined himself as a poor speller, the misspelling of a certain proportion of the words which he uses becomes for him a moral issue. He misspells words for the same reason that he refuses to be a thief. That is, he must endeavor to behave in a manner consistent with his idea of himself.

In these cases we find that this self-definition as a poor speller, and consequently the resistance to learning how to spell correctly, can usually be removed in from one to five interviews. The majority became average or better spellers within the space of two or three months.

A study of the spelling behavior of these students shows that each individual seems to have a definite standard of poor spelling which he unconsciously endeavors to maintain. If his spelling test is cut in two, it will be found that each half contains approximately the same number of misspelled words. If we study his letters or written theses, there is likewise a striking consistency in the number of misspelled words per page. Strange to say, the spelling of foreign languages seems to be impaired very little if at all, showing clearly that the difficulty cannot be attributed to eye movements, left-handedness, or other mechanical interferences. Evidently the conception of one's self as a poor speller usually has reference to one's native language only.

The clinical technique consists in first finding several strong values apparently unrelated to the value in question which can be used as levers, so to speak, and then demonstrating the inconsistency between these values and the one responsible for the deficiency. Almost every student considers himself independent and self-reliant, for example. On the other hand, it can readily be shown that the poor speller expects his defect to be condoned and treated sympathetically; that, in effect, he has his hand out, begging for indulgence. If the contradiction can be demonstrated from his own viewpoint, a reorganization becomes compulsory. His definition of himself as a poor speller is vigorously rejected and a determined effort made to establish the opposite definition. The result obtained is out of all proportion to the effort exerted to bring it about. Spelling assumes such interest that it is studied at every opportunity, even from the advertisements on street cars and subway trains. An elaborate analysis to convince the subject that his difficulty really is due to a fixed idea of himself, does not seem to be necessary in the remedial treatment of spelling. He should, however, be asked to recall when he first accepted the role of a poor speller, ceased to worry about it, and dismissed the question as closed.

It is significant that not only poor spellers, but stammerers and others with similar defects, freely admit as a rule that they accept themselves as they are and make no effort to change. This is an excellent defense, of course, for they feel no inconsistency once the definition has been accepted. And they often attempt to avoid the effort of maintaining a more useful definition by referring the defect to heridity or neuro-muscular maladjustment. Our experience also shows that unless a person has an unusually optimistic view of the future he would not be likely to anticipate a lenient attitude on the part of others in regard to errors in spelling. This optimism also appears in the fact that poor spellers seem almost universally to count on the services of stenographers who are good spellers, and many are able to quote the names of several people who became famous in spite of a deficiency in spelling.

Those who claim that they "do not have a mathematical mind" are likewise victims of their own resistance. Such a student may have defined himself in childhood as the exact opposite of some unassimilable companion who had been held up as a shining example of mathematical proficiency. In other cases, remarks by parents or teachers that the child was lacking in aptitude for mathematics seem to be the explanation. The suggestion was accepted and is now a part of the student's conception of himself. In one instance, a student who despised mathematics in high school, during his freshman year, acquired a sudden attachment for the subject and is now a professional statistician. The boy's older brother was proficient in mathematics, and the two had been in conflict for years.

The method has also been applied to the treatment of occupational maladjustments and marriage problems. In these cases the nature of the definition responsible for the difficulty is not so obvious. It must be deduced from the individual's history and his present attitude and behavior, considered in the light of the theory. The diagnosis made must be acceptable and convincing to the individual concerned, of course, and must be built up as a logical solution of the problem under consideration. The subject should be urged to co-operate in stating the self-definition as accurately as possible before its consistency is called in question.

So-called lazyness, lack of concentration, etc., are due to the acceptance of definitions at cross purposes with one another. Such individuals cannot act in consistency with one definition without being inconsistent with another. For example, a student may define himself as intelligent, but poor in mathematics. To maintain the first definition he should make high grades in mathematics; but, to maintain the second, he should fail. However, if he must act, as long as he is playing both roles at once, he is forced to compromise. His grades in mathematics will split the difference some where near the passing mark, and the teacher will characterize him as lazy. For his own part, he will claim that he cannot concentrate, and the claim will be perfectly true. This seems to be the explanation of the characteristic level of performance already noted in regard to spelling. As long as the definitions remain unchanged, the characteristic rate or grade of activity tends to remain constant.

The remedy is not to be found by means of tests which reveal the specific weaknesses, or in persistent drilling on the fundamentals, but only in changing the definition. Energetic concentration simply means that a person is free from conflicts and able to bring his united efforts to focus on the task in hand.

What a person is able or unable to learn, in other words, depends, to a large extent at least, upon what he has already learned, and especially upon how he has learned to define himself. Difference in native ability cannot be summarily dismissed, but at present this explanation is frequently dragged in simply to serve as an alibi, both for the school and for the individual. Character traits, so-called, are likewise attributed to heridity.

It should be remembered in this connection that a person may accept any idea if nothing has been learned to the contrary to interfere with its acceptance; while a contrary idea provides a sort of immunity. We have an instance of a very slow boy, for example, who characterized himself as "the slow one" and his brother as "the quick one." He felt so guilty when working too rapidly that he had developed a large repertory of devices to use up the necessary amount of time in order to be true to his role. Attempts to teach him rapid methods of work naturally met with complete failure so long as the original definition was retained. Very often a troublesome child has unwittingly been cast in that part by the criticism of parents or teachers. A boy who has previously defined himself as "good" would vigorously resist, of course, the suggestion that he is "bad". If his definition in this respect has not yet been strongly established, however, he may accept the role and consider the question closed. Thereafter, he endeavors to perfect himself in the part to which he has been assigned, and grows more and more unmanageable the more his behavior is condemned. Youths who are placed in reformatories usually emerge not reformed, but confirmed in their self-definition as social outcasts and potential criminals. To make sure that this definition is shared by all of its members, many gangs require a term in reform school as a prerequisite for membership.

Shyness, seclusiveness, feelings of insecurity, and inadequacy, lack of friends, and the like are symptomatic of self-valuations which are not supported in the situation in which the subject finds himself. They are not traits, for they would disappear if a more favorable situation could be found. In order to be favorable from the subject's standpoint, however, would mean a situation approximating the childhood situation in which these

values were developed and to which they then seemed to be appropriate.

The subject himself, however, arrives quite naturally at exactly the opposite diagnosis. From his own standpoint, his values seem so consistent with one another that no important changes are possible. He therefore turns for support to fantasy and puts the blame for his difficulties on the external situation. Thus, in defending the validity of his present scheme of thought and action, he renders his problem more insoluable than ever.

On the other hand, it must be remembered that numerous other values have been accepted in addition to those which cause his unhappiness. If this were not so, he would be content to withdraw even furthur from the outside world and retreat still deeper into fantasy. It is this inability to unify on any course of action, in fact, which keeps him perpetually in search of a solution and gives us the opportunity to help him toward a clearer view of his problem.

Attention must therefore be fixed on the values which offer some hope of unified action. Nor are such values difficult to find. We have already mentioned that most persons conceive of themselves as intelligent and self-reliant. Even more strongly founded, however, is the idea of oneself as a person who is useful to others, willing to hold up one's own end, and capable of making a contribution to the group to which he belongs. At any rate, we have never seen anyone who did not conceive of himself in this way, the values in question may be so blocked that the external behavior fails to reveal their influence. The test for the presence of any value, of course, is whether a person is pleased when the value is attached to him, or is disturbed when charged with its opposite.

As always, the technique consists in making the subject aware of his own inconsistency. The inhibiting definitions must be seen as useless burdens from which he must try to free himself, rather than as assets to be justified and retained. But no matter how undesirable a given definition may be from a social standpoint, it will not be rejected unless it seems inconsistent from the subject's standpoint. We do not aim at consistency with the demands of society, but only at self-consistency. Social ends must be approached indirectly. If the personal problem is successfully solved and unity of action achieved, however, the social problem seems to disappear.

Since each personality is an organized system in which every idea is related to every other, it is obvious that any attempt to force the issue and remove the resistance by attacking it simply misses the point completely. For this reason the consultant will probably be more successful if he does not try too hard. In dealing with children, it will be noticed that parents and teachers, whose own piece of mind is affected by the child's success or failure, usually cannot set aside their personal interest in the matter and are likely to become impatient. We may with advantage remind ourselves that only the individual himself can solve his problem, and he must necessarily solve it in his own way.

Preaching to the subject, telling him what he ought and aught not to do, trying to get him to accept our ideas and standards is ineffective for the reason that he has already accepted other ideas. His resistance to our suggestions is not due to obstinacy but to inability to accept them until the contrary ideas have been reconsidered and rejected.

A comparison with other theories will clarify both the similarities and differences. We accept Adler's principle of the unity of the personality, though not his theory of maladjustment as due to fear or discouragement. We agree with Freud that the subject is usually unaware of the cause of his difficulties, though we do not agree with the theory of repression. Instead of trying to remove complexes, we try to change definitions. The value of the analytic approach, in our opinion, is to demonstrate how certain definitions originated, and thus to bring about reconsideration of those which were arrived at prematurely. We extend the Gestalt principle to include concepts as well as precepts, but reject the equilibrium theory as a form of mechanism.

Both Freud and Adler, it seems to us, implicitly employ the same method which we advocate explicitly. Freud attempts to render certain values unassimilable, and in this way to bring about their vigorous rejection, by associating them with sexual connections which are not acceptable. Adler attempts to bring about a reorganization by interpreting the resistance as due to fear or cowardice. Almost no one, it is safe to say, can assimilate the idea of himself as either an Oedipus or a coward.

When the concept of the personality is developed in greater detail, it will bear, we believe, an even closer resemblance to the concept of the atom. Ideas seem to jump from one orbit to another within the personality just as electrons change their relative positions within the atom. There are other similarities also. In some of its aspects the electron must be conceptualized as a wave, in other aspects as a particle. The same is true of an idea. When we speak of an idea entering the system, the closest analogy from the material world is that of a particle or bullet passing through a surface of separation. But when we speak of a person behaving in consistency with an idea, we think in terms of a wave of activity following a definite direction. Moreover, structural and fundamental concepts have been present in psychology since the time of Wundt and Brentano, when the atom was still regarded as a sub-microscopic billiard ball. In view of the obvious differences between the descriptive data of psychology and physics, the similarity of the conceptual structures developed for interpretative purposes is truly remarkable.

May: EXISTENCE, New York, Basic Books, 1958

Summary of May's Introduction

O R I G I N S

Existentialism is a spontaneous movement reaching back to the early 19th century and confined to no one school of thought. It emphasizes kennen as against wissen and seeks the foundations upon which scientific techniques are based. Its central concern is with the raw material of life, with the re-discovery of the living person amid the compartmentalization and dehumanization of modern culture. (It reverses Descarte's dictum and insists that we are: therefore we think.) Its chief prophets May sees in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, who in many respects were predecessors of Freud. All three share one common characteristic. They did not set out to construct a philosophy or psychology but to understand one particular case, their own. It was one of Kierkegaard's central convictions that the more we are involved in a given situation the more likely we are to understand it. Truth becomes reality only as some individual produces it in action.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY

I. To Be and Not to Be. Existentialism reverses Descarte's dictum, it says I am, therefore I think, I feel, I do. Whereas the ego is a reflection of the outside world, the sense of being refers to one's whole experience, unconscious as well as conscious. While the ego is the subject in the subject-object relationship, the sense of being is on a level prior to that dichotomy. The "and" in the title of this section "To Be and Not to Be" is no mistake. It is used to express the fact that non-being is an inseparable part of being. Death is an inescapable reality to every man and the normal man must be able to accept anxiety, hostility and aggression, to tolerate them without repression.

2. Anxiety is found when the individual becomes aware that his existence is threatened, that he can lose himself and his world, that he can become "nothing." It occurs at the point where some emerging potentiality faces the individual, some possibility of fulfilling his existence which at the same time threatens his security. "If you lock up your potentialities, you are guilty against what is given you in your origin, in your "core." Such a person has guilt feelings. He is also actually guilty. The guilt is real. It does not come from cultural prohibitions or from introjection of cultural mores. It arises from the fact that I can see myself as one who can choose or fail to choose. Such guilt is "ontological." It is common to all men. It may become neurotic (pathological) if it is repressed, (concealed, not accepted).

3. Being-in-the-world. Existentialists hold that a person and his world are a unitary, structural whole. The two poles, self and world are always related. Self implies world and world self. Neither is

understandable without the other. By world we mean the structure of meaningful relationships in which a person exists and in the design of which he participates. It thus includes the past events which condition my existence and also the vast array of determining factors which operate upon me. My world is not limited to past events. It includes also all the possibilities which open up before me. Indeed these future possibilities are the most significant aspect of a human being's world. They are the potentialities with which he builds or designs his world.

4. The three Modes of World. There are three modes of world, that is, three simultaneous aspects of world which characterize the existence of each one of us:

1. Umwelt - the environmental, biological world.

2. Mitwelt - the world of one's fellow men.

3. Eigenwelt - the inner world, that of the relationships to oneself.

The terms "adaptation" and "adjustment" are entirely accurate as pertains to the "Umwelt;" not so as regards the "Mitwelt." The term relationship is the correct one. If I insist that another person adjust to me, I am not taking him as a person. The essence of relationship is that both persons are changed. The human being lives in three modes of world simultaneously. The reality of being-in-the-world is lost if one of these modes is emphasized to the exclusion of the other.

5. Of Time and History: The most crucial fact about existence is that it emerges, that is - it is always in the process of becoming. The existential therapists propose a psychology of being rather than is or "has been," or fixed inorganic categories. Though the concepts were worked out several decades ago, it is highly significant that recent experimental work in psychology, such as that of Mowrer and Liddell, illustrates and bears out their conclusions. At the end of one of his most important papers, Mowrer holds that time is the most distinctive dimension of human personality. "Time-binding" - that is the capacity of bringing the past into the present as part of the total causal nexus in which living organisms act and react - is "the essence of mind and personality alike." Liddell has shown that his sheep can anticipate punishment for about fifteen minutes and his dogs for about half an hour. But a human being can bring the past of thousands of years into his present as data to guide his present action. And he can likewise project himself into the future not only for a quarter of an hour but for weeks and years and decades. The capacity to transcend the immediate boundaries of time, to learn from the past of a thousand years ago and to mold the long-time future is the unique characteristic of human existence. Existentialists do not neglect the past, but they hold that it can be understood only in the light of the future. The past is the domain of the Umwelt, of the contingent, historical, deterministic forces operating upon us. But since we do not live exclusively in the

Umwelt, we are never merely the victims of automatic pressures from the past. The deterministic events of the past take their significance from the present and the future. In the psychoanalytic exploration of any individual's past, we may note two curious facts. First is the phenomenon that events of the past which he carries with him have very little if any necessary connection with the events which actually happened to him as a child. One single thing that occurred to him at a given age is remembered and thousands of things are forgotten. Memory is a creative process. We remember what has significance for our style of life. What a man seeks to become determines what he remembers of his has been. In this sense the future determines the past. The second fact is this: whether or not the patient can even recall the significant events of the past depends upon his decision with regard to the future. Some hope, some commitment to work toward changing something in the immediate future is necessary before any uncovering of the past will have reality. Existential analysts take history very seriously, but they protest against any tendency to evade the immediate, anxiety-creating issues in the present by taking refuge behind the determinism of the past.

6. Psychotherapeutic Implications: Existentialism is characterized by a lack of specifically developed practical methods. This is explained by the fact that its analysts believe that one of the chief obstacles to the understanding of human beings in our Western culture is the overemphasis on technique. Our Western tendency has been to believe that understanding follows technique. Existentialists believe the exact opposite. They hold that technique follows understanding and that the central task of the therapist is to understand the patient as a being and as a being-in-his-world. All technical problems are subordinate to this understanding. This does not mean any derogation of technique. It is merely put in its place. Existentialist procedures:

1. Techniques vary from analyst to analyst and a single analyst will use different techniques with different patients.

2. The existential analyst will seek to see the patient's situation in all its complexity, avoiding the utilization of ready-made formulas.

3. He believes in the principle of presence. He looks upon the relationship between himself and his patient as no mere role-playing but a genuine relationship. The transference thus becomes an event occuring in a real relationship between two people. It is not limited by what happened in the patient's relationship with his or her father.

4. The goal of therapy is to develope the sense of being. The distinctive feature of the neurotic is that his existence has become darkened, blurred, he is overconcerned about the Umwelt. The therapist must help him to find his own Eigenwelt without permitting the patient's Eigenwelt to be overshadowed by his own.

5. The principle of commitment. Truth exists only as the individual himself produces it in action.

Learning Theory and Personality Dynamics

O. H. Mowrer, pp. 535 - 539

A person "has a neurosis," or "is neurotic"to the extent that he engages in behavior which serves to reduce anxiety directly (symptomatically) but does not alter the realities which produce the anxiety. Freud frequently referred to anxiety as a kind of "signal," a premonition of impending danger, that something is not going well in the life of the affected individual. The neurotic is thus a person who, knowingly or unknowingly, attempts to neutralize this indicator without finding out what it means or taking realistic steps to eliminate the objective danger which it represents. He is like a person who stops up his ears to keep from hearing an air-raid siren or who mans an antiaircraft gun and aims at the siren rather than at the approaching enemy.

This reformulation brings scientific anxiety theory into fundamental agreement with the implicit assumptions of the great religions of the world concerning anxiety, namely, that it is a product, not of too little self-indulgence and satisfaction but of too much; a product, not of over-restraint and inhibition, but of irresponsibility, guilt and immaturity.

Nothing could be truer in the light of my own clinical, as well as personal, experience than the proposition that psychotherapy must involve acceptance of the essential friendliness and helpfulness of anxiety, which under such management, will eventually again become ordinary guilt and moral fear, to which realistic adjustments and new learning can occur.

SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN THE STUDY OF HUMAN NATURE

Basic Assumption: The key to any true understanding of human nature is to be found in the realm of values, motives and meanings; and the problems thus involved are just as truly a subject for scientific inquiry as chemistry or physics.

What We Mean by 'Science.'

The essence of the scientific enterprise which has been responsible for such splendid achivements in the control of the material world is the co-operative attempt to organize human experience by the classification of facts, by the recognition of their sequence and relative significance and by the continuous submission of its generalizations to rigid tests.

According to John Dewey the steps in reflective thinking are as follows:

1. The occurrence of something felt as a difficulty or perplexity.

2. Observation designed to make clear precisely what the difficulty is.

3. The coming to mind of suggested solutions to the difficulty.

4. Reasoning out by the aid of memory and imagination what consequences are involved in the suggestions thus entertained and evaluating the suggestions by their aid.

5. Observation and experimentation designed to test by empirical fact the suggested solutions in the light of their consequences.

Common sense, he says, stops short at 3, mathematical reasoning, scientific insight and untested scientific explanation and philosophy fall in 4, while careful attention to step 5 is the distinguishing characteristic of modern science.

Scientific Principles.

1. Empiricism - The raw material of experience in all its complexity is taken as the starting point. Scientific reasoning proceeds from the concrete to the abstract, from the immediate to the remote, from the particular to the general. The scientist may be guided by generalizations and 'hunches,' but actual experience gives him his primary source and his final authority.

2. Objectivity - the personal equation is so far as possible eliminated in that facts and conditions are so described that others may repeat the experiment or observe for themselves and draw their own conclusions. Reliance is placed upon such tests rather than upon persuasion or argumentation.

3. Continuity - New phenomena are explained in terms of previous observation and generalization, the unknown in terms of the known. No explanations are accepted except in terms of tested and ordered experience.

4. Particularity - the field of inquiry must be limited and the problem clear-

ly defined. It is necessary for the time being to devote oneself to some small portion of the universe and to neglect the rest.

5. Universality - The particular can be understood only in the light of the general. The aim of all scientific work is to discover relationships which are universally valid.

6. Provisionality - the true scientist is careful to recognize that all his findings are tentative and subject to revision.

7. Economy - 'Neither more nor more onerous causes must be assumed than are necessary to account for the phenomena.' Corollaries:

a) Between two theories, each of which accounts for a given set of facts, that one is to be accepted which brings them into unity with the wider field of experience.

b) As between two explanations, a multiple simple hypothesis is more apt to be true than a single recondite explanation.

c) The scale of accuracy in any inquiry must be exactly suited to the end in view, to the yardstick available and to the material under consideration. It may be as much an error to use too fine a scale as one that is too coarse.

8. Disinterestedness - The desire to find the truth must be supreme. Rigid honesty and accuracy and the ability to recognize and discount personal bias must characterise the good scientific worker.

Scientific Procedures:

The methods upon which science relies to test its suggested explanations (hypotheses) fall into three groups:

1. Controlled experimentation designed to measure the influence of a given variable by excluding all external stimuli in order to determine the exact functional relationship.

2. Naturalistic observation - exact description together with explanation in terms of relationships.

3. Statistical studies designed for the evaluation of variables where controlled experimentation is not possible.

Scientific Method in the Social Sciences.

1. The scientific principles listed above apply in toto.

2. The method of controlled experimentation is ruled out

a) by the complexity of the subject matter and the difficulty or impossibility of isolating the variables.

b) by the difficulty of tampering with living men or institutions, as controlled experiementation requires.

3. Statistical methods have important uses and also serious limitations. They are properly used only to verify hypotheses, or 'hunches' gained thru intensive study of particular cases or situations. A thoro knowledge of and feeling for the data should precede the application of even the simplest statistical methods. Nothing is gained by applying statistics to unreliable data.

4. Judgments of value are indispensible in all scientific operations. No ends are ever assumed as fixed. The scientist asks rather, If such and such a course is followed under such and such conditions, what is likely to happen? His reasoning therefore involves evaluation. The great difference between the physical and social sciences lies in the kind of values which are involved. In the case of the physical sciences they are are of limited range. In the case of the social sciences those values which we call 'ethical,' or 'moral', come definitely into the picture. Without taking them into account it is impossible to understand man either individually or colledtively.

5. The participant observer, such as the social worker or the minister of religion, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to observe the operation of motives and judgments of value

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SCHOLASTIC ILLUSIONS

from "Wars of Families of Minds"

by William Lowe Bryan

No theory completely embraces all the conditions determining any action. Some conditions are omitted unintentionally because of ignorance. Some conditions are excluded intentionally, on the one hand as disturbances which interfere with the accuracy of experimental results, on the other hand as complications which interfere with the possibility of mathematical or logical treatment. The intentional exclusion of disturbing or complicating conditions is not a procedure which requires defense. Its defense is found in the whole history of learning, and after that in the history of the practical applications of learning. To make any progress, we must focus for certain things and be temporarily blind to environing things.

It may be, however, that in arriving at a theoretical result, either because of my ignorance, or because of the very efforts to be exact or to be logical, I shall leave out of account conditions which are not in fact insignificant, which will not be absent when my bit of theory is tried, which will be there to upset all my previsions and to bring me to confusion. My airship will not fly. In such a case, the best fortune is immediate and decisive practical trial. Decisive failure destroys our illusions, if we have them, and sets us looking for conditions which have been overlooked. Unhappily, however, decisive trial of theoretical results is often indefinitely postponed. In this case, the scholar must be of extraordinary constitution if he escape the historic disease of his kind, namely, blindness to realities which his method has not embraced.

I wish to consider two types of this illusion of the scholar. One of them, which may be called the illusion of consistency, is generally recognized. The other, not so generally recognized, I shall call the illusion of precision. I wish to show how in both cases these illusions spring directly out of the painstaking employment of methods which must be employed to discover the truth, and how, when they have risen, they render the scholar blind to certain aspects of truth which are not insignificant either in theory or in practice.

The Illusion of Consistency

I am, let us suppose, a scholar who is impressed above all things with the necessary self-consistency of the truth. Accordingly, I have spent years in developing a system of greater or less extent, which, to my mind, has the quality of complete self-consistency. I have made its consistency explicit, by stating everything in exact logical or perhaps mathematical form. Every term, every proposition or equation, every syllogism or problem is perfectly defined and the whole stands, to my mind, flawless and self-evidential. Everything in it hangs together. Everything in it can be shown to be as certain as the most certain thing in it and that thing no sane man can doubt. Here is the truth, final and clear, and here, within the field concerned, is the law for action.

Whether such a system be finally credited with great value or with small, it is sure to have certain characteristics which limit its value. Its salient merit of exact logical or mathematical consistency was brought at a price. That price was the exclusion of conditions too complicated to be dealt with by the logical or mathematical methods employed. That price was paid by Spinoza in one field and by Newton in another. The procedure requires no defense. It is necessary. There is no definition without negation.

However, a lifetime spent in developing and contemplating such a system makes it easy to forget and ignore altogether what the method has excluded. Every clear idea, as we know experimentally, makes it harder to do justice to impressions just unlike those which belong with that idea. A system of such ideas is self-protecting somewhat after the analogy of a living organism. Every item in the system is felt to be proof of and proved by all the others. Everything in the system comes to the point of attack, makes me abnormally sensitive for faint experiences of the right sort, and abnormally oblivious to salient facts of the wrong sort. In a word, there is perhaps no hypnotic agent more powerful to sharpen the sight or to dull it than a system of ideas which one has made for himself, and whose truth seems guaranteed at every turn by complete internal consistency.

Very likely this hypnotic illusion of consistency is strongest when the system concerned is believed to be all-embracing--a philosophy of God, the world, man, what not; and the illusion is the less likely to be broken because decisive trial is so difficult if not quite impossible. However, it is not simply the philosophers who, along with their systems of beliefs, develop the illusion of consistency. No doubt every man does so in a degree and men of science along with the rest. The history of science is full of examples. It is seldom that a scientist is able to do justice to facts which controvert his most important theories. For this reason there is sober truth in the cynical remark that the progress of science requires the death of scientists.

The illusion of consistency, as I have said, is very well known, for it springs out of conditions which have been legitimately and conspicuously present throughout the history of learning. And so for centuries this illusion has been notorious as a limitation of the scholar's knowledge and practical judgment.

I turn to an analogous illusion which is less generally recognized.

The Illusion of Precision

To take a typical case, let us suppose that I am not a logician but an experimental scientist. I cultivate a distrust for philosophy. I am wary of all elaborate argumentation. Logic is a trap. I have studied facts pure and simple. I have lived in the laboratory. I do nothing except with instruments of precision. I have learned how to shut out disturbing conditions with the last degree of refinement. My results are strictly quantitative. Everything has been verified over and over and is verifiable by whom you please ad libitum. The outcome is not poetry, not a guess, not a speculation. It is science and, within its field, it is the law for action.

It would be idle in this presence to insist upon the value of such procedures and such outcomes. The chief merit of our time lies doubtless in the fact that we have succeeded better along these lines than men ever did before. And yet directly out of the methods which science must employ there rises over and over again an illusion which stands between the scholar and the truth and which may make him a failure in practice.

Those disturbing conditions which were with infinite pains shut out may be practically insignificant. Or the scientist may take adequate account of them in a separate study. But sometimes they are not insignificant and sometimes, after having carefully shut them out of his laboratory, the scientist forgets them altogether and does not dream that they are waiting outside his laboratory door ready to take revenge when his formulae come to trial. Unhappily the necessary practical tests are often long delayed or indecisive. This is true in every field of science and there is no field of science where such delay does not permit the illusion of precision to survive.

But when the phenomena concerned are very complicated, when, for example, we confront the complexities of human nature in the individual and in society, when we attack by exact scientific method the problems of psychology, ethics, political economy, or any science dealing with human life, and thereupon undertake to tell men what to do, we have then the best possible conditions for the development of the illusion of precision.

For on the one hand it is possible in all these fields to be precise as one will. There are methods from the older sciences to serve as analogical models. There are, if you like, instruments of the highest precision. One has only to be scrupulous, persistent, intolerant of errors. One will end by securing results which, whatever else may be true of them, are at any rate exact. All this tends to establish in the man who does it a faith which cannot be shaken. There is my machine. There is my mathomatical method. There are my statistics. There is my sure concrete fact which no one can deny, which all the world may verify. There is a bit of <u>science</u> which will stand till the judgment day and take its place along with all the rest. How can there be any illusion in this? Is not this precisely the death of illusions? Is not this incoming of exact science the beginning of the end of every erroneous conception of human life?

So be it. There rises here nevertheless an illusion from which few of us altogether escape. If I would remember just what my scientific work has actually made known to me, namely, a fragment, which exists never in isolation but always in flux with innumerable other things which have not been scientifically determined, that would guard me against serious illusion--that would keep me, as a scientist, from believing or from advising or from prophesying except within the safe and narrow limits of my scientific knowledge.

But in fact it is fatally easy to forget how little I know, to forget the whole tangle of things which I have left out through ignorance or shut out in the interest of accuracy, to believe in a word that the whole complex affair from which I have painfully abstracted and defined a fragment goes on by rules laid down in my monograph.

The life of the scholar tends to unfit him to succeed practically in any field, tends to make his advice inadequate in every field, unless his work as scholar is tested, corrected, and brought into due perspective with things outside his specialty by thorough-going practical experience. A life-time spent in developing a system whose criterion of validity is its internal logical or mathematical consistency may bring about a signal advance toward a finally valid view of all truth. In like manner a lifetime spent in intellignet scientific research makes its contribution to theoretical and in the long run to practical knowledge. But never, I believe, does either of these procedures or both of them combined determine all the conditions of any action. Always some of these conditions are shut out through ignorance or for the sake of consistency or for the sake of accuracy. From these excluded conditions the eye of the scholar is holden so that he cannot see them. And when from the height of his learning he tells the foolish multitude what to do, it is not simply the multitude which replies that he also is foolish. It is over and over again the greater reality which, speaking through the event, brings him to confusion.

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUES

Heinz Hartmann in Imago - 1928

Abstract by A. T. Boisen

An attempt to outline the implications of psychoanalytic experience for the understanding of spiritual laws and moral judgments is a problem hitherto neglected. Altho the subject matter of psychoanalysis has always to do with value judgments and every step of the analytic procedure raises moral problems it has been customary to take account of nothing beyond the health of the individual.

From the standpoint of method psychoanalysis is an empirical science. It is moreover essentially genetic in its procedure. Because it thus deals at first hand with the moral problems of living men and women and with their origins it might be inferred that it should be possible for it to determine new standards and goals for ethics and for pedagogy. Its claims must however be more modest.

Whenever we proceed in the capacity of teachers or of therapists we are guided by certain value judgments. We are seeking a certain value or good toward which our procedure is a means. Thus in psychoanalysis when we assume that the cure of an individual is dependent upon certain conditions we attempt to bring about those conditions. When psychoanalysis reveals to us the terrific power of the sex urge and its relationship to mental health, we may say that sex morality should no longer tolerate the conventional restrictions. We have thus our ethical position determined by our analytic findings. But in doing so we start with certain presuppositions. We assume that mental health is an unconditionally desirable end. Similarly we may say that the infantile urge to see and know is genetically related to scientific curiosity and also to the compulsion neurosis and we may assume that as teachers we have the option of influencing the child in the direction of satisfying, repressing or sublimating the original urge. Here again we are presupposing a hierarchy of values which is subjectively determined. So also with the problems of infantile masturbation or of monogamy as against polygamy. Whether we increase or diminish the cleavage between the ego and the conscience is in all cases determined by a subjective judgment quite independently of analytic experience. So also the question as to whether an ethical attainment which can only be secured at the cost of a neurosis is or is not too dearly bought at such a price. Only where there is agreement in regard to the ends to be attained is it possible to use psychoanalysis to determine the technical means of reaching the desired ends.

It follows therefore that the determination of ends cannot result from psychoanalytic procedure and that in general a hierarchy of values can never be built on the basis of a mere fact series. Nevertheless it must not be forgotten that the subject matter of psychoanalysis is the loving, hating, fearing, hoping human being who is himself the center of all value judgments. It is therefore impossible in analytic procedure to separate facts and value judgments. It is indeed true such a distinction is of the utmost importance and that to neglect it is a sure source of error in our findings. No one is in better position than the analyst to know how often

open or disguised value judgments affect adversly our ability to deal with reality. While therefore values cannot be empirically determined they must be recognized and dealt with as empirically subjective. All attempt tc determine a scale of values must then be characterized by a recognition of their subjective nature. For example, the motives which led to a given action are facts upon which the valuation of a psychical situation will depend and psychical situation will depend and psychoanalysis will serve to reveal these motives.

Among the common sources of error in the determination of values where psychoanalysis is concerned are the following:

1) The genetic error: viz., the assumption that the value of some cultural attainment is lessened if it can be traced to origins generally regarded as base; or conversely, because out of certain primitive sources (e.g. sadistic tendencies) valuable results are secured to assume that the valuation of these sources must be revised. No given bit of human behavior can be evaluated by a consideration of its genetic determinants.

2) The topical error: viz., to draw analogies between conscious and unconscious processes and to deduce therefrom conclusions in regard to the value or lack of value of the total personality. It is thus unjust to identify repression and hypocrisy as Nietsche has done when he talks of the hypocrisy of the good man.

3) The therapeutic error; viz., the assumption that health is the supreme desideratum. We must recognize that for some individuals this may not be true. The therapist must recognize that his professional scale of values may not be generally applicable.

In the field of philosophy (Weltanschauung) the great contribution of psychoanalysis must be sought in the attempt to consider a system of ideas in the light of the philosopher's personal experience and to trace the relationship between spiritual phenomena and life patterns or psychological types. In any such study its chief interest must be that shown in Dr. Helene Deutsch's recent study of George Sand, in which the individual is treated with the emphasis upon the general rather than upon that which is merely individual and distinctive.

In the field of ethics psychoanalysis will not be able to determine what is good and bad. It will however enable us to determine what is regarded as good and bad and why it is so regarded. It can furthermore help us to determine the psychical processes which hinder and those which further the desired behavior or end.

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